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Abstract
This work is an empirical analysis of collusion by using a private consumer level
data set in a setting where no a priori knowledge of collusion exists. This study
benefits from spatial variation in the data. For identification, the relation between
price and local market power under different assumptions of conduct is central.
Accordingly, first, using a simple theoretical background I provide some theoretical
intuition for the measure of local market power used in this work. Second, while
controlling for demand and cost shifters and using OLS and GMM, I estimate
pricing equations to explore if market patterns are more consistent with collusion or
competition. Results suggest that consistent with a regime switch from collusion to
competition, stable relations in the market are disrupted after month seven. Third, I
estimate the hypothetical overcharge associated with this finding. To this aim, first,
I employ the techniques frequently used in collusion retrospectives; second, I propose
importing empirical strategies from merger retrospectives. Adopting the techniques
that are used widely in merger retrospectives to collusion involves either using i) basic
difference-in-difference framework where locations characterised by monopolistic
pricing even in competition are set as the control group for the counterfactual of
regime switch; or, ii) difference-in-difference framework with treatment intensity,
where the regime switch is treated as a treatment, which, at each location, produces
heterogeneous effects that is inversely proportional to the level of local market
power the provider enjoys at that location. I find that overcharge estimates using
alternative methodologies range in 7.48−13.98%. Furthermore, results suggest that
if the spatial dynamics are ignored, estimation leads to undercompensation in regions
where the market powers of dominant competitor and potential competitor converge;
overcompensation in regions where the market powers diverge. Finally, to address
the inference problems associated with spatial dependency across observations
and difference-in-difference methodology, I apply various remedies proposed in the
literature. The findings are robust to alternative methods of inference.
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Before 1990’s, competition policy was an area primarily driven by law. This trend
changed with the new millennia, and policy gradually became more economics
imbued. Neven (2006) provides a case in point; between 1995 - 2004 the annual
growth of firms providing competition economics consulting was around 25-30%
(pp. 748-749). Another case in point is from Alexander Italianer, former Director
General of DG Competition of European Commission; when speaking in a conference
in 2010, he told the audience: “This is where we are at today. Competition cases
are an intricate combination of legal arguments backed by solid economic analysis.
The interplay between law and economics has never been greater. And the Courts
acknowledge this and welcome this interplay. I see this trend going forward and
developing across competition law instruments∗”.
Within the domain of competition economics I am primarily interested in empirical
analysis of collusion. When it comes to collusion, conventional wisdom is that the
role of the empirical economist is at the post ruling period; the assessment of the
impact of an already proven collusion. There is no role for the economist in the
process of evidence gathering, or triggering an investigation; detection is reserved
for leniency, the promise of immunity from penalties in the case of self-reporting. Not
surprisingly, many economists have issues with this demarcation; they are worried
that leniency might not be enough in desisting and deterring cartels with highest
profitability. Consequently, they propose complementing leniency with proactive
detection, detecting cartels using economic analysis.
This work is an empirical analysis of collusion; in particular its detection and
estimating the overcharge associated with it, in a setting where no a priori knowledge
of collusion exists by using a consumer level data set. However, I also extend to rich
literature of mergers, in particular to studies that estimate the impact of a merger
ex post, using postmerger data. In this literature, typically consumer level data is
used and refined identification strategies are employed; therefore, they offer some
inspiration for estimating overcharge.
This study benefits from spatial variation in the data. For identification, the relation
between price and local market power under different assumptions of conduct is
central. Accordingly, in the first chapter, using a simple theoretical background I
∗Charles River Associates 2010 Conference, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
speeches/text/sp2010_09_en.pdf
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provide some theoretical intuition for the measure of local market power used in this
work.
The second chapter introduces the main data set, and other sources of data; informs
about processing and refinement of the data; presents the variables employed
in empirical analysis. Moreover, it introduces simple markers designed to flag
suspicious patterns in the market. Application of some of these markers suggest
that consistent with a regime switch from collusion to competition, stable relations
in the market are disrupted after month seven.
In third chapter, I take on the suspicious patterns identified around month seven, and
investigate further, while I control for demand and cost shifters; I explore if observed
patterns are more consistent with collusion or competition. For this purpose, one
particularly important work in the literature is Bresnahan (1987) who suggests that
if there is price competition, for the products that have a close substitute, the price
would converge to marginal cost; while in collusion, price and cost would diverge.
The first major contribution of this dissertation to the literature is taking the
premise in Bresnahan (1987) – centring on the relationship between price and local
market power in identifying regime switch – that is defined on an heterogeneous
product / product characteristics space setting to an homogeneous product /
geographic space setting. In this study, local market power is taken to vary at each
location according to cost difference between potential competitor and dominant
competitor at that location. Consequently, estimation centres on explaining pricing
behaviour, and particularly its relation with indicator of local market power. Using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and
via interacting a two level factorial variable, the dummy for suspicious first seven
months, with market power indicators, two different pricing equations are estimated;
one for first seven months, and the other for after month seven. Findings indicate
that i) at locations where market power of provider and the closest rival converge,
there is a large price difference between two periods; ii) at locations where the
provider has large market power, price in both periods converge; iii) before month
seven, local market power indicator is positively but only linearly related to price; iv)
after month seven, local market power indicator is both linearly and quadratically
related to price; providers suffer large price cuts to serve buyers that are gradually
closer to the closest rival. These findings are interpreted as further evidence for a
regime switch from collusion to competition. The results also suggest that level of
market power each provider has on a buyer is very important in the assessment of
the impact of collusion on price, which is explored further in estimating overcharge.
Fourth chapter presents the literature on ex post evaluation of competition policy
actions in order to identify empirical strategies that might be used in estimating
the overcharge associated with the hypothetical collusion. First, I explore the
literature associated with ex post analysis of collusion. Some popular reduced form
strategies involve before and after, dummy variable approach, forecasting, yardstick
and difference-in-difference. In search of additional empirical strategies, next I
turn to merger retrospectives; I observe that the literature using a reduced form
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approach almost always use difference-in-difference and frequently use consumer
level data. A comparison of collusion retrospectives and merger retrospectives that
use difference-in-difference suggest that two lines of literature are unexpectedly
disconnected; compared to merger retrospectives, collusion retrospectives are in
earlier stages of development; merger retrospectives which use spatial variation
in identification, provide great insight to collusion retrospectives. Inspired from
methodologies used in merger retrospectives, I propose two alternative identification
strategies to identify the impact of a regime switch from collusion to competition:
i) basic difference-in-difference which involves using home markets – locations
characterised by monopolistic pricing even in competition, hence are unaffected by
the regime switch – as the control group for the counterfactual of regime switch; and
capturing the impact of the treatment, as a deviation of price in home markets from
price in overlapping markets ; ii) difference-in-difference with treatment intensity,
which involves interpreting the regime switch as a treatment, which, at each location,
produces heterogeneous effects that is inversely proportional to the level of local
market power the provider enjoys at that location.
Chapter 5 brings these methodologies to data. Empirical objective in this chapter is
to estimate the hypothetical overcharge. To this aim, first, I employ the techniques
frequently used in collusion retrospectives: before and after, indicator variable
approach, forecasting. Overcharge estimates using these three methodologies are
respectively 9.26 %, 11.14–13.98 %, 8.05–11.46%. Second, I use empirical strategies
imported from merger retrospectives. Basic difference-in-difference specifications
suggest that the variation in overcharge is strongly related to difference-in-difference
coefficient which captures the impact of the treatment. It is shown that the impact of
the regime switch is conservatively estimated in the interval of 7.48−11.25%. I also
show that if the provider’s market power at each location, as measured by relative
proximity and number of rivals, is taken as an indicator of degree of exposure to the
“treatment”, market power variations might lead variations in the price predicted
for competition counterfactual, consequently variation in overcharge estimate as
high as 11.89 %. This constitutes second major contribution of this dissertation
to the literature. To my knowledge, this is the first collusion retrospective that
uses spatial variation in determining control groups, and that takes on regime
change within a treatment intensity framework. Findings indicate that if the spatial
dynamics are ignored, and single overcharge estimation is made, estimation leads to;
undercompensation in regions where the market powers of dominant competitor and
potential competitor converge; and overcompensation in regions where the market
powers diverge.
Finally, to address the inference problems associated with spatial dependency across
observations and difference-in-difference methodology, I apply various remedies
proposed in the literature. These include i) imposing an error structure using Conley
standard errors, ii) changing the level of variation in the data, iii) using effective
number of clusters rather than actual number of clusters in defining critical values,








In this work, the relation between price and local market power under different
assumptions of conduct is central. Variation in local market power is used both
in identifying the regime switch; and estimating overcharge. The objective of this
chapter is to provide some theoretical intuition for the measure of local market power
used in this work, and to set a theoretical background. Note that this is different
than developing a fully-fledged theoretical model.
The nature of the industry and of the data (detailed information on which is provided
in the next chapter) suggest that I should take on a spatial setting. I centre on
the relationship between price at which a provider meets demand at a particular
location and market power that provider can exercise at that particular location.
This, in turn relates to both the proximity of alternative providers that could
serve that location, and the nature of competition in the market at that location
specifically whether the market is monopolised, cartelised or competitive. Implicit
in this spatial setting is the idea of price discrimination - so a given provider will
potentially charge different price to consumers at different locations. In this setting,
I highlight an important characteristic of the market. Under collusion, collusive
agreement ensures that each provider enjoys undisturbed market power at each
location. However, under competition at the locations where cost difference across
providers disappears, price under competition is forced towards cost. Consequently,
regime switch would have a big impact on price. If cost difference across providers is
high even in competition, price in both regimes will be similar; consequently, regime
switch would have a small impact on price. It follows that the impact of regime
switch on price is inversely proportional to the local market power of the provider
under competition. Building on this, I propose approximating local market power
variations via an indicator of local cost differences. For location l, I suggest using
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∆lj = dkl − djl, a measure of relative proximity; the distance between the closest
rival k and location l, dkl, net off the distance between provider j and location l, djl.
Background Literature: The spatial competition first modelled in Hotelling
(1929)1 is a linear one dimensional market with two sellers, each producing one
homogeneous product. There is no price discrimination, and the major prediction
was that sellers will tend to cluster at the centre, being only marginally different2.
Hoover (1937) is the first one to combine price discrimination and spatial setting
of Hotelling (1929). Hoover (1937) offers three conditions for price discrimination.
First is the absence of any returns for arbitrage3. Second is the ability to observe
the location of the buyers4. Third is the optimal scale to be large, resulting in
concentration of production in certain locations5. If this is not the case, production
will be dispersed and geographical advantages will erode. “...material producing
industries with standardized commodities (p.189)” satisfy these criteria. Some
example industries are iron, steel, oil, cement, furniture, lumber, ready mixed
concrete, plywood, fertilizer and sugar6. Hoover (1937) points that in these markets,
competition has two primary dimensions, price and distance.
Following Hobbs (1986), in this setting, under a delivered pricing scheme,
pjl = min
(
pmjl , tkdkl + Ck
)
(1.1)
where tk is the unit transportation cost, and Ck is the production cost of the closest
rival provider k; dkl is the distance of provider k to location l; pjl and p
m
jl are
actual price and monopoly price provider j charges at location l. This is a formal
representation of the well-known characteristics of spatial price discrimination.
Market is characterized by a Bertrand competition at each location. The price
charged to each customer c by firm j at each point is the minimum of monopoly
price and minimum price the least cost firm k can charge. Consequently, competitive
1Some models follow Salop (1979) framework of circular city.
2d’Aspremont et al. (1979) revisit this theorem and show that this result does not hold under
quadratic formulation of distance.
3Arbitrage is only possible under “perfect spatial price discrimination” (see, Braid (2008)), in
which consumers within a region are further discriminated according to their types. Consequently,
favoured buyers might have resale opportunities.
4See also MacLeod et al. (1988). Hamilton and Thisse (1992) characterize price discrimination
as “primarily an informational problem (p. 176)”. They suggest that if demand is inelastic and
consumer locations are unobservable firms would not prefer to discriminate. On the other hand,
if firms have full information on customer locations, they would price discriminate at equilibrium
(Thisse and Vives, 1988, p.124-25).
5Also see, Capozza and Van Order (1978). Note that large scale might have other implications
for pricing. Firms might try to avoid underutilization. In such a case, downturns in the market
would be associated with fierce competition and price wars, e.g. McBride (1983). This leads some
empirical studies, e.g. Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001), to model cost structure as dependent
on capacity utilization.
6See, Hoover (1937); Lederer and Hurter (1986); Vogel (2011)
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pressure from rivals is stronger in the border regions. Since these regions are more
distant to the provider and closer to rivals, they are expected to be characterised by
lower price.
Later studies expanded into game theory setting. Typically, pricing is taken in
a multistage process, and as conditional on earlier stages. An example of this is
Vogel (2011) that divides the market process into four consecutive stages: entry,
location, pricing and consumption. The characteristics of the equilibrium are refined
by backward induction. Even when pricing is contingent on entry and location,
optimal pricing still involves a Bertrand competition at each location. Hurter
and Lederer (1985); Lederer and Hurter (1986), improves Hoover (1937) setting
by allowing complete information. At the first stage, firms chose locations. Second
stage is the revelation stage. Third is pricing and fourth is payoff. They suggest
that optimal pricing would be determined by the cost structure of the high cost
firm, product being served by the low cost firm. MacLeod et al. (1988) expands
by allowing multiple plant ownership. Firms first decide on whether to enter into
the market. If they do, they decide on the number of plants and where to operate
them. After choosing the locations, they set a price schedule. Equilibrium price is
characterised as a Bertrand outcome at each location; marginally below the cost of
the second low cost firm7. Hamilton and Thisse (1992) modify the setting; instead
of single price, a contract is offered to consumers. The intuition behind the pricing
behaviour remains the same.
Recall that this study centres on the relation of price with local market power of
the provider, which is determined by local relative costs of provider and the least
cost rival. Past theoretical evidence suggests that constructing the framework as
multistage might not contribute to the insight regarding this particular relation.
Moreover, the dataset covers only 18 months, a relatively short period of time to
analyse entry/exit decisions. Consequently, in setting the theoretical background,
I employ a static framework; in which providers make pricing decisions given their
exogenously determined presence in the markets, capacities, own location choices,
locations of rivals and buyers.
The theoretical background is to be set in a number of stages. To fix ideas I start
with a very simple text-book model8. Second, I discuss some generalizations within
the basic framework. Third, I consider a very general setting.
1.2 The Simplest Model
Consider the case where there are two identical firms located at either end of a line
of length L = 1. Both firms produce a homogeneous product, and have identical
7Hamilton et al. (1989) also arrive at similar conclusions.
8After all, “the linear spatial model is a first step at generalizing economic models to deal with
markets that exist in more dimension: three if one interprets ‘space’ in a literal sense. (Martin,
2010, 109)”
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constant unit cost of production c ≥ 0. There are no capacity constraints.
At each point on the line there is a demand for this product represented by the
demand function Q(p) where Q ≥ 0 is the quantity bought and p ≥ 0 is the price
at which the commodity is sold. Given the nature of the product that underpins
the empirical analysis, assume that this the commodity is a necessity; so, demand
is strictly positive for all p ≥ 0 and, in addition, has the standard property of being
strictly decreasing in price. In addition, in order to have well-defined monopoly
equilibria it is assumed that there is a price range for which demand is elastic9. Let
pm (χ) > χ be the price that would be set by a monopolist that is serving demand
Q(p) with constant unit cost, χ > 0. From standard theory pm(χ) is a strictly
increasing function of χ. Also let pim(χ) = (pm (χ)− χ)Q(pm (χ)) be the profit
earned by a monopolist that is serving demand Q(p). By the envelope theorem
monopoly profit is a strictly decreasing function of χ.
The market operates under delivered pricing, so firms deliver the product to
consumers and can charge different price to different consumers depending on their
location. Consumers have no market power. For simplicity, assume that both firms
have the same constant transport cost per unit distance, t > 0. Consequently the
effective unit cost to firms 1 and 2 of meeting demand originating at a distance
0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1, from firm 1, f1, and consequently a distance d2 = 1 − d1 from firm 2,
f2 - is
χj = c+ tdj, j = 1, 2 (1.2)
Figure 1.1 illustrates. The dashed lines cjχj show how units cost vary for both
providers as d1 increases from 0 to 1. The solid lines pmj p
m
j show the price that each
form would charge at each location were it a monopolist at that location, and how
these vary as d1 increases from 0 to 1. For simplicity these are shown as straight
lines parallel to the cost lines.
Consider demand that arises at a distance d1, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1 from firm 1, with the
costs of two firms in serving this location given by Equation 1.2. We can make the
following, increasingly strong definitions of each firm’s competitive position at this
location:
Definition 1.2.1. For two firms j, k = 1, 2 and k 6= j, firm j is
• a potential competitor for serving the demand at this location if χj ≤ pmj (χk)
• the dominant competitor for serving the demand at this location if χj ≤ χk,
9Here, an explicit assumption is that at each location the provider applies a single price
(potentially varies spatially but uniform at each location) for every unit bought. Consequently,
nonlinear pricing, which may imply a higher payoff to provider, is ruled out. In the case of nonlinear
pricing, an important consideration should be the replicability of the provider’s offer by other
providers. To the extend that provider’s offer can be observed and matched by competitors, the
intuition in single price should extend to nonlinear pricing. In our case, single pricing assumption
is realistic given the nature of trade in the industry studied in the empirical chapters.
8
Figure 1.1: Two Firm Spatial Competition
• an effective monopolist10 for serving the demand at this location if pmj (χk) ≤
χk
Moreover,
• set of locations in which firm j is an effective monopolist is the home market
of firm j
• set of locations in which there is at least one potential competitor is the
overlapping market11 between potential competitor and dominant competitor.
Clearly a firm is an effective monopolist at a location if and only if it has no
potential competitor at that location. It follows that we can split the market
up into 4 segments as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Firm 1 is a potential competitor
for all consumers located between 0 and 1 − a; the dominant competitor for all
consumers between 0 and 1
2
; an effective monopolist for consumers between 0 and
a. Analogously firm 2 is a potential competitor for all consumers located between
a and 1; the dominant competitor for all consumers between 1
2
and 1; an effective
monopolist for consumers between 1− a and 1.
Now, under two alternative assumptions about the nature of competition in the
market consider the implications for pricing behaviour.
10For a similar definition, see, (Thisse and Vives, 1988, p.125-6). They define the market area
in which any firm can meet non-zero demand as ‘the potential market’, and the firm having a
lower market price then the marginal cost of the all possible rivals as having ‘a monopoly position”
(p.125-6).
11Thisse and Vives (1992) use the term “overlapping market area” (p.255-6).
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1.2.1 Bertrand Competition
From standard analysis it follows that:
• at those locations where firm j is an effective monopolist firm j will supply
the market at a price pmj (χj)
• at those locations where firm j is the dominant competitor but not an effective
monopolist, χj ≤ χk ≤ pmj (χj), firm j will serve the market at a price χk.
So, under Bertrand Competition, we see that, for j, k = 1, 2 and j ≤ k,
• Firm j will serve the market for which it is the dominant competitor, i.e.
χj ≤ χk.
• The price j sets for serving a customer in this market and located at a distance







pmj (c+ tdj), (c+ t(1− dj)
)
(1.3)
which is just the standard result as reported in 1.1 above.
So firm 1 will serve the market between 0 and 1
2
and firm 2 will serve the market
between 1
2
and 1. The price set by firm 1 will be pm1 (χ1) for consumers located
between 0 and a and, so a strictly increasing function of d1, but will be χ2 for all
consumers between a and 1
2
and so a decreasing function of d1. So under Bertrand
Competition the price charged by each firm across the market it serves will be an
inverse U-shape with respect to the distance between the provider and the buyer.
We can express this in a rather different way by introducing the following definition
under Bertrand Competition, for those locations in which provider j is the dominant




, at a location that is a distance




1 if χk ≥ pmj (χj)
χk−χj





1 if χk ≥ pmj (χj)
(c+tdk)−(c+tdj)





1 if χk ≥ pmj (χj)
t(dk−dj)





1 if χk ≥ pmj (χj)
t(1−2dj)




So, market power lies between 0 and 1. It is constant and equal to 1 when firm j
is an effective monopolist. However, when firm k is a potential competitor it is an
increasing function of χk- so the more costly it is for rival k to serve a given location
the higher is firm j’s market power - but consequently decreases sharply with dj.
We can combine Equations 1.1 and 1.4 to get



























So, for all locations served by firm j the price it charges under Bertrand competition
is just a weighted average of its monopoly price and the cost of serving that location,
with the weight given by its market power at that location.
Figure 1.2 summarizes the pricing pattern in competition and collusion in this simple
framework. In one dimensional competitive market with delivered pricing structure,
it is reasonable to expect initially a linear and monotonically increasing relation
between provider distance and price. As we travel from provider to rival, initially we
11
Figure 1.2: Price Patterns in the Market under Collusion and Competition
are travelling within the home market of the provider. Rival firm has no incentive to
extend operations to this region. Nevertheless, as the provider extends its operations
further – into the overlapping market, proximity to the rival matters because the
rival firm has an incentive to serve this area. The closer the operations are extended
to rival, the higher is the price cut provider needs to make to keep the buyers12
1.2.2 Collusion
Now suppose firm 1 and firm 2 form a cartel via explicitly colluding. Since our
interest is in explaining pricing behaviour conditional on being in a cartel rather
than the decision to form a cartel, I will take it that firms are explicitly colluding;
meaning that the cartel exists, and, if detected and successfully prosecuted by
the Competition Authority, it will pay a fixed penalty F ≥ 013. So its objective
is simply to maximise joint gross profit across all locations, which requires that
12Effects of proximity to rivals on pricing has long been recognized in the literature. As captured
by Hoover (1937),
“The effect of the presence of rival points of supply is, of course, to make the demand for the goods
of each seller more elastic than it would be if his location were the only one in the field. But the
effect is not spread evenly over any one seller’s market area. Near the outer margins of this area he
is most vulnerable, while in the neighbourhood of his own location he may be able to raise prices as
far as local competition allows and still keep them below what it would cost his distant competitors
to deliver in that territory (p.187).”
13Katsoulacos et al. (2015) provide a critical assessment of the design of monetary punishments
in the antitrust enforcement in a non-spatial context. One aspect of the analysis is the impact
of penalty regime on the collusive price. In the case of fixed penalty regime, collusive price is
the monopoly price. Since the fine translates as a fixed cost to the conspirators, it does not
affect pricing. Same result holds if penalty regime depends on profit. If penalty regime depends
on revenue, collusive price is higher than the monopoly price. If penalty regime depends on
overcharge, collusive price is lower than the monopoly price. In this work, to ensure monopoly
pricing in collusion, a fixed monetary penalty is assumed.
12
both firms maximise joint gross profit at each location. Since monopoly profit is
strictly decreasing function of χ, this means that the cartel should let the dominant
competitor at each location act as a monopolist. For those parts of the market
where a firm is an effective monopolist this will happen anyway even under Bertrand
competition. For those parts of the market where a firm is a dominant competitor
but not an effective monopolist this outcome could be achieved by having the rival
firm committing itself to either refusing to serve that market, or quoting a price
above the dominant competitor ’s monopoly price.
So, under a cartel we see that, for j = 1, 2
• Firm j will serve the market for which it is the dominant competitor,
• The price it sets for serving a customer located at a distance dj from it will be
pcartelj = p
m
j (c+ tdj) (1.6)
and so is a strictly increasing function of dj, the distance between the provider and
the customer.
Once again a somewhat different way of saying that, under a cartel, for those
locations in which it is provider j that is the dominant competitor, so that χj ≤ χk,
its market power under collusion at distance dj is given by;
µcartelj (dj) =
{
1 if χk ≥ χj
0 otherwise
(1.7)
Recall that Equation 1.5 sets out the relation between price the firm charges and its
market power under competition as a weighted average of its monopoly price and
the cost of serving that location, with the weight given by its market power at that
location. Since collusive strategy provides undisturbed market power to provider
at every location; combining Equations 1.5 and 1.7, would collapse pricing equation
into 1.6. It follows that even though the collusive strategy did not include an explicit
agreement on price, the effect of a cartel by adjusting the market power of each of
its members in those parts of the market in which they would otherwise have faced
real competition is monopoly pricing at each location. So we have the following
result:
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Figure 1.3: Quadratic Transportation Cost
i. Each firm serves exactly the same market under both Bertrand Competition
and collusion.
ii. Under a cartel, market power is constant and equal to 1 throughout a firm’s
market, so price is necessarily increasing in distance between the provider and
the customer.
iii. Under competition, market power declines sharply the further a customer is from
the provider, leading to an inverse U-shaped relation between the equilibrium
price and the distance between the provider and the customer.
1.2.3 Immediate Extensions
The theoretical framework considered so far involves some very strong assumptions.
I now briefly consider the implications of dropping some of them while retaining the
basic framework of two firms located at either end of a line.
(i) Linear transport cost. If transport cost is given by some increasing function
of distance then, given the assumption that the commodity is a necessity, positive
amounts will be sold at all locations. Given symmetry, each firm will serve half the
market. This is displayed in Figure 1.3, in which the transportation cost is quadratic
in distance.
cjχj illustrate how units cost vary along with dj, pmj p
m
j show the price that each
firm would charge at each location had it been monopoly supplier at that location,
and how these vary with dj
14
14Functional form of transportation cost has been highly debated in the literature. d’Aspremont
et al. (1979) suggest that quadratic transportation cost assumption leads to maximum
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Figure 1.4: Cost Heterogeneity
(a) (b) (c)
(ii) Symmetric Firms. Provided that the asymmetry is not too great, we
can allow the firms to differ in their unit cost of production and in their unit
transportation cost. Each firm will still have a part of the market for which it
is an effective monopolist. However, as shown in Figure 1.4, cost side heterogeneity
leads to asymmetrical market allocation. Left panel depicts market allocation when
production cost of f2 is 50 % higher than f1. cjχj maps the cost of serving at
each location thus, the minimum price. Similarly, pmj p
m
j maps the monopoly price
that provider would prefer to charge at each location. Higher production cost
makes it more difficult for f2 to undercut f1, easier for f1 to undercut f2. This
expands home market of f1 in the expense of home market of f2. As the centre
panel shows, overlapping market shifts, but the behaviour within remains the same.
In competition period, firms undercut each other at low market power locations.
The panel on the right shows the case if heterogeneity in cost is related to unit
transportation cost. Overlapping market rotates but the pattern within is again not
affected.
(iii) Customer Heterogeneity. Up to now, two sources of variation within price
have been mentioned: increase in price due to higher transportation cost and decline
in price due to proximity to rivals. Clearly, this deterministic representation is
incomplete. For example, large buyer size might translate as lower price. The
motivation for giving price concessions (say in the form of quantity discounts /
rebates) to large buyers might be particularly strong for industries in which scale
matters. Moreover, some factors unobservable to researcher might also be influential
in price; some examples are financial stability of the buyer, default risk, road quality,
the duration of the provider-buyer relation. Variations in price might be due
differentiation. This contrasts with Hotelling (1929) conclusion of minimum differentiation. In
this debate of linear vs quadratic, I side with Davis and Garce´s (2009) “Each case is clearly special
and therefore restrictive”. When the distance in question is not literal, or not a cost actually
borne, but signifies a deviation from an optimal choice as in the setting of Davis (2006) – movie
theatre competition, it might be more intuitive to use a nonlinear specification. On the other hand
it might be more intuitive to use a linear specification in the setting of Miller and Osborne (2014)
- price discrimination in cement markets, in which transportation cost is a significant part of the
price, and determines profitability directly.
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Figure 1.5: Customer Heterogeneity
(a) Competition (b) Collusion
to observable/unobservable heterogeneity related to these “other” factors. Thus,
it is more realistic to expect stochasticity in pricing. At each location, imagine
there is a stochastic factor, jc, specific to each provider–buyer pair. Figure 1.5
illustrates price–distance relation for a hypothetical provider in one dimensional
world, assuming the distribution governing the stochasticity at each location is
constant across the market.
After inclusion of heterogeneity, under competition, price now has three sources of
variation: i) An increasing trend in price over distance at the locations where the
provider is an effective monopolist, ii) Declining trend in price over distance at the
locations where the provider is the dominant competitor, iii) Provider–buyer specific
heterogeneity due to observable/unobservable factors. Right panel depicts collusion.
In collusion, only first and third sources of variation are present in price.
1.3 General Case
1.3.1 Bertrand Competition
Consider a spatial industry with j producers and l buyers located at distinct
locations. Parties have full information about distance between buyers and all
potential providers. There are no capacity constraints. In this case, we have no
restrictions with regards to number of dimensions in the market. Ql(p) represents
the demand at each location with the same properties in one dimensional case.
pmjl (χjl) represents the monopoly delivered price a firm would desire to charge at
each location while serving demand Ql(p) with cost χjl > 0. p
m
jl (χjl) is a strictly
increasing function of χjl. Similar to one dimensional case, cost is characterised by
an interaction of unit production cost and transport cost.
χjl = f (cj, tjl, djl) , j = 1, 2...J (1.8)
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For example, assuming total transportation cost is governed by Tjl(djl), the average
transportation cost per unit of travel would be tjl =
Tjl
djl
. Then, χjl would be
χjl = cj + tjldjl.
The definitions in one dimensional case with respect to competitive position of a
firm at each location can be amended as follows:





, firm j is
• a potential competitor for serving the demand at this location if χjl ≤ pmkl (χkl)
• the dominant competitor for serving the demand at this location if χjl ≤ χkl,
• an effective monopolist for serving the demand at this location if pmjl (χjl) ≤ χkl
It follows that
• at those locations where firm j is an effective monopolist, firm j will serve the
market at a price pmjl (χjl),
• at those locations where firm j is the dominant competitor but not an effective
monopolist, χjl ≤ χkl ≤ pmjl , firm j will serve the market at a price χkl.
So, under Bertrand Competition we see that for firms j, k = 1, 2...J , where χkl =
minχ(−j)l,
• Each location l will be served by the firm j, satisfying,
χjl ≤ χkl (1.9)
• Price firm j sets for serving a customer located at location l will be
pcompjl = min
(
pmjl (χjl) , χkl
)
(1.10)
So for the locations at which firm j is an effective monopolist, pmjl (χjl) ≤ χkl, price
will be a (strictly increasing) function of χjl. However, for the locations at which
j is the dominant competitor, χkl ≤ χjl ≤ pmkl (χkl), price is a function of χkl.
This brings us to the relation between local market power of provider j and local
relative costs. Modifying Equation 1.5 to the general setting, given provider j, the
dominant competitor, and provider k, χkl = minχ(−j)l where j = 1, 2...J ; under
Bertrand Competition, firm j’s market power at location l is characterised by
µcompjl =
{
1 if χkl ≥ pmjl (χjl)
χkl−χjl
pmjl(χjl)−χjl
if χjl ≤ χkl ≤ pmjl (χjl) (1.11)
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It is easy to see the dynamics of the relation between µcompjl (χjl, χkl) and djl.
Recall that for any firm j, χjl = f (cj, tjl, djl). Assuming, unit production cost is
independent of distance travelled15,
∂cj
∂djl
= 0; and per unit cost of transportation is







































Note that two forces are in motion. Let us start with the second term in Equation
1.12. This centres on the impact of cost increases on monopoly mark-up. Assuming
at each location, a well-defined monopoly price exists, and monopoly profit is















will hold. In this case, this term will cancel out.
We are more interested with the first term. In addition to χjl, any incremental
change in distance might also affect χkl. This is intuitive as, incremental change
in distance might affect on the cost of the minimum cost rival. Thus, this term
captures the relative change in delivered cost of provider in relation to the minimum
cost rival. For example, consider a marginal increase in distance served for provider
j. Market power of j, would be higher at the latter location only if expansion of









Finally, regarding price - market power relation, which is captured by Equation
1.4 in one dimensional case, little changes. If χkl ≥ pmjl (χjl), j has undisturbed
market power, hence prices monopolistically. If, χjl ≤ χkl ≤ pmjl (χjl), then by same
15One example of unit production cost being dependent on the distance would be additional
inputs, e.g. preservative chemicals, being used in the products shipped further away.
16Independence of tjl from distance travelled by rival, dkl, is straightforward. Independence
of tjl from djl involves the assumption that distance related economies of scale associated in
transportation is marginal. Regarding the industry and the geography studied in this work, this
is a mild assumption; as, transportation is done primarily by land, via standard size trucks, and
over relatively short distance.
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derivation
pcompjl (χjl, χkl) = χkl




1− µcompjl (χjl, χkl)
)
χjl (1.13)
Thus, price charged is still a weighted average of monopoly price a firm is willing
to charge and the cost of serving that location, with the weight given by its market
power at that location.
An Application in Two Dimensional World - Competition




f ) refer to coordinates of independent




c) refers to coordinates of
independent buyers. Euclidean distance between buyer l and provider j is djl(cl, fj).
Equation 1.11 suggests that price cuts are conditional on the competitive pressure
from rivals. In one dimensional models, by construction, as provider - buyer distance
increases, rival - buyer distance decreases. As a result of competitive pressure,
market power falls. However, in two dimensional setting we cannot anticipate a
negative relationship between price and provider - buyer distance. MacLeod et al.
(1988) illustrate this. Consider two firms (left panel) operating on an irregular
grid as shown in the following figure. As we travel away from xi1, the increase in
competitive pressure from xj2 is only relevant for the shaded area. For the rest
of the plain, there would not be an increase in competitive pressure. Right panel
introduces a third firm, xk3. The area where price declines with distance is now
irregular. Therefore, it is hard to suggest a straightforward relationship. It remains
a fact that firms suffer higher transportation cost as more distant locations are
served. In some cases, the heightened competition outweighs this effect. In some
other cases it does not.
The role of relative proximity in market power can be shown algebraically. Assume
that the firms have constant, linear and symmetrical transportation cost and unit
cost of production. Given χkl = minχ(−j)l, where j, k = 1, 2...J ; Equation 1.11
suggests,
17The term undertaking forms the basis of competition law in distinguishing different entities
that are independently liable from a competition law perspective. In this regard, critical element
is the control over the undertaking. Undertakings are distinct only if they are distinctly controlled.
For example, two production plants registered under different legal names, but controlled by the
same board, are part of the same undertaking. Similarly in this study, “undertaking” refers to
production facilities that are commonly controlled. See, Jones (2012) for a discussion in legal
context.
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Figure 1.6: Rivalry in Two Dimensional World
(a) Two firms (b) Three firms
Source: Figure 2 in MacLeod et al. (1988).
µcompjl (χjl, χkl) =
{
1 if χkl ≥ pmjl (χjl)
χkl−χjl
pmjl (χjl)−χjl
if χjl ≤ χkl ≤ pmjl (χjl)
=
{
1 if χkl ≥ pmjl (χjl)
(c+tdkl)−(c+tdjl)
pmjl (χjl)−χjl
if χjl ≤ χkl ≤ pmjl (χjl)
=





if χjl ≤ χkl ≤ pmjl (χjl)
=





if χjl ≤ χkl ≤ pmjl (χjl)
(1.14)
where,
∆jl = min dkl − djl (1.15)
Therefore, local market power of each provider will be proportional to its relative
proximity.
Figure 1.7 illustrates the functioning of a hypothetical market defined on a 900×900
Cartesian plane under Bertrand competition. The market structure is exactly the
same as Figure 1.2. Therefore assume that firms are symmetrical both in production
and transportation cost. Consumers have no market power and firms can price
discriminate. Market operates under delivered pricing. Again for simplicity, firms
add a constant mark-up to cost if they are monopolists. The parametrization is




f ), marks the coordinates of the
independent facilities controlled by different undertakings. The graph displays price
in a colour scale as indicated on the right. Blue values correspond to lowest; red
values correspond to highest price.
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Figure 1.7: Spatial Competition in Two Dimensional World
In the areas where the provider is an effective monopolist, no other rival can restrict
its pricing. At these locations, market power is maximum and price increases with
distance linearly. On the other hand, at locations in which the competitiveness of
potential competitor and dominant competitor converge, market power of provider
is lower and providers need to price cut. The increase in competition creates some
price rifts in the market.
1.3.2 Collusion
Assume that j firms decide to collude and form a complete cartel. The objective
of the cartel is to maximise joint gross profit. Since the profit at each location is
a decreasing function of χjl, the collusive returns will be maximized if cartel lets
dominant competitor at each location act as a monopolist. Therefore, in case of a
complete cartel formed by j firms, j, k = 1, 2...J , and k satisfies χkl = minχ(−j)l,
• Firm j will serve location l if
χjl ≤ χkl (1.16)
• The price at each location l will be
pcarteljl (χjl) = p
m
jl (χjl) (1.17)







Note that each firm is operating where it is a dominant competitor. Since collusive
agreement ensures against the risk of being undercut, the market power of firm j at
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Figure 1.8: Spatial Collusion in Two Dimensional World
any location l is characterized by,
µcarteljl =
{







Similar to earlier case, to see the effects of collusive strategy on price, Equations
1.19 and 1.13 should be combined. Cartel, by setting market power to unity in 1.13,
collapse pricing function to Equation 1.17. Thus, even though collusive strategy
does not include an explicit agreement on price, it results in monopoly pricing.
An Application in Two Dimensional World - Collusion
Figure 1.17 illustrates the functioning of the market under collusion. Under the
assumption of constant, linear and symmetrical transportation and production costs,
pricing is characterised by,
pcarteljl = min p
m
jl (c+ tdjl) (1.20)
For every provider, price increases linearly in all directions. Market power is
governed by Equation 1.19 and maximised at every location due to cartel agreement.
Note that locations with the lowest price under competition, the regions of price
rifts, now have the highest price. Therefore, a possible regime switch is very likely
to affect these regions. On the other hand, areas that correspond to home market,
e.g. the corners of the plain, have the same colour. A possible regime switch is
unlikely to affect these regions.
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1.3.3 Defining the Variable of Interest
∆jl = Distance of the Closest Rival from location l−
Distance of Provider from location l
∆jl can be identified as a “relative proximity based local market power measure” for
each realized transaction. It measures market power of the provider at location l, as
a function of relative proximity of provider and the closest rival to that particular
location. The provider is expected to enjoy a market power associated with and
proportional to this value. For each provider-location pair it is constant across
time.
For each transaction,
• Large positive values mean that provider is the closest firm to the customer
(home market).
• Large negative values mean that provider is serving to a customer closer to its
closest rival (home market of the rival).
• Values around zero mean that both firms are good alternatives for the buyer
(overlapping market).
1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide some theoretical intuition for the measure of local market
power used in this work. I centre on the relationship between price at which a
provider meets demand at a particular location and market power that provider
can exercise at that particular location. This, in turn relates to i) the proximity of
alternative providers that could serve that location, and ii) the nature of competition
in the market at that location - specifically whether the market is monopolised,
cartelised or competitive. I highlight an important characteristic of the market.
Under collusion, collusive agreement ensures that each provider enjoys undisturbed
market power at each location. However, under competition at the locations where
cost difference across providers disappears, price under competition is forced towards
cost. Consequently, regime switch would have a big impact on price. If cost
difference across providers is high even in competition, price in both regimes will be
similar; consequently, regime switch would have a small impact on price. It follows
that the impact of regime switch on price is inversely proportional to the local market
power of the provider under competition. Building on this, I propose approximating
local market power variations via an indicator of local cost differences. For location
23
l, I suggest using ∆lj = dkl − djl, a measure of relative proximity; the distance
between the closest rival k and location l, dkl, net off the distance between provider






This chapter, first, presents the main data set, other sources of data, and the
processing and the refinement of the data. Second, it introduces the variables (and
the intuition behind these variables) employed in the empirical chapters 3 and 5, the
empirical objectives of which, at this stage, can be generalized to the analysis of firm
pricing decisions, and particularly, the relation of these decisions with the measures
of market power in a spatial setting. Third, it introduces alternative methodologies
of simple data analysis, called “screening” or “collusive markers”, which are designed
to flag suspicious patterns in the market in understanding if further inquiry into
the market is warranted. Application of some of these markers, e.g. evolution of
average price; price variation; distance; relative proximity of provider and the closest
rival; correlation of price with distance of closest rival; and correlation of price with
number of rivals, indicate that consistent with a regime switch from collusion to
competition, stable relations in the market were disrupted after month seven.
2.2 Sources of Data and Construction of the Data
Set
This study, even though it uses multiple sources of data, builds on a consumer level
data set of monthly transactions for provider-buyer pairs in a certain region. Data
set does not originate from a cartel investigation; thus, there is no information with
regards to existence of a cartel, how it operates or what its coverage is. Access
to dataset is granted by TCA under confidentiality terms. Terms require masking
the identities of the providers and customers; the regions they makes sales to /
operate in; date of the sales; costs; and details about the products concerned. Even
though terms do not dictate concealment of the industry, for now it will be concealed
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(henceforth, product X). However, some information relevant for economic analysis
should be provided.
• Product is homogeneous. The scope for branding is limited. Firms are not
exclusively producing X, but it has a big share in their revenues.
• The sales are bulky in quantity. The transportation cost constitutes an
important part of the delivered price.
• Scale is important. Marginal production cost fall as output is expanded.
• The product is an intermediate product. Thus, producers may choose to
integrate upwards or downwards. Figure 2.1 summarizes the relation of
product X with downstream and upstream products.
Figure 2.1: Product Attributes, X, Z, and T
• Facilities differ in complexities. Some operate like assembly plants, while
others are more sophisticated.
• In distribution, vertical agreements are occasionally preferred; but they are
not the norm.
This study benefits from three different sources of data: regional demand data, data
reported by undertakings, and distance information provided by web mapping. Next
section outlines the data processing and refinement for each one.
2.2.1 Regional Demand
The primary purpose of X, is to produce Z ; primary purpose of Z is to produce
T . Alternatively speaking, any production of T , creates a demand for Z. Any
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production of Z creates a demand for X. Given the input-output relation, T
production is the ultimate source of demand, hence ultimate source of demand
variation. Therefore it is possible to capture regional demand fluctuations affecting
X, by incorporating T into analysis. To this aim, around each Z location, “relevant”
T production over time is monitored; consequently, first source of data draws from
T production.
Figure 2.2: Spatial Production Patterns in X, Z and T
Figure 2.2 illustrates the spatial relation between X, Z and T . Let ti refer to the
volume of T production at each center. zi corresponds to the locations to which X
is delivered (henceforth, X locations). The assumption employed here is zi = xi.
This means, consistent with its primary purpose, all the shipments to these locations
have been used in the production of Z. In the figure, ri marks the limit distance
within which it is considered viable to supply Z from. It is initially set to r¯, an
industry rule of thumb.
Two defining features of T is the customer needs N , and the production process
P . They together define the volume of T produced at each location, hence quantity
of Z required, QDZ . Production of T is subject to licensing. Licenses are provided
at the district level1. This includes monthly volume of T production, Qnpdt, in a
breakdown of customer needs n = 1, 2, ...N¯ , production process p = 1, 2, ...P¯ , month
t = 1, 2, ...T¯ and district l = 1, 2, ...L¯.
Producers of T do not prefer to supply Z from providers that are far away.
Alternatively speaking, only T production in a reasonable radius can create demand
for each Z production. To identify “relevant” T locations that might be associated
with each Z location, distance between Z locations and T locations should be
retrieved.
T production data is at district level. Therefore, first, the coordinates of all districts
are manually retrieved from Google Maps. Even though within a given district, T
1Perhaps a better term might be “district plus” as, data has information on districts and
counties. According to Turkish administrative system, from specific to general, ordering of
administration regions is neighbourhood, district, county, province.
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production can be anywhere, distance is calculated in reference to a single point.
As the first choice, the coordinates of a public building, e.g. municipality, hospital,
post office, are used. If no public building is registered in the Google Maps in that
district, a central location is arbitrarily chosen. Ambiguity about exact coordinates
of T production inevitably causes some measurement error. However, since the
districts are small, error is expected to be negligible. Second, coordinates of X
locations are identified. Third, in connection with Google servers, a matrix of point
to point driving distances between each district and each X location is constructed
in an automated manner. After retrieving the distance information, building on
nearby T activity, three different regional monthly demand indices are constructed:
For each X location, first measure is the aggregate monthly T volume that is in
r¯ units of driving distance; second measure uses 0.8r¯ as the cut-off; third measure
uses 0.6r¯.
Not surprisingly, the demand for T exhibits seasonality and is prone to calendar
effects. To strip seasonal effects off, first option is using an indicator variable for each
calendar month. Benefit of this approach is that fixed effects capture seasonality,
not only from demand side, but also from supply side. However, there are two
drawbacks: first, data is not long time wise; as it spans 18 months, only 6 calendar
month indicators would be nonzero more than once. Second, employing calendar
month fixed effects means forcing an additive seasonal structure on data. Second
option is seasonally adjusting the demand data first and using adjusted data in
the estimation. This allows experimenting with more flexible seasonal patterns.
However, (i) any supply side seasonality in X production would not be captured,
(ii) as the process would be sensitive to outliers, identification of seasonal patterns
would be challenging with disaggregated data2.
Table 2.1: Seasonal Adjustment
n2p2 n1p2 n1p1 n2p1 Total
Log Transformed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Fitted [(0, 1, 1)(0, 0, 0)] [(0, 1, 1)(0, 1, 1)] [(0, 1, 1)(0, 1, 1)] [(0, 1, 1)(0, 1, 1)] [(0, 1, 1)(0, 1, 1)]
Calendar Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pvalue 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Seasonality (pvalue) ISNT ISP ISP ISP ISP
Stable seasonality (FS) 0.1809 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kruskal - Willis (W) 0.1028 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Seasonality Assuming Stability (T) 0.1507 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Evolative Seasonality (FM) 0.2107 0.3994 0.7459 0.2285 0.0000
Residual Seasonality (R) (F Stat) 1.43 0.31 0.64 0.71 1.22
FS No Seasonality. Monthly averages are not different
W No Seasonality. Monthly averages are not different
H0 FM Seasonal effect across years is not different
T Seasonality is not present
T Residuals do not have seasonality
As a solution, data is stripped of seasonal effects at the aggregated level, and
in proportion to each district’s weight in unadjusted data, aggregated adjusted
data is disaggregated to districts. This works as follows: First, a weight ωn¯pdt
2Potential differences in seasonal patterns across different customer needs N and production
process P combinations make the task more challenging.
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is calculated for each district, d, month, t, and n, p combination. This bases on
i) seasonally unadjusted monthly district level volume, Qnpdt, ii) total monthly
unadjusted volume,
∑




aggregated data is adjusted at aggregated level for each combination of n, p, where
n, p = (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2). After retrieving seasonally adjusted aggregate series
Q˜n¯pt, district level seasonally adjusted series are calculated via interacting district
weights with seasonally adjusted aggregate data, Q˜n¯pdt = ωn¯pdtQ˜n¯pt. This process is
iterated, for three different radii; ri = r¯, 0.8r¯, 0.6r¯.
Table 2.1 provides information about some diagnostics and seasonality tests. Since
T information is publicly available, we are not restricted with the sample period.
Seasonal adjustment builds on eight years of monthly data (96 months) of T
production3. For the seasonal adjustment Demetra is used as the software. It
compares alternative models and suggests the most suitable model to the data
basing on information criterion measures. It also reports many diagnostic tests
automatically which are informative about the nature of seasonality. As seasonal
adjustment method, TRAMO-SEATS of Gomez and Maravall (1996) is used.
ISNT stands for “identifiable seasonality is not present”, ISP refers to “identifiable
seasonality is present”. The results indicate that the seasonal pattern, when present,
follows a multiplicative structure, thus series are log transformed. In many cases
an ARIMA model of [(0, 1, 1)(0, 1, 1)]4 has the highest likelihood5. Residuals do not
exhibit seasonality, indicating the model does a good job in removing seasonality.
Calendar effects are consistently significant across subgroups. Findings indicate that
n2p2 is in stark contrast to other n, p combinations. Both Freidman test, which is
concerned with if subsamples in a sample are governed by the same distribution,
and Kruskal-Wallis test, which compares subsample means, do not find evidence
for seasonal patterns. Since there is no evidence for seasonality for Q22dt, series
have only been adjusted for n, p = (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1). Final regional demand index,
(tnplt), is an aggregation of seasonally adjusted indices n, p = (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), and
unadjusted index n, p = (2, 2) into a single index.
2.2.2 Undertaking Data
Second source of the data set is the reported figures from undertakings and covers
18 months. These include information about
• Providing facility (origin of production)
3In the estimations in Chapter 3 and 5, only data spanning 18 months is used.
4[1− L][1− L12]Qm = [1 + γ1L][1 + γ1L12]em where Q is quantity, m is month, e is the error
term and L is the lag operator. This model is also called as the airline model following Cleveland
and Tiao (1976) that study airlines.
5Three years in data exhibit more volatility than remaining 5. If volatile years are excluded,
[(0, 1, 1)(0, 1, 1)] has the highest likelihood in all specifications. If volatile years are included
N1P1 has different form [(1, 0, 0)(1, 0, 0)]. For the sake of consistency I use [(0, 1, 1)(0, 1, 1)] in
all specifications.
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• Type of the product
• Destination county
• Distance of the facility to the buyer’s location as reported by undertakings
• Identity and type of the customer (vertical relations, buyer’s line of business)
• Total revenue, quantity and transportation cost (if any) in each transaction
• Monthly unit price of some inputs
• Information on the rebates and discounts, if any is provided to consumers and
how they are set.
One problem encountered with handling the dataset is a structural one. The data set
is fairly old and the access is provided to the rawest format of data. This necessitates
doing serious refinement where interaction with the original providers of data is not
possible6.
Dataset contains revenue and volume for each transaction but not the price.
There are some observations with zero quantity, zero revenue or no customer
identity7. These transactions have been omitted. The transaction price is
found by dividing total revenue to total quantity. If multiple transactions
are reported at customer/location/provider/month level, these transactions are
aggregated by taking quantity weighted average. To give coefficients a more intuitive
interpretation, price is normalized with average price in the competitive period.
There are two types of sales. Some sales are delivered to buyer’s location by the
providers. Consequently, the revenue reported includes the freight as well. In
some other sales, product is picked up by customers at the origin of production.
Consequently, freight is not included in the invoiced revenue. To assure conformity
between two types of sales, all sales have been converted into delivered sales. This
has been preferred instead of the other way around for two reasons: First, delivered
sales are more frequent in the dataset, even though the difference in frequency is
small (8 %). Second, the assumption done by opting for delivered pricing is that
any buyer is equally efficient in transporting the product with the producing firms.
This is more reasonable then the assumption that the transportation cost reported
by all firms are as they actually realize -not diverging from actual transportation
cost.
Undertakings report transportation cost differently. For any consumer c located at
l, provider j, month t and transaction i,
TCi = vidjltjt (2.1)
6However, this have been considerably mitigated by the helpful inputs of the experts at the
TCA.
7The observations omitted in this sort is % 0.4 of the sample.
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would hold where TCi is the total transportation cost incurred at the transaction i,
vi is the volume of transaction, dlj is the distance between provider j and location l
and tjt is the transportation cost for provider j per unit of volume per unit distance in
month t. Some undertakings report TCi, vi, and djl; some others report vi along with
djl and tjt; and some others report vi, djl, tjt. The conversion of mill price has been
done by benefiting from transportation cost calculations of one of the firms which
reports tjt for each month. As transportation is highly standardized, I do not expect
monthly unit transportation cost to differ greatly across undertakings, hence use
that monthly figure for all undertakings
(
tjt = tj¯t = tt
)
. Following transformation






where REVi refers to revenue reported from transaction i. Price is then the ratio of
revenue including actual or potential freight to total quantity8.
Some of the revenue / volume figures are flawed, as they suggest prices equal to
zero or infinity9. In some cases it is straightforward to detect the source of anomaly,
e.g. skipping / adding a decimal, or reporting the transportation cost as the price.
In these cases corrections have been done. Regarding less straightforward cases,
following rule of thumb is applied: i) If there is one other entry for that customer
in the same month, that value is taken as the price of both shipments. ii) If there
are multiple, the average price of non-anomalous entries is used as the price of the
anomalous entry. iii) If there are none, the average of first month before and first
month after is taken as the price. iv) If the anomalous entry belongs to the last
month, the average of two preceding months is used; if it belongs to the first month,
the average of two proceeding months are used. Inspection of the data showed that
sale reports of one undertaking are inaccurate for one month. For these cases, the
price of the shipment is taken equal to the price in proceeding month10.
Regarding the customer location, in some cases no province information is present.
These transactions have been omitted11. For some other cases, province is provided
without accompanying county information. These transactions are taken to be
destined to the administrative centre of the province12. In some cases, county names
8For delivered sales of some undertakings, it is difficult to understand whether the reported
revenue already includes the transportation cost or transportation cost should be added on
top of that revenue figure. For the undertakings where there is a doubt, to understand
whether the revenue already includes the freight or not, the transactions are analysed on
customer/location/provider basis to see if any one customer demanded both delivered and mill
sales from a certain location, in the same month. In this case it becomes easier to understand
whether the reported figures already include freight. A separate log outlining the decision making
process is kept in the process, which may be provided upon request.
9The observations omitted this sort is % 0.3 of the sample.
10The observations in this category is % 0.1 of the sample.
11The observations omitted this sort is % 0.4 of the sample.
12The observations in this category is % 1.1 of the sample.
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are reported as province names or are matched with incorrect provinces. These cases
have been corrected with the assumption that the most specific information, the
county, is accurate.
The dataset includes customer identity information. This information is first
used in distinguishing transactions within a vertically integrated undertaking, or
transactions across rival undertakings (consumers). These two types of transactions
are omitted from the analysis and the attention is confined to what we may think
of as “commercial sales”, sales destined to third parties. Second, I use customer
identity information in approximating customer size. In the assessment of the
customer size, transactions from all providers are taken into account. Since, the
same customers are not always registered under the same name across different
providers, first task is harmonizing customer identities. In many cases, the difference
is simply related to using abbreviations or differences in spelling. For these cases,
taking name, province, county, customer type information together it is not difficult
to identify the same customers registered under different names13. Customers with
different identities are taken independent from each other14.
Finally, we have information about buyer’s line of business, and presence of any
vertical relation between the buyer and provider. In this work, to analyse the
potential impact of vertical relations on price, an indicator variable, which marks
the transactions between provider and a vertically related buyer, is constructed.
2.2.3 Web Mapping Data, Distance and Coordinates
There are two possible alternative distance measures. First is based on the
coordinates of competitors and/or centre for commercial activity (i.e. city, town)
and calculating the Euclidian distance between competitors and/or centres. In
the literature, this approach is more frequently preferred when distance covered is
conceptualized as a time loss for the consumer15. Some examples in this fashion are:
McManus (2007) analysing coffee consumption around University of Virginia, Davis
(2006), studying spatial competition in movie theatres, Dafny (2009) taking on the
effects of hospital mergers, and Pinkse et al. (2002) focusing on spatial competition
patterns in wholesale gasoline16. Second measure is using the driving distance. This
is preferred when transportation cost is literal and competitiveness declines with
1339 % of the customers are registered similarly enough to indicate they might be identical, for
29 % of which similarity in names is also supported by consistency in province, county, customer
type information. For 10 %, the similarity in the names of the customers is not supported by other
available information, these customers are taken independent from each other.
14It should be noted that the methodology used here is an imperfect reflection of the customer
side. Customer name, location and customer type are poor measures of assessment of control,
which in essence a fairly complex task.
15Clark and Houde (2013); Lewis (2008) are some exceptions where covered distance is
considerable, yet Euclidian distance is preferred.
16Thomadsen (2005) studies fast food consumption and uses a combination of both shortest
route and Euclidean Distance. If the outlet is in a shopping mall Euclidean distance is used, if not
shortest route is used.
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each extra mile. Some examples are Bajari and Ye (2003) for construction projects,
Harrington et al. (2015); Miller and Osborne (2014) for cement markets, and Houde
(2012) for retail gasoline17. Since our case is similar to the second one, in this study,
driving distance is preferred in all estimations.
Recall that the variable of interest in this study is the relative proximity of
provider and the closest rival. First step in calculating this measure is retrieving
distance of provider and all rivals to each location. Methodology is similar to
that in retrieving regional demand data. First the coordinates of the production
facilities, and coordinates of the buyers’ counties are obtained via satellite imagery
applications. Next, in connection with Google servers, a matrix of point to point
driving distances between each provider and each county is constructed in an
automated manner18. It should be noted that the distance matrix is not constructed
only for the production facilities from which the transaction data is coming from.
It also includes neighbouring facilities that might be a competitive restraint.
After forming the distance matrix, second step is identifying the closest rival,
calculating the distance of the closest rival to the location, and the measure of
relative proximity. This is done consistently with the notion of undertaking.
Consequently, facilities owned by the same undertaking are not expected to compete
with each other. Figure 2.3 depicts a hypothetical case. cl corresponds to location
of buyers. fj corresponds to location of five independent providers.
Figure 2.3: An Example Two Dimensional Plane
djl(cl, fj) corresponds to distance between customer l and provider j Computation
of the closest rival for a transaction from f1 to c2 would be formalized as,
Closestf1c2 = min (d22(c2, f2), d32(c2, f3), d42(c2, f4), d52(c2, f5)) (2.3)
Note that this would imply ∆f1c2 = d22(c2, f2) − d12(c2, f1) = 80 − 100 = −20. On
17Houde (2012) goes one step further and take traffic flows into consideration as well. One
optimal route minimizing travel time is defined for every consumer in a given traffic zone.
18For a similar application of using web mapping as a data source, see, Bajari and Ye (2003).
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the other hand, if f1 and f2 are controlled by the same undertaking, then,
Closestf1c2 = min (d32(c2, f3), d42(c2, f4), d52(c2, f5)) . (2.4)
This would imply ∆f1c2 = d32(c2, f3)− d12(c2, f1) = 95− 100 = −5.
Distance information and spatial distribution of providers and customers are also
used in calculating the number of rivals in a defined radius, d¯, around each buyer.
Following the Figure 2.3, first consider all five facilities are controlled by different
undertakings. Regarding a transaction between f1, and c2, the rivals within 100
km would be f2 and f4; number of rivals would be 2. However, if f1, and f2 are
controlled by same undertaking, the only rival within 100 km would be f4, and
number of rivals would be 1; if all f1, f2, f3 are controlled by the same undertaking,
there would not be any rivals in 100 km, and number of rivals would be 0.
2.2.4 Variables
In this part the variables that are used in the empirical chapters, Chapter 3, proactive
detection of collusion, and Chapter 5, estimation of the overcharge are presented.
Naturally, since the empirical objectives of the two chapters differ, empirical strategy
and methodology differs; consequently the variables employed in the estimation also
differs. However, at this point, to understand the intuition behind the variables
used in these two chapters with different empirical strategy and methodology, it is
sufficient to consider the commonality in two different empirical objectives at the
very general level: This is analysing firm pricing decisions, and particularly relation
of these decisions with measures of local market power measures, in a spatial setting,.
In both empirical chapters, where necessary I am revisiting the intuition of these
variables.
The relation between pricing and local market power is at the centre of the analysis.
Local market power variations are captured by ∆jl , the relative proximity of the




. The intuition is, after
controlling for observables, ∆jl = min(dkl)− djl approximates to χkl − χjl, the cost
difference between potential competitor and dominant competitor at each location.
The pricing behaviour when competing with a single rival vs. multiple rivals, should
differ. Therefore, in the literature, it is common to include the number of rivals in
a defined radius to capture the impact of non-local competition. Some examples in
this fashion are: Thomadsen (2005) and the number of fast food restaurants within
2 miles, Harrington et al. (2015) and the number of cement providers within 150
km, Dafny (2009) and the number of hospitals within 5 miles, and finally Houde
(2012) and the number of gasoline stations within 5 miles. In this study, number of
rivals in a defined radius (NBRjlc) is used as a control variable as well
19.






One important source of heterogeneity is supply side factors. Nature of the data
makes it possible to associate transactions with production facilities. Therefore, any
heterogeneity in cost structures that are constant over time is captured by facility
fixed effects.
Another time invariant supply feature put forward in the literature relates to
multiplant ownership. In assessing the risk of vertical foreclosure in concrete and
cement markets in US, Hortac¸su and Syverson (2007) find that multiplant ownership
is efficiency enhancing in distribution of products: “...deliveries ... typically ordered
on very short notice by consumers at different locations, can be made more efficiently,
by having a dispatch office that substitutes production and delivery among firm‘s
several local plants (p. 252)”. This improvement in efficiency should be more
pronounced when scale matters also in production; providers may also switch
production from one plant to another to rationalize production. To account for such
distribution and/or production related efficiencies, I employ an indicator variable; it
marks the presence of a nearby additional X facility owned by the same undertaking
within a defined radius20.
Time varying supply side features do not constitute a major concern. The reason
is the nature of variation in the data. Measures of local market power and price
vary over customer/location/provider/month basis, thus, has considerable variation
within each month. On the other hand, capacity utilization or cost realizations (i.e.
wages, energy, and other inputs) vary over provider/month basis and has similar
trends across undertakings. This limits the size of any potential omitted variable
bias on the coefficients of market power measures. However, some specifications
employ energy price and capacity utilization as controls, while some others use
month fixed effects to control for time varying factors.
Turning to the demand side, main source of heterogeneity suggested in the literature
is the brand related effects. Nevo (2000a,b, 2001) suggests that brand fixed effects
go a long way in controlling for factors (like quality) that are observable to the
consumer/producer but not observable to the researcher. Similarly, Lewis (2008)
favours a high/low quality division which captures brand recognition of the firm
and loyalty of customers in gasoline markets. Studying bottled water, Bonnet and
Dubois (2010) find evidence for strong brand effects on top of manufacturer effect. In
our setting, via employing facility fixed effects, manufacturer effects are controlled.
Any brand effect on top of manufacturer effect is assumed to be negligible. This
should be a reasonable assumption; as, homogeneity of products limits returns for
further brand making.
In incorporating demand fluctuations into the analysis there are three options.
First is using transaction volume directly as a control21. This is only legitimate
if quantity is exogenous. An illustration of this would be Houde (2012) with the
assumption of “consumer has inelastic demand for gasoline. In this representation
consumption is split between heterogeneous consumption needs and a common fixed
20Radius is the same as it is in number of rivals. See, Footnote 19.
21This issue is thoroughly examined in Chapter 3.
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quantity (p.2156).”. Another example is Harrington et al. (2015), analysing the
collusive patterns in cement. Building on procurement data, in which, list price,
and discounts are separately observed, empirical strategy involves using volume as
a control. Naturally, in assessing exogeneity, nature of the available data should
also be taken into account. Nevo (2000b) points that when transaction level data is
concerned, strategy might involve an explicit assumption of exogeneity. Baum (2006)
suggests that, transaction data may imply a price taking consumer (p.186). However,
as data gets more aggregated, endogeneity issue becomes more problematic.
Second option is using instruments. In this case, demand shifters might be employed
in identifying the coefficients of transaction volume in pricing equation within an
instrumental variables framework using 2SLS or GMM. Third option is employing
demand shifters directly in a reduced form setting using OLS.
In this study, some specifications take on the assumption of exogeneity of transaction
volume (vjltc), and employ transaction volume (and other volume related controls)
directly in identifying the regime switch (Chapter 3). However, despite the
inelasticity of demand for product X, and nature of data set (consumer level
transaction data) in line with Nevo (2000b), these estimates are interpreted with
caution. In identifying regime switch, regional demand indices building on seasonally















for transaction volume within an IV framework, which allows
exploring the impact of exogeneity assumption. In estimating the overcharge,
regional demand indices are directly employed in reduced form setting as controls.
Two other demand side controls are (i) contractual obligations (vertical agreements),
(ii) size of the consumer. Providers might be willing to offer more favourable
conditions to the buyer, if the buyer is vertically related. This effect is controlled
by an indicator variable marking the presence of a contractual relation between
each buyer-provider pair. There are two variables indicating buyer size. First is an
indicator variable (γlargec ) marking the buyers in top 5 %
22. Second one is aggregated
volume of all purchases in 18 months (V¯lc) for each buyer/location pair. Like
transaction volume, this variable suffers from potential endogeneity issues. Similarly,
in some specifications, V¯lc is employed directly as a control; in some others, aggregate
T license information, tnptl is used as an instrument for V¯lc in an IV framework; in
some others tnptl, is employed directly in reduced form setting as a control.
To summarize, following is the list of variables used:
Price (pjltc): Price of commercial sales (excludes transactions within an undertaking
or across undertakings) for the transaction between provider j, to customer c, at






is total revenue; vjltc is the transaction volume. In some cases, providers or
buyers prefer mill sales. To homogenize the type of sales, mill sales have been
converted to delivered sales via Equation 2.2. Also to give the coefficients more
22Excludes transactions within an undertaking or across undertakings.
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intuitive interpretation, price is normalized by the quantity weighted average price
in competitive period, p¯23.





Calculated as the difference between driving distance from the rival closest to





: Square of ∆jl to capture nonlinearities.
Number of rivals in a defined radius (NBRjlc): Total number of rivals in a
defined radius. The radius chosen is the ‘volume weighted average provider distance’.
It captures the impact of deviations from localized competition on market power.





: Total volume of X transactions for each buyer, over 18 months.
Facility fixed effects (γj): To control for time-invariant unobservable features at





: Indicator variable marking top 5 % of the buyers in terms





: It is a dummy variable indicating collusive regime. It is equal to
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2.3 Data Analysis and Collusive Markers
2.3.1 Collusive Markers, and Related Literature
In a well-known strand of research25 , Professor Joseph Harrington analyses how
cartels operate. Guided by theory and enforcement experience, the aim is providing
rules of thumb for isolating suspicious patterns in the market. These rules of thumbs
are widely referred as “collusive markers” or “Harrington markers”, and flag the
possibility of a regime switch. Some examples are: a steady period of high price
followed by a decline; structural changes in pricing; a high correlation in pricing
behaviour across competitors; a change in relation of price and cost; reduction of
variation in price, product characteristics or quality; elimination of discounts; price
increases accompanied by declining imports; and stability in the market shares.
Collusive markers have low data requirements. They are intuitive and the economic
analysis involved is not necessarily complicated. Their purpose is “screening” the
market in deciding if more detailed analysis is required. However, since they are
only designed to flag the possibility of collusion, risk of type 1 and 2 errors are
considerable26. In this part, the literature on screening for collusion is presented.
Abrantes-Metz (2013a) focuses on aluminium market, where large customers
(primarily producers of canned beverages and drinks) express their concerns about
activities of metal warehouses, which recently have been taken over by investment
banks. Metal warehouses are accused of creating bottlenecks in the market.
Figure 2.4 depicts the evolution of the relation between inventory accumulation
and price in the market. Vertical line marks the warehouse takeovers. Before
warehouse takeovers, the correlation between inventory accumulation and price is
weak and negative. After the takeovers the correlation changes sign, and inventory
accumulation is associated with higher price. Similar breaks are also found in other
markers, e.g. the relation between cost of warehousing and inventory accumulation;
the relation between cost of warehousing and price. Abrantes-Metz (2013a) suggests
that findings warrant antitrust scrutiny or some regulatory action in the market.
In screening for collusion, Giles (2007) proposes an unconventional methodology
known as the Benford’s Law; if any data set is naturally occurring, the distribution
25Harrington (2006b,c, 2008)
26Yet, ironically, all the successful attempts of detecting collusion so far are studies of this sort.
This is a good example for divergence of needs of policy making, and the incentives in academic
research. Regarding policy making, it is not necessarily the case that the most sophisticated
analysis is the best. Competition policy stands on the intersection of economics, and other
fields, particularly law. At the heart of the case for proactive detection there is an assumption:
Upon detecting suspicious patterns, it is possible to launch an investigation. However in many
jurisdictions investigations require legal consent. On one hand, in order to convince decision
makers, the findings in the detection process should be reliable enough, and reliability usually
comes with more complex economic analysis. On the other hand, since decision to investigate is
taken by non-economists, making the analysis more complex might, (i) make communication more
difficult, (ii) increase the time requirements. It is difficult to say where the optimum is.
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Figure 2.4: Inventory Holdings and Prices in Aluminium
Source: Figure 1 in Abrantes-Metz (2013a).
of first and second digits can be predicted. Some examples for compatibility with
Benford’s Law are ”areas of lakes, lengths of rivers, and molecular weights of
compounds (p.157)”. In the field of economics, returns from Dow-Jones stocks,
Standard and Poor indices, price in European stock markets are found compatible
with Benford’s law27.
Giles (2007) points out that collusion can be taken as an anomaly, a non-natural
intervention to naturally occurring data process. Consequently, it should be possible
to detect bid rigging by monitoring the deviation of the actual bids from the
distribution predicted by Benford’s Law. In Giles (2007), bidding behaviour in ebaY
for the professional football tickets is taken on as an example. Observed bidding data
is in compliance with Benford’s Law, which is consistent with competitive bidding.
To isolate suspicious patterns in retail gasoline market in the Western Australia
between 2004-2012 Rauch et al. (2013) also use Benford’s Law. Since the price
data in retail petroleum is confined to an interval, it is the difference between
retail price and wholesale terminal price that is compared with Benford’s Law
predictions. First step is assessing compatibility of the aggregate market data
with the law in the long run. Results suggest that data frequencies roughly agree
with Benford’s law predictions. In the second stage, the analysis is repeated for
each undertaking. Results suggest suspicious deviations from the Benford’s Law.
Particularly for one undertaking, British Petroleum, the deviations are the most
visible. Third step centres on the relation between the size of deviation and some
collusive markers. Results indicate that except two years, 2009 and 2012, stations
with greater deviation have higher average margins, lower variance in margins, fewer
price changes, fewer price declines and low variance in market price. These findings
are interpreted as potential “circumstantial evidence of explicit collusion between
companies (p.19)”.
27See, (Giles, 2007, p.158) for a summary of literature
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Probably one of the most commonly used marker is the variance screening developed
by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006). At the first part of the analysis, the study centers
on a prosecuted bidding ring that was operational in frozen fish procurements of
US Department of Defence in 1984-1989. Figure 2.5 illustrates the price and cost
patterns for one type of fish, perch, in 1987-1989. First vertical line corresponds to
one member of the ring leaving the cartel; second vertical line corresponds to start of
the legal proceedings. Before the breakdown of the cartel, the price of frozen perch
is high and relatively stable. Following the collapse of the collusion, despite average
price falls by 16 %, standard deviation increases by 263 %, which gives a coefficient
of variation increase of 332 %. In the second part of the analysis, Abrantes-Metz
et al. (2006) explore the pricing patterns in Louisville gasoline market in which there
is no prior information about any collusion. Monitoring pricing patterns of 279 gas
stations, they look for “pockets” exhibiting high price, low price variation. Results
suggest there are no clusters of gasoline stations that provide a meaningful pattern
of collusion.
Figure 2.5: Perch Price and Cost, 1987-1989
Source: Figure 1 in Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006).
The proposition of Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) to analyse first two moments of price
has took a hold in the literature. A small empirical literature that centre on price
variation has emerged.
Blanckenburg et al. (2012) study 11 European cartels and find that in seven of
them variance is significantly lower in collusion periods. Bolotova et al. (2008a)
explore patterns in Citric acid and Lysine cartels. Results suggest that in both
cases, there are significant price increases; however, in lysine cartel price increase
has been coupled with decline in variance, but in citric acid cartel with increase
in variance. Esposito and Ferrero (2006) follow the footsteps of two documented
cartels in Italy, motor fuels; and personal care and baby food products. Using
scanner data, price variation in supermarkets and pharmacies are analysed. Results
exhibit considerable regional heterogeneity; suspicious patterns are present in all
regions but they are more concentrated in central and southern regions.
Heijnen et al. (2015); Jime´nez and Perdiguero (2012); Vickers and Ziebarth (2014)
41
incorporate price variation analysis within a broader framework.
Heijnen et al. (2015) study Dutch retail gasoline industry, particularly the patterns in
price variation with the objective of isolating some clusters of outlets with suspicious
price variation. A station is defined suspicious if it is at 5% of the stations with the
least price variation. Any two suspicious stations that are h kilometres apart are
regarded to be in the same cluster, along with non-suspicious stations that are in
the same radius. Final step is assessing the randomness of each cluster, basing on
the distribution of suspicious and non suspicious stations. The cluster that is least
likely to occur, is identified as “should be investigated”. The stations in this cluster
are removed and the analysis is iterated until no suspicious cluster is detected.
Vickers and Ziebarth (2014) study the response of the macaroni industry to the
National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA). Branded as “elimination of cutthroat
competition for the sake of fair competition”, NIRA is a temporary relaxation of
antitrust rules in US as a response to the Great Depression. The questions asked
in the study is, whether the official declaration of turning a blind eye to collusion
had an impact on firm behaviour. To this aim, three markers are employed. If there
is collusion: i) price would be less responsive to the changes in the cost, ii) price
variation would decline, and iii) price persistence (measured as the autocorrelation
in price) would increase. Results suggest that the act weakened the relation between
price and cost; as, correlation declined from 0.66 to 0.52. Moreover following the act
price dispersion declined significantly, as estimates for the fall is around 20-33 %28.
Third, after NIRA, price persistence falls to one third of former levels. It is also
noted that, all these patterns are more pronounced on the big firms in the industry
which would be the usual suspects for collusion.
Jime´nez and Perdiguero (2012) focus on price variation and price levels, however
incorporates two benchmarks. First benchmark is for monopolistic behaviour.
Canary Islands, are a collection of seven islands of various size, and in two of them
there is only one gasoline station. Price levels and variation in these markets are
taken to represent monopoly. Second benchmark is for competition. Price level and
price variation for a maverick brand are taken as the competitive benchmark. The
question is, two ends of the scale being defined as such, where do the gasoline markets
on oligopolistic islands locate? The results suggest that behaviour of oligopolistic
firms is closer to monopolistic firms.
2.3.2 Preliminary Analysis of Data
Figure 2.6 illustrates the price trend in the market. Left panel depicts the evolution
of monthly average price (in the form of a price index) by weighting each transaction
with the volume. Right panel presents non-weighted values.
28Vickers and Ziebarth (2014) suggest that this change in price variation cannot be traced back
to factors of the cost as the cost variation is same before and after NIRA.
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The price is relatively stable until month 7; then, it collapses without any sign of
recovery. In a period of one year, it suffers a decline of almost 30 %. The average
price in month 7–17 is 9.7% lower than the price average in the preceding months.
This period is also marked with considerably higher variation in price. Standard
deviation of price after month 7 is 34.9 % higher than the preceding period, while
the coefficient of variation is 49.3% higher.
Figure 2.6: Monthly Price
Figure 2.7 illustrates the evolution of monthly average distance between provider and
buyer. Month 7 marks the lowest average distance; after month 7, providers serve
regions further away. Within a couple of months, the average distance increases 15
%. The direction of this expansion is also important. This is captured by the index
of relative proximity measure, ∆jl , which bases on the difference between provider
distance to buyer from the distance of the closest rival to buyer. Similarly, it seems
that initial stability in this measure is disrupted similarly in month 7. The index
value is negative and increases in absolute value. Meaning that, firms extend their
activities to regions closer to their rivals.
Figure 2.7: Distance of Operations
Serving customers closer to rivals necessitates price reductions. First panel in
Figure 2.8 takes on this relationship. It illustrates the evolution of the correlation
between transaction price and the distance of the closest rival to buyer each month.
After month 7, the correlation between price and rival distance gradually increases;
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expansion of operations is increasingly associated with price cuts. Second panel
centres on the correlation between price and the number of rivals around the buyer
in a defined radius ; they are negatively correlated. Until month 7 the association of
two variables shows a stable pattern. Similarly, the correlation increases in absolute
terms in later months.
Figure 2.8: Price-Rival Distance & Price-Number of Rivals Correlation
Findings indicate that month 7 might represent a structural break in the form of
regime switch from collusion to competition. In the next chapter, using proactive




Proactive Detection: An Empirical
Application in a Spatial Setting
with Market Power Heterogeneity
3.1 Introduction
Competition policy draws its legal justification from competition law. Legal rules
bans the undertakings from certain conducts, and defines the penalties they face
if they do not comply. Within the borders of these prohibitions and penalties,
the decision makers i.e. court, competition authority, evaluate the facts and the
arguments of parties and form a decision. In a way, this decision is what gives
cartel its existence; it is difficult to talk about a cartel without any legal ruling.
Any legal ruling that say a cartel does/does not exit, builds on a prosecution;
which requires willingness to investigate on the law enforcement side, which in turn
depends on the available evidence. Some rare cases aside, the conventional wisdom
in the competition policy is that economics have no role in the process of evidence
gathering, or triggering an investigation. This is enshrined by the phrase “you can’t
catch a thief with an economist1”. Rather, in “thief-catching”, policy makers around
the world prefer relying on “the thieves themselves”. Today in many jurisdictions,
leniency2 is the primary tool to detect collusion. The role of the economist is confined
1This phase is credited (Schinkel, 2013, p.4) to Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Criminal Enforcement in US Department of Justice. See, the presentation done by
Scott D. Hammond in October 2005, in OECD Prosecutor’s Programme Working Party https://
www.justice.gov/atr/speech/ten-strategies-winning-fight-against-hardcore-cartels.
2Leniency is granted by the competition authority in exchange for cooperation. EU antitrust
regulations allow any firm that is part of a cartel to step up and acknowledge its participation in a
collusive scheme; provide a detailed description of the collusive agreement i.e. coverage, duration,
participants; and present any evidence it has. In return, if EU Commission does not have enough
evidence prior to the application and the applicant is the first, an immunity from fine is granted.
If the applicant firm is not the first to come forward, then instead of an immunity, a reduction is
granted. The amount of reduction is 30–50 % for the second firm, 20–30% for the third firm, and
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to the post ruling period; the assessment of the impact of an already proven collusion,
which most probably is “detected” by a leniency application.
Not surprisingly, many economists have issues with this demarcation3. They
find the overreliance to self-reporting troublesome; in particular, they are worried
that leniency might not be desisting and deterring the cartels with highest
member loyalty; these with highest profitability. Consequently, it is better to
complement leniency with other tools; to this end, they propose proactive detection
methodologies, detecting collusive activity by using economic analysis in the absence
of no prior information about the cartel.
Harrington (2008) describes the proposed methodology: The economist, similar to
what a “detective” would do in pursuing a case, adopts a sequential analysis. The
first step is “screening”. The aim in this stage is flagging markets that are “worthy
of close scrutiny (p.214-215)”.
Building on collusive markers proposed by Harrington (2006a,c, 2008), in Chapter 2,
I conduct a simple analysis of data. Findings indicate that consistent with a regime
switch from collusion to competition, stable relations in the market were disrupted
after month seven. I take this as a suspicious pattern to be investigated further.
In the sequential analysis of Harrington (2008), if no suspicious pattern is identified
in the screening, there is no basis for further investigation. If some suspicious
patterns are identified, the law enforcement has two options. First, is triggering
an ex-officio investigation with the available information4. Second, is asking the
economist to go to the second stage, “the verification”. In this stage the aim is to
“systematically exclude competition as an explanation for observed behaviour and
gather evidence in support of collusion”. The difference between screening and
verification is this: Whereas screening may entail studying price patterns, verification
requires controlling for demand and cost factors and any other variables necessary
to distinguish between collusion and competition. (p.215)”. If the verification stage
suggests patterns are consistent with competition, no further investigation is carried
on. If not, authorities may trigger an ex-officio investigation. Harrington (2008)
also suggests there might be a third stage, “the prosecution”; providing economic
evidence “to persuade a court or some other administrative body that there has been
violation of law”. This stage is essentially “verification with different standards
(p.215)”, and is uncharted waters, as, in no jurisdiction, economic evidence is seen
sufficient to establish guilt5.
In this chapter, I take on the suspicious patterns identified around month seven,
20% for the subsequent firms. See, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=
CELEX:52006XC1208(04).
3See, Abrantes-Metz (2013b); Schinkel (2013).
4At this point I presume that it is possible to trigger an ex-officio investigation, which typically
would be more plausible if collusion is only an administrative offence. If collusion is a criminal
offence, obtaining legal consent using economic evidence might be practically impossible.
5Note that this is different than damages proceedings where the impact of the conduct on price
is estimated, after the guilt is established by a court decision.
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and investigate further, while I control for demand and cost shifters. Building on
the theoretical framework laid on in Chapter 1, I explore if observed patterns are
more consistent with collusion or competition.
In devising the empirical strategy, I consult to the empirical literature concerned
with the identification of collusion. The literature in this area can be grouped into
three: studies basing on data analysis, works making regime comparison, and studies
tracking collusive strategy. As covered in Chapter 2, data analysis is primarily used
to identify suspicious markets, firms or periods. In some works, similar to this one, it
is used as a first stage in a multi stage analysis. Regime comparison entails either (i)
making estimations alternative regime assumptions and competing them in terms of
likelihood, or (ii) estimating a single pricing/bidding equation assuming competition,
and tracking the left over patterns in the unexplained portion. Tracking collusive
strategy involves testing a specific type of correlation across the behaviour of rivals
that arises as a result of the collusive strategy cartel employs or is suspected to
employ.
One particularly important work in the literature for our purposes is Bresnahan
(1987) who suggests that if there is price competition, for the products that have a
close substitute, the price would converge to marginal cost; while in collusion, price
and cost would diverge. He tests this theory in explaining drastic changes in US
automobile industry in 1955, by taking this year as a temporary price war in the
context of a longer collusion.
This study contributes first to the literatures of detecting collusion using consumer
level data, and empirical analysis of price discrimination. However, more important
contribution of this work is taking the premise in Bresnahan (1987) – centring on
the relationship between price and local market power in identifying regime switch –
that is applied to an heterogeneous product / product characteristics space setting
to an homogeneous product / geographic space setting. In geographical space,
local market power varies at each location according to cost difference between
potential competitor and dominant competitor at that location. In this study,
estimation centres on explaining pricing behaviour, and particularly its relation with
∆jl , relative proximity of the provider and its closest rival to the buyer. The idea
is that after controlling for factors influential in pricing6, ∆jl acts as an indicator
of variations in local market power measure, the cost difference between potential
competitor and dominant competitor at each location. Using OLS and GMM and
via interacting a two level factorial variable, the dummy for first seven months, with
market power measures, two different pricing equations are estimated; one for first
seven months, and the other for after month seven. To my best knowledge, there
is no work with similar methodology in homogeneous product / geographic space
setting.
Findings indicate that i) at locations where market power of provider and the closest
rival converge, there is a large price difference between suspected collusion period
6Controlling for all factors influential in pricing is naturally not possible; however, as part of
future work, I plan to study other confounding factors.
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and competition period; ii) at locations where the provider has large market power,
price in both periods converge; iii) in suspected competition period, local market
power indicator is both linearly and quadratically related to pricing; providers
suffer large price cuts to serve buyers that are gradually closer to the closest rival;
iv) in suspected collusion period, local market power indicator is positively but
only linearly related to price, and the linear relation is much weaker than that in
competition. These findings are interpreted as further evidence for a regime switch
from collusion to competition. The results also suggest that level of market power
each provider has on a buyer is very important in the assessment of the impact of
collusion on price, which is explored in detail in Chapter 5.
This chapter is organized as follows: Next section discusses the motivation in
proactive detection, and previous episodes of successful detection. Third section
introduces the literature, empirical strategy methodology, and contribution of this
work to the literature. Fourth section presents the estimations. Final section
concludes.
3.2 A Brief Assessment of Proactive Detection:
The Motivation and the Outcome
3.2.1 Motivation for Proactive Detection
Today in many jurisdictions leniency is the primary tool to detect collusion.
Leniency has delivered many cartels worldwide. However, after a recent roundtable7,
OECD suggested that enforcement might be improved if it is complemented by
other tools. The concern is, leniency might fall short of desisting and deterring
“high-quality” cartels.
...what type of cartel is typically brought up by a leniency application? ...
[T]he less well-organized ones. Or old-and-dying cartels that lost most of
their profitability and so their stability. ... [S]ophisticated active cartels,
certainly those that formed with the leniency programs being a reality ...
can only exist because they found ways in which to avoid being destabilized
by the lure of leniency... [W]hen agency resources are limited, it is
doubtful whether they should be spend mostly on bringing these tail-end
leniency cartels, since it means that other cartels, in particular more
sophisticated and profitable ones ... cannot be discovered, and in some
cases also cannot be investigated when a suspicion does exist (Schinkel,
2013, p.259).
The decision to collude is the outcome of an assessment of relative pay-offs in
7See, www.oecd.org/daf/competition/exofficio-cartel-investigation-2013.pdf.
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collusion and competition8. The most successful cartels have the broadest pay-off
gap between competition and collusion, thus have the highest member loyalty. It
follows that success of leniency on a specific cartel, depends on profitability of
cartel; in other words, leniency is dependent on internal dynamics of the cartel
(Abrantes-Metz, 2013b, p.228).
In this debate, whether leniency systematically fail to deliver high quality cartels
or not, one line of experimental economics literature is particularly relevant. These
works focus on the relation between leniency and deterrence, and test two competing
arguments9:
i. The urge of being first to report (also known as “the race to the courthouse”)
destabilize the cartels, increase probability of detection and make collusion less
likely.
ii. As anyone can apply for leniency at any time, the credibility of retaliations
increase. Moreover, expected fines might be reduced if firms can apply leniency
taking turns. As a result, incentive to collude is fortified, and collusion is more
likely.
Literature, despite not centring on cartel quality, does answer relevant questions
like “what is the relative level of price?” or “what is the relative cartel stability?”
in collusion, if i) leniency is allowed, and ii) leniency is not allowed. Table 3.1
summarizes the related findings.
Most of the studies have findings that justify the concerns about the quality of
cartels. Under leniency, cartels are more resilient, and characterised by higher
price10. However, this should be interpreted with some caution for at least two
reasons. First, leniency and antitrust policy are imperfectly modelled in these
studies. Institutions like damages11, or leniency plus12 are not incorporated. Fines
are either set to 10 % of turnover – the maximum fine limit – or are fixed at a constant
8This assessment involves weighing the expected cost of collusion (fines, damages, reputation
loss) and probability of detection on one side, the expected net profits from collusion on the other.
9See, Hinloopen and Onderstal (2014), p.318.
10The findings by Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et al. (2015) either justify absence
of quality issues, or provide a case for increasing fines rather than investing in improving the
detection rate.
11Damages are compensation claims of parties that are harmed by collusion. More formally
damages may be defined as “...compensation for actual loss (damnum emergens), for gain
of which that person has been deprived (loss of profit or lucrum cessans), plus interest.”
See, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.349.01.
0001.01.ENG, Article 12.
12“Leniency plus” refers to a further fine reduction granted to the applicant if the applicant
reveals another collusion in a distinct market. See, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
international/multilateral/template.pdf, Footnote 5.
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Table 3.1: Some Experimental Works and Relevant Findings
Work Relevant Finding
Apesteguia et al. (2007) For the subset of cases in which self-reporting happens,
the price is not necessarily the maximum price. However,
for the subset of cases in which self-reporting does not
happen, market price is the maximum price. There is no
cartel pricing below the maximum price.
Bigoni et al. (2012) “What does not kill us makes us stronger”: Average
collusive price is higher in treatment with self-reporting in
relation to treatment without self-reporting. Also, when
probability of detection and the level of fines increase,
under leniency, collusive price increases even further.
Dijkstra et al. (2011) Cartels formed under leniency are able to make larger
price increases.
Hinloopen and Onderstal (2014) Treatment with no leniency: cartel is less stable, and
collusive price is lower.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) The level of collusive price is similar in all cartels. If there
is leniency, collusive price is lower; survival probability of
cartels is lower.
Bigoni et al. (2015): Let us assume leniency causes overburdening in
competition authority and this reduces deterrence. The
best way to overcome this problem is increasing the
fines. Increasing probability of detection will not have
the desired effect.
value13. Second, since market structure does not vary within an experiment14, only
one market can be tested at a time. It is difficult to generalize findings under one
market structure to other market structures.
13In EU anti-cartel enforcement, the fine setting would start by determination of a basic fine.
This is 30 % of the revenue from relevant sales multiplied by the number of years, plus 15-25
% entry fee for cartels. Then, first, aggravating factors are considered i.e. offender is a repeat
offender, or a ring leader. Second, mitigating factors are considered i.e. offender has a limited role,
or cooperated with authorities beyond legal requirements. 10 % threshold applies on the world
turnover of the entire undertaking. Naturally, in many cases, 10 % only constitutes a hypothetical
threshold. See, “Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of
Regulation No 1/2003”, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/
?uri=CELEX:52006XC0901(01)&from=EN.
14Only a limited number of market structures have been used in experimental literature.
These are Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods, Bertrand competition with product
differentiation, English type oral auction and first price sealed auction.
51
Nevertheless, from a policy making perspective, assuming there are inherent quality
issues in leniency, it should not be provoking to suggest that these issues might be
mitigated by complementing leniency with proactive detection. The more successful
a cartel, the greater is the divergence between competition and collusion. This
means that the likelihood of a successful cartel to pop-up in the radar is higher
(Abrantes-Metz, 2013b, 228)15.
In the following part, some of successful episodes of proactive detection is explored.
3.2.2 Episodes of Proactive Detection
Probably the most well-known case of successful proactive detection is the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) market studies
by Christie et al. (1994); Christie and Schultz (1994). The aim is analysing
competitiveness of NASDAQ. The market is subject to free-entry and exit, and
there are multiple dealers operational at any given time.
Christie and Schultz (1994) study the bid-ask spreads of 100 most traded stocks
in 1991. These stocks are compared with similar 100 stocks from New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX). In NASDAQ stocks,








of a dollar) are suspiciously rare. On
the other hand, for the similar stocks in AMEX and NYSE, the bids are distributed
more evenly to odd and even eights. Results suggest,
• A quarter of the spreads in NYSE/AMEX is 1
8
, while the ratio is 10 percent
for NASDAQ. More than 30 % of the spreads in NASDAQ is 4
8
, while this
is 5% in NYSE. This implies a minimum spread of 2
8
for each transaction in
NASDAQ.
• 66 % of the NASDAQ firms have no16 quotations with the lowest spread,
1
8
. Only 2 % of the NYSE/AMEX firms have no quotations with the lowest
spread.
• In NASDAQ, in the subset of stocks that are rarely quoted in odd eights,
average duration time for odd eights is less than 2 minutes, while average
duration time for an even quote time is 20-35 minutes. On the other hand, in
the subset of stocks that routinely use odd eights, the average duration time
of an odd- eight quote and even-eight quote is similar.
Christie and Schultz (1994) find that the distribution of dollar spreads in NASDAQ
and other stock exchanges are fundamentally different (p.1819), and conclude,
15Note that cartels might strategically attempt to fly under the radar. However, this means the
cartel is no more equally “successful”. A less pronounced benefit of proactive detection is better
quality dawn raids. Guidance about nature, length, type, coverage or parties of a cartel may help
to target the dawn raids effectively (Bos, 2009, p.110).
16Less than 4%.
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“While this article does not provide conclusive evidence of tacit collusion among
market makers, we are unable to offer any other plausible explanation for the lack
of odd-eighth quotes (p.1835).”
Upon making their findings public at 24th of May 1994, Professors William Christie
and Paul Schultz immediately became famous17. On 26th of May the Los Angeles
Times18 and on 27th of May the Wall Street Journal19 covered potentially collusive
practices in NASDAQ.
After the news became public, the behaviour of the NASDAQ dealers changed
drastically. Christie et al. (1994) show that,
• Inside spread narrows within a couple of trading days.
• Percentage of odd-eight quotes for the most popular stocks jumps from less
than 3 %, to 40 %. Within these odd-eight quotes, highest share is one-eight
spread with almost 70 % share.
Christie et al. (1994) comment on these findings as follows, “the change in the
inside spread for these stocks may reflect the breakdown of implicit agreements among
market makers to post quotes exclusively on even eighths for these issues. (p.1853)”
Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation in the summer of 1994,
eventually reaching a settlement with 24 dealers in July 1996 including big names
like Goldman, Sachs & Co., J.P. Morgan Securities Inc, Lehman Brothers Inc.,
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. and Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.
DOJ publicly acknowledged the role of Christie and Schultz (1994) and Christie
et al. (1994) by announcing “The Department’s investigation began in the summer
of 1994, shortly after the publication of an economic study by Professors William
Christie of Vanderbilt University and Paul Schultz of Ohio State University about
the NASDAQ market20”. The follow-up law suits following the case were settled
around 1 billion dollars in December 199721.
A similar episode is related to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), the
interest rate to be charged by member financial institutions for lending. The rate
is computed by taking an average of some mid ranking quotes, ignoring the highest
and lowest ones22. Figure 3.1 summarizes the patterns in LIBOR and alternative
indicators of cost of borrowing in 2007-2008. Interest rate is marked on the left axis.
17For an account of events form Professor William Christie’s view, see, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=h6IruE_sMsw.
18Along with Milwaukee Journal, Detroit News and others.
19Along with Boston Globe, Atlanta Constitution and others.
20See, https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/1996/July96/343-at.html.
21For a map of the legal process, also see, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB916082557328717000
and http://www.economist.com/node/111273.
22Exact method of calculation depends on the currency. For example, for GBP derivatives, 16
institutions submit bids and the rate is the average of mid 8 quotes, after discarding highest and
lowest 4 quotes. See, https://www.theice.com/iba/libor.
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The horizontal lines mark two structural breaks in the market: First is the date
(September 2007) of the joint announcement of European Central Bank, Federal
Reserve, and Bank of Japan about a coordinated intervention. Second is the date
(April 2008) of the announcement of British Bankers Association to investigate.
The figure suggests that starting from August 2006, LIBOR is virtually constant
on average until August 2007. Between September 2007 and April 2008, LIBOR
plunges, and remains systematically higher than alternative indicators of cost of
borrowing. After April 2008, LIBOR stabilizes and converges with alternative
indicators of cost of borrowing.
Figure 3.1: Trends in Libor and Other Rates
Source: Figure 1 in Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012)
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2011) explore the suspicious stability in the market before
September 2007, using Benford’s Law. Since LIBOR is sticky in the first digit,
they track the compatibility of the second digit with Benford’s Law. First finding
is that in the long-run (between 1987-2005), second digit distribution of LIBOR
is compatible with Bedford’s Law predictions. Later, to identify deviations in the
short run, they monitor LIBOR on a rolling six month basis. The results indicate,
• Until January 2006, data complies with Benford’s Law.
• Starting from February 2006, for a period of 18 months (until August 2007),
data deviates from Benford’s Law.
• Between August 2007 and December 2007, second digit behaviour is again
compatible with Benford’s Law.
• After oscillating between convergence and divergence until April 2008, the
data diverges from Benford’s Law once again between May 2008 and October
2008.
The results are interpreted as follows,
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The behavioural departures of LIBOR from the expected path, in
particular a path that LIBOR had followed for at least the prior 20
years, raise questions regarding the integrity and quality of its rate signals
coming from individual banks and cry out for an answer. Based on
our evidence, biased signals coming from the individual banks (agent
aggregation bias), rate manipulation or collusion appear as one likely
answer (p.897).
In June 2012, US Department of Justice announced that it reached an agreement
with Barclays Bank PLC, regarding LIBOR. Settlement is related to the following
conduct: “certain Barclays traders communicated with traders at other financial
institutions, including other banks on LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, to request
LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that would be favourable to their or their
counterparts trading positions23”. European Commission in 04.12.2013 announced
that it has fined banks participating in the interest derivatives industry by a total of
1.49 billion Euros for two different collusive activities: one (EURO LIBOR) covering
September 2005 and May 2008, and the other one (JPY LIBOR) covering 2007-2010
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1208_en.htm.
Abrantes-Metz and Sokol (2012) comment on this as follows:
The alleged Libor collusion and manipulation is something that antitrust
authorities or the banks themselves could have detected had they used
econometric screens. ... What explains the lack of adoption of screens
by the DOJ is that it, like many organizations, is slow to respond to
changes. However, in a world of uncertainty, organizations may copy
other organizations, as competition will eliminate inferior ideas (p.16).
Estrada and Vazquez (2013); Mena-Labarthe (2012) and country contribution
from Mexico in 2013 OECD roundtable24 tell a successful detection story from
Mexico. Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) applied to Mexican Competition
Authority (CFCE) about suspicions regarding Medical Procurements. Using a
dataset provided by the IMSS, CFCE analysed i) distribution of auctions across
bidders, ii) convergence of market shares, iii) profit margins, iv) the effects of new
entry on the bidding behaviour.
Data suggests that the winning bids are exactly the same in some auctions over and
over. Moreover, the market shares display patterns consistent with bid rotation.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the evolution of monthly market shares in three categories
of drugs over time. Market shares start from initially very divergent values, and
then converge. Shares remain convergent until two simultaneous events happen in






mechanism - a change away from small regional procurements to nationwide large
procurements - ii) aggressive new entry in the market. This change acts as a
structural break, and market shares diverges again.
Findings are interpreted as evidence indicating that a cartel might be in place before
2006; then it might be disrupted by the structural changes. Building on these
findings CFCE launched an investigation. The investigation process provided the
legal evidence documenting the coordination among the firms. In January 2010, the
investigation ended. Seven pharmaceutical firms have been fined for bid rigging in
procurement of two different products.
Figure 3.2: Bidder Market Shares in CFCE Investigation
Source: Figure 2 in Estrada and Vazquez (2013)
Similarly, in July 2016, COMCO/WEKO had a rulling regarding 8 construction
companies and imposed a total fine of 5 million CHF. According to 2016 Annual
Report of COMCO/WEKO25 “The companies had agreed on bids and determined
who was to be awarded contracts in connection with several hundred invitations to
tender ... between 2002 and 2009. The investigation began in April 2013 with
searches of premises, largely based on a statistical analysis of [public tender protocols
(Offerto¨ffnungsprotokollen)]. As part of the arrangements that were uncovered, the
companies had until mid-2009 met regularly for market assessment meetings. At
these meetings ... The eight companies discussed the projects that they were each
interested in. If they reached agreement, a decision was taken on which company
should be awarded the contract. The other companies submitted bids offering their
services at higher prices (p.5).”. The case at hand is the product of a long term
project of COMCO/WEKO that is launched in 2008. The aim was developing a
screening tool that has modest data requirements, can be applied simply, and is
reliable. Imhof et al. (2016) presents the COMCO/WEKO multi stage framework.
First stage aims to single out the suspicious firms and/or auctions. To this aim, first
variance screening is used. Second marker, called “relative distance”, is designed to
capture phantom bidding. It is the ratio of the difference between two lowest bids to
standard deviation of losing bids. In the case of phony bids, the ratio takes a large
value, while in the case of competitive bidding it approximates to 1. Second stage
looks for some regularity in the observed suspicious patterns. Third stage centres
on geographical distribution of the suspicious activity. Fourth stage aims to identify




There is reason to believe that proactive detection may be a reality of antitrust
policy in the near future as research is growing fast; research and policy interaction
might provide considerable improvements; and awareness of consultancy firms is
increasing26. Similar optimism is shared by Harrington (2006a):
For sceptics who think that screening cannot work, I have two responses.
First, screening is used for various other forms of illegal activity such as
tax evasion, insider trading on security markets, and credit card fraud. It
appears to be working there. Though the available data is much greater in
those cases than it would generally be for someone screening for collusion,
this leads me to my second point. We have never really tried to engage in
cartel screening. Solutions to challenging problems are not found until we
seriously apply ourselves to solving them. The sceptics may ultimately
be right but their views reflect a pessimistic assessment based on the
existing body of knowledge. Innovation is the creation of new knowledge
and, by its definition, is not anticipated. Who knows what innovations
in screening methods may arise once we apply ourselves. So, I intend
to ignore the sceptics until after we’ve seriously tried to develop and
implement methods for screening (p.38).
In the next section, literature on proactive detection of collusion is explored27.
3.3 Literature
The works in this field are quite diverse in methodology, strategy and complexity.
It is possible to evaluate existing research in three subsections: studies basing
on data analysis, works making regime comparison, and studies tracking collusive
strategy. Since both in Chapter 2 and in previous subsection data analysis literature
is presented, in this section they are not introduced again. This section focusses on
the works in the latter two categories.
It should be noted that it is not always straightforward to classify works between
detection literature and estimation of damages literature, because some works aspire
to do both. In these cases, when a judgement needs to be made, own positioning
of the paper, the literature it covers, and the gravity of the analysis are taken into
account. To avoid repetition, I refrain from covering works that are better suited to





27For another evaluation of literature from a more sceptical view see, Doane et al. (2015).
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3.3.1 Regime Comparison
There are two defining factors for the works that use regime comparison. First,
is the information set researcher has. Some studies track the behaviour of
prosecuted cartels (Jakobsson (2007); Porter and Zona (1993, 2003, 1999)). In
this case, in identifying the regime switch, the researcher may benefit from the
information available from proceedings, e.g. identity of cartel members, nature
of collusive agreement, cartel’s duration. Some others, like this work, track cases
with no prior knowledge of cartel activity. In this case, first, suspicious time
periods, regions, or firms are identified. Next, suspicious patterns are compared to
non-suspicious patterns (Aryal and Gabrielli (2013); Padhi and Mohapatra (2011)).
Second, is the methodology. One approach is estimating a competitive pricing
equation and applying it first to competing firms, then to colluding firms, with the
expectation that if there is collusion, pricing equation will only explain behaviour
of competing firms (Porter and Zona (1993, 1999)). Another is estimating multiple
pricing equations, one of which is collusive, and racing the equations in terms of
likelihood (Baldwin et al. (1997); Banerji and Meenakshi (2004); Bresnahan (1987)).
Also common is, estimating a competitive pricang equation, and monitoring the
correlation in the unexplained portion across competitors (Bajari and Ye (2003);
Jakobsson (2007); Padhi and Mohapatra (2011)). Almost all the works making
regime comparison look at on bidding markets.
Porter and Zona (1993) study a bidding rigging that was active in Long Island
highway construction projects and operated by phantom bidding. The identity of
the winner is determined in ring meetings held before each auction. Designated
firm submits a serious bid, while other bids are complementary. The collusion
is partial, in the sense that there is a competitive fringe. The aim is identifying
collusive behaviour via comparing the level and the ranking of bids of prosecuted
firms, with those of the fringe. Results suggest that the level of bids for the fringe
is well explained by competitive bidding equation; bids are primarily determined
by factors of cost, such as capacity utilization, or proximity. However, the same
bidding equation does a poor job in explaining the bidding behaviour of the ring.
Regarding the ranking of the bids, findings are similar: For the fringe, bid ranking
is determined by the cost rankings; while for the ring, bid ranking and cost ranking
are unrelated.
Porter and Zona (2003, 1999) focus on tenders for milk procurement in Ohio school
districts. Demand is insensitive to price. Production is scattered. Firms have similar
suppliers, inputs, and technology, and symmetrical production cost. Transportation
cost is important for competitiveness, and competition is localized.
Three milk producers in Cincinnati have been accused of bid rigging. Two of them
applied for leniency and pleaded guilty while the third pleaded innocent. The case
eventually was settled, and did not go to court. Collusion spanned 1980-90, with
two brief interruptions, one in 1983-1984, another in 1989. Collusive strategy is
customer allocation; members of the ring submit only phantom bids for the school
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districts that are being served by one of the other members. Ring members submit
competitive bids only against distant rivals which are located outside the Cincinnati
area. Porter and Zona (2003) expect that “Since competition is localized, prices will
fall to competitive levels only in areas where there is a sufficient number of local
competitors. Distant competitors are disadvantaged by transportation cost and can
only limit price increases to a certain extent. The competitive significance of each
supplier is directly related to its relative distance from the school district (pp.217-8)”.
Since all three firms are located in Cincinnati, the relative proximity of the rivals
to school districts is similar. In competition, this pushes price towards the cost.
In collusion, ring members have the opportunity to drive up the price, as they are
constrained only by competition from distant rivals. Behaviour of the control group
shows that the likelihood to bid is a declining function of distance. Firms almost
never bid for a district more than 75 miles away, while they bid for every other
auction that is at almost zero distance. Regarding the level, bids increase with
distance. The closest supplier has some market power, but this quickly erodes.
Porter and Zona (1999) analyse two issues related to bidding: decision to participate
in an auction and the level of the bid. The strategy is similar to Porter and Zona
(1993): Taking the behaviour of the non-participating firms (control group) as the
competitive behaviour, and comparing it to the behaviour of the colluding parties.
The methodology in comparing the behaviour of ring members and the control group
is as follows: For each defendant, the defendant bidding data is added to the control
group data and the estimation is made by assuming first, the defendant has no
difference in the likelihood of bidding from the control group; second, the likelihood
of bidding is different for the defendant. Same methodology is applied on the level
of bids, and the findings are similar; bidding equation for each defendant is different
than the bidding equation for control group.
At the next step, the consistency of behaviour of defendants with collusive strategy
is explored. Results suggest that in comparison to the control group, the defendants
have higher likelihood to serve further away. Also the level of the bid is a
declining function of distance. This is consistent with the collusive strategy,
which should produce high price in Cincinnati, at the heart of collusion; and low
price on the boundaries. This pattern is only disrupted with the interruptions
to collusion, the price wars, which are characterised by a fall in Cincinnati price.
Finally, the independence of the defendant firm behaviour from identity of rivals
is formally tested. If all firms are competing, information about a bidder (either
participation to the auction or bid level) should not have any explanatory power
in predicting whether another firm is also participating or its bid. However if the
defendants are using phantom bidding as the prosecution suggests, their decisions
(both participation to the auction and bid level) should be positively correlated.
The results are consistent with collusive behaviour; unexplained part is highly
positively correlated across defendants. The correlation is present both in decision
to participate and the level of the bid.
Banerji and Meenakshi (2004) examine wheat procurement in Northern India.
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Primarily concerned with process of price formation, and its efficiency, they also
explore the possibility of collusion among asymmetrical buyers. If present, the
hypothesized form of collusion is a bid rotation among three big buyers, which
together control 45 % of the trade; if collusion is in effect, in each auction, one ring
member is competing against a set of small firms. However, if competition is in
effect, all large players are expected to participate in the auction. Basing on the
bidding data, two models, one for collusion and one for competition, are estimated.
Collusive model outcompetes the competitive model in terms of likelihood statistics
and fit to the data.
Bajari and Ye (2003) look at highway maintenance auctions in US. They propose
following test for assessing if firms are competing. First, after controlling common
features governing bidding, the bidder behaviour should be independent from each
other. This conditional independence, in practice corresponds to retrieving bid
equations for each bidder, then monitoring the correlation between residuals in
the bidding equations between bidders in a pairwise manner. Results suggest
that one pair of firms violates conditional independence. Second condition of
competitive bidding is exchangeability. Identities of the rivals in an auction should be
inconsequential in determining the bid; it should be governed by relative costs. This,
in practice, corresponds restraining the sample to two firms and testing parameter
equality in bidding equation in a pairwise manner. Results suggest another pair
fails to satisfy exchangeability. Conditional independence and exchangeability
tests suggest three alternative explanations. First, all the firms are competing.
Second, the firms violating conditional independence are colluding. Third, the
firms violating exchangeability are colluding. To assess the likelihood of these
explanations, Bajari and Ye (2003) compare three estimations made under these
three assumptions. Findings suggest that competitive model not only outcompetes
the collusive models in terms of likelihood measures; but results of competitive model
are more compatible with the actual cost and mark-up levels in the industry.
Bajari and Ye (2003) provide a good self-critique of the empirical strategy. Since
the strategy involves, controlling all the factors related to bidding behaviour and
monitoring the left out correlation in the residuals, misspecification, or uncontrolled
factors might lead to correlation in the residuals (p.983, FN21). Jakobsson (2007)
points out a couple of other issues. First, if suppliers procure inputs from each other
(or from a common source), this should introduce some dependencies in bidding
that might are not captured by observables. Second, testing behaviour of bidders
pairwise might make interpretation difficult if cartel is composed of more than two
firms. Third, if there is a competitive fringe, strategic considerations might introduce
dependencies. Strategy of the fringe might differ when facing some member of the
cartel vs. when facing non-members.
Systematic framework developed in Bajari and Ye (2003) has been applied by
others to other settings. An example is Padhi and Mohapatra (2011) that apply
conditional independence and exchangeability tests to Indian roadwork procurement
data. Another example is Jakobsson (2007), investigating the bidding patterns in
asphalt paving auctions in Sweden. The study tracks a legal case. Nine firms have
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been prosecuted for price fixing and market allocation in 1990’s. Jakobsson (2007)
examines if the bidding behaviour violates the conditional independence. The results
suggest high pairwise correlation in the residuals of the bidding equations for eight
out of nine prosecuted firms28.
Aryal and Gabrielli (2013) develop an intuitive test to detect collusion. If bidders
are colluding, their mark-up should be higher relative to that in competition. For
example, if the same bid observed in both competitive and collusive regimes, it
must be because the cost is lower in the collusive regime. However, note that cost
is unobservable; but using structural estimation techniques it is possible to infer
it under alternative conduct assumptions29. In that case, to identify collusion,
researcher can test if the cost inferred under competition assumption and cost
inferred under collusion assumption have identical distributions.
The test is applied on data from Californian Highway procurement auctions30. At
the first stage, to identify suspicious behaviour, bidders that violate conditional
independence and exchangeability are identified via a reduced form equation. These
pairs are marked as suspicious. Later cost is inferred first under assumption of
competition, and then under assumption of collusion. The result is in favour of
competition; it is not possible to reject the equality of the distributions. They
view this divergence in the verdict as “highlight[ing] potential pitfalls of inferring
collusion based only on reduced form tests (p.26).” There are a couple of comments
to be noted about this conclusion.
First, Bajari and Ye (2003) methodology simply asks “Is there left over relation
between bidders’ mark-ups even after observable factors that are influential in bidding
are controlled?”. It is the answer “No” that provides a concrete evidence; after
controlling for observable factors, there is no proof of dependency in bidding
behaviour across firms. As discussed above for the answer “Yes” there may be
multiple explanations, only one of which is collusion; some others are presence of
an omitted variable, misspecification or interdependencies among firms. Second, it
is not clear how (actual or alleged) failure of Bajari and Ye (2003) to distinguish
between competition and collusion can be generalized all empirical strategies that
employ reduced form techniques. Third, the structural estimation also comes with a
cost: structural rigidity. The estimates might be severely biased if the assumptions
about conduct are not realistic, or the issue of how to address the time spent
travelling from one conduct to another is not addressed31.
28Lundberg et al. (2015) using an updated version of the same data set, builds on the empirical
strategy by including probability to collude to the analysis.
29Structural estimation techniques are analysed in detail in Chapter 4.
30Before applying it on data, Aryal and Gabrielli (2013) do Monte Carlo simulations; results
suggest that the test is picking up collusion. The test is applied on publicly available auction data,
about which there is no a priori information regarding presence of a collusion.
31See, Peters (2006) for an assessment of sensitivity of structural estimation to assumptions
about the conduct.
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3.3.2 Tracking the Collusive Strategy
Differing from the works in the previous group, works in this group do not test
the presence of any correlation across rivals. Instead they test a specific type of
correlation: the collusive strategy cartel employs or is suspected to employ.
Ishii (2009) develops a test for a specific type of collusive strategy; keeping a score of
“favours” in the form of “letting the rival to win”. Cartel members expect to have
a proper return for the favours they do, i.e. winning in the future. In this scheme,
before any auction the most likely winner is the firm which did the most favours in
relation to favours it received.
The study takes on compensation consulting market32 in Okinawa using publicly
available data and with no a priori knowledge of collusion. There are some suspicious
patterns in bidding behaviour. With the exception of a couple of cases, such as
non-Okinawian firms being present, the winning bids are clustered very close to
reserve price with little variance. Ishii (2009) proposes estimating likelihood to
win, using observables that should influence bidding behaviour, e.g cost indicators,
level of competition, along with a score variable that captures pairwise balance
sheet of “favours” of firms to each other. Under competition, the score should
capture nothing. Likelihood to win should be determined by relative cost and level
of competition. Under hypothesized collusive strategy, score should signal the most
likely winner. The findings suggest that the effect of score is significant and very
strong while observables that should influence bidding behaviour have little effect
and/or insignificant.
One of the most frequently studied cartels in competition economics is Vitamins
cartel. On a global scale, vitamin producers adopted market sharing arrangements
and fixed the price during September 1989 - February 1999. Prosecution in EU
ended with Commission fining eight vitamin producers a total of 855.22 million
Euros33. Figure 3.3 illustrates some patterns in price announcements in Vitamins
industry.
There are two features of price announcement behaviour that is consistent with
a regime switch. First, before 1985, price is announced by the market leader
unilaterally, while after 1985 price announcements become joint. Second, before
1985, advance price announcement does not occur, while after 1985, it is a common
practise. Building on this finding, Marshall et al. (2008) formally estimate the
likelihood of a price announcement using demand and cost shifters, i.e. price of
oil, exchange rate; and the variable of interest, time elapsed since the previous
adjustment (time lag). The idea is that if the firms are competing, price
announcements would be determined by demand and cost shifters, not by time lag.
On the other hand if firms are colluding, price increases would be determined by
the regularly held cartel meetings, and price and time lag would be closely related.
32To be more specific, the market under investigation is consulting services extended to parties
whose property has been subject to compulsory purchase by public authorities.
33http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003D0002
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Figure 3.3: Price Announcements of Producers of Vitamin A
Source: Figure 1 in Marshall et al. (2008).
Findings suggest that after 1985 price is primarily governed by the time lag. It
is noticeable that even though parties pleaded guilty for post 1990, the structural
break in price announcement behaviour goes back to 1985. This is interpreted
as a potential sign of under enforcement, meaning five years of cartel not being
penalized34.
Conley and Decarolis (2016) develop a way to detect collusion in average price
auctions (APA), and apply it public road works auctions in Italy. In APA auctions,
the auctioneer, rather than making the price as the first criterion, eliminates too
high and too low quotes and awards the auction to the bidder closest to the average
of “reasonable” bids.
In APA setting, if firms are not allowed to submit multiple bids, all firms bidding the
reserve price is an equilibrium. No profitable deviation is possible, as price cutting
would guarantee being eliminated, while increasing price will render your bid invalid.
However, if firms can submit multiple bids (via shadow companies or colluding), they
can both “pilot” the average, and have some control over the identity of the winner.
The methodology proposed is designed to detect if the bidders are trying to pilot
the mean35: If the firms are coordinating, their co-occurrence in auctions should not
34However, this is not the only explanation. It might be the case that what had started as
coordinated effects or tacit collusion in 1985 might have evolved into explicit collusion over time.
Some players might have communicated their incentive to coordinate by adopting a strategy that
would clearly be unprofitable in a competitive regime, such as advance announcement. In this
case, adopting the unprofitable strategy works as a “...device that produces the commonly held
belief among firms that they will collude (Harrington (2012) FN 16, 24 and p.658)”, or mutual
understanding mechanisms.
35One of the conclusions drawn is very provocative, it is suggested that auctioneer might prefer
to allow collusion as it provides a lower price, “it is not obvious that bidder coordination should
always be sanctioned. We present the case of a market in which bidder coordination reduces the
procurement cost for the auctioneer relative to an environment where firms compete...[t]hus our
results argue against any automatism in antitrust activity (p.37)”.
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be random. Once factors influential in the participation and bidding decisions are
taken into account, they should be appearing together in auctions unusually often.
Bid level may also be used to identify collusion in a similar manner. It is possible
to compare impact of the coordination on the auction outcome, with a group of
non-suspicious firms with similar characteristics.
Conley and Decarolis (2016) first apply their methodology to a prosecuted public
road work bidding ring in Turin. The prosecution implicates eight different cartels.
The test captures seven of them, only missing the cartel that was least frequently
operational. Next, the test is applied to Northern Italy public road works, for which
there is no legal evidence of collusion. Results suggest, 30 % of the auctions show
signs of coordination.
Bos and Schinkel (2009) develop a framework to detect a specific form of collusion,
basing point pricing36. The collusive strategy is pricing the product as if it has
been transported from an agreed on specific location, independent of actual origin.
The providers retain the difference between invoiced transportation cost, and the
incurred transportation cost.
The methodology builds on a forensic technique, geographic profiling, which is used
in identifying the most likely area a criminal resides in, basing on the locations of
multiple crime scenes. This is applied to collusion as follows: If a cluster of firms are
colluding via basing point pricing, to allow sizeable gains, the location of the base
(or bases) should be far from the cluster. If the firms in the cluster are competing,
at each point, the price any provider can charge is capped with the minimum price a
rival can offer. Therefore, base should fall within the neighbourhood of the cluster.
It follows that by estimating the location of the base, it is possible to flag base point
pricing.
Hu¨schelrath and Veith (2014) follow the German cement cartel prosecution. In
2003, German Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt) imposed fines amounting
to 660 million Euro37 to cement producers38. Collusion involves market allocations
and quotas, and covers 1990s. Figure 3.4 illustrates the price patterns. First vertical
line marks the deviation of a discontent member, and de facto collapse of cartel.
Second vertical line marks the beginning of the investigation, and formal collapse of
the cartel. Cartel period is characterised by an initial steady increase in price. This
is followed by price stability. Following the collapse of the cartel, price falls sharply.
Hu¨schelrath and Veith (2014) offer a methodology with which consumers (using only
own procurement data) can detect cartels without the involvement of competition
authority. Building on a very detailed transaction dataset of 16 consumers with
various providers, for each customer, they hypothesize a two stage analysis. At
the first stage, customer is expected to do a structural break analysis. Results
36For an example antitrust case see FTC vs. Cement Institute, et al., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).




Figure 3.4: German Cement Cartel
Source: Figure 1 in Hu¨schelrath and Veith (2014)
suggest that only two customers fail to identify a structural break. At the second
stage, basing on the information in first stage, each customer is expected to run a
multivariate regression. Findings indicate 80 % of customers would be able to detect
collusion.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Contribution
Findings so far suggest that consistent with a regime switch from collusion to
competition, stable relations in the market were disrupted after month seven. In this
chapter, I investigate further, and explore if observed patterns are more consistent
with a regime switch.
Followed by Bajari and Ye (2003); Jakobsson (2007); Padhi and Mohapatra
(2011), one frequently used empirical strategy is estimating a pricing equation for
competition. If the competition is present, conditional on controlling all common
factors, residuals should be independent across firms. However, in our case, this
assumption is problematic for at least two reasons. First, producers purchase inputs
and final products from each other. This inevitably introduce dependencies in error
terms across rivals. Second, in bidding markets, where this methodology is widely
applied, typically researcher has access to reserve price, which partly controls for
unobservable factors. Since here there is not a similar measure that would reduce the
risk omitted variable bias, the risk of dependency in error terms increases further.
Neglected dependencies in error terms might lead to false positives, concluding for
collusion even if the firms are competing.
Another alternative is using structural estimation techniques39. It is possible to
39Structural estimation is more widely employed in damage estimation rather than proactive
detection. Chapter 4 presents a detailed presentation of structural estimation methodologies, their
merits and drawbacks.
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construct two structural models, one for collusion and one for competition, and see
which model is a better fit to the data. However, note that if a regime switch is
present within 18 months, then, there will be an episode of collusion, a transition
period, and a period of competition. Not knowing the length of the transition, or
its dynamics makes structural analysis challenging.
Followed by Jakobsson (2007); Porter and Zona (1993, 2003, 1999), another
frequently used empirical strategy is estimating a competitive pricing equation and
applying it first to competing firms, then to colluding firms, with the expectation
that if there is collusion, pricing equation will only explain the behaviour of
competing firms. Alternatively, as in, Baldwin et al. (1997); Banerji and Meenakshi
(2004); Bresnahan (1987), researcher can estimate multiple pricing equations, one
of which is collusive, and race them in terms of likelihood.
In devising the empirical strategy, I give special importance to Bresnahan (1987)
who suggests that if there is price competition, for the products that have a close
substitute, the price would converge to marginal cost; while in collusion, price and
cost would diverge.
Bresnahan (1987) studies pricing behaviour in US automobile industry. In relation
to proceeding and preceding year, in 1955, the total output in the US automobile
industry is higher, and the price is lower. Sales concentrate on small size and lower
value cars. In an attempt to understand the dynamics behind this change in 1955,
Bresnahan (1987) looks at supply side and tests an interesting hypothesis: 1955 is
a temporary price war within a larger context of collusion.
As illustrated in Figure 3.5, assume marginal cost is increasing with the automobile
quality, the x-axis. Demand is characterised by heterogeneity in preferences; each
individual has a different desired set of characteristics. Differences in preferences
taken together with the menu of prices, lead to different purchasing patterns at
the optimum. Therefore, it is unlikely for models with very distinct product
characteristics to influence each other‘s demand. It follows that distant models
have zero, neighbouring models have non-zero cross price elasticities.
Y-axis, informs about the cost and the price. Let each number on the x-axis
correspond to a different model. First assume that models 1, 2, 4, 5 are produced
by firm A, and model 3 is produced by firm B. Also assume that in terms of product
characteristics, the closest two models are 2 and 3. If firm A and B are competitors,
then as a result of high cross price elasticity between model 2 and 3, the mark-up
would be low. On the other hand, if i) firm A and B are controlled by the same
undertaking, or, ii) A and B are colluding, the degree of substitution between models
2 and 3 is irrelevant for the determination of mark-up. It follows that the impact
of regime switch is most pronounced on models 2 and 3. Bresnahan (1987) has
following proposition:
The intuition of why competitive and collusive behaviours are distinct in
such a model is straightforward. If firms compete on price, price will
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Figure 3.5: Cost and Mark-Up in Collusion and Competition, Bresnahan (1987)
Source: (Davis and Garce´s, 2009, p.341).
be near marginal cost for those products for which a close, competitive
substitute exists. If firms are setting price by some (tacitly) collusive
means, then P −MC for one firm’s products will not depend crucially
on whether their close substitutes are sold by competitors or by the firm
itself. ...Thus even when marginal costs are taken to be unobservable,
competitive and collusive conduct can be discerned from the movements
in industry and firm price and quantity (p.458).
I, similar to Bresnahan (1987), centre on the relationship between price and market
power, under different regimes. The difference between two works is, Bresnahan
(1987) is specified in product characteristics space, and market power varies on
product characteristics. My work is specified on geographical space and market
power varies on locations. Estimation centres on explaining pricing behaviour, and
particularly its relation with ∆jl = min(dkl)− djl, relative proximity of the provider
and its closest rival to the buyer. The idea is that after controlling for factors
influential in pricing, ∆jl approximates to local market power measure, the cost
difference between potential competitor and dominant competitor at each location,
χkl−χjl. Via interacting a two level factorial variable (the dummy for collusion) with
market power measures, two different pricing equations are estimated for each regime
using OLS and GMM. In this process, dynamic effects (i.e. entry/exit, location
choice or investment) are ignored. This primarily stems from data structure. Data
set covers 18 months; this is relatively short for dynamic considerations.
To my best knowledge, there is no work with similar methodology in homogeneous
product / geographic space setting. One example of similar motivations is Baldwin
et al. (1997), looking at timber removal auctions in US. Primary aim is to understand
the presence of collusive patterns from 1975 to 1981 in Pacific Northwest, a region
marked with low winning bids. The empirical objective is comparing alternative
explanations for low bids, collusion vs. supply shifters. Collusion probability is
modelled as a function of bidder proximity, defined as an indicator variable if
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the highest two bidders are in the same county. Results suggest that the bidder
proximity is borderline insignificant. Baldwin et al. (1997) claim that if instead of
a local proximity index (proximity dummy) a global index was available, this would
“produce a significant improvement of the collusive model, thereby strengthening final
conclusions (pp. 684-5).” This finding is encouraging for the design of empirical
strategy here, and the variable of interest, ∆jl .
Additionally this study contributes to proactive detection literature via using
consumer level data. In competition economics, rather than assessment of collusion,
transaction data more commonly is used in the assessment of mergers - for which
Chapter 4 and Appendix 3 provide a summary of literature. Let alone proactive
detection, there are only a handful of studies that focus on collusion in broader sense
and use consumer level data. In this mini-literature, the most common objective is
overcharge estimation. Some examples are Hu¨schelrath et al. (2016) who estimate
the overcharge related to German cement cartel using a private data set; Kamita
(2010) who estimate the impact of antitrust immunity granted to Hawaiian airlines
on price; Laitenberger and Smuda (2015) who estimate the overcharge related to
European detergent cartel using a private data set; McCluer and Starr (2013) who
estimate the overcharge related to Marshfield/Blue Cross Blue Shield case in US
using a private data set; and Nevo (2001) assessing the allegations of collusive pricing
behaviour in ready to eat cereal industry. These works are discussed in more detail
in the next chapter. Another empirical study of collusion that use consumer level
data is Harrington et al. (2015) who focus on the cartel stability issues in German
cement cartel. In the study, the empirical objective is illustrating differences in
the behaviour of the discontent member and other members in a reduced form
framework. However, the work with most similar empirical objective to this work is
Hu¨schelrath and Veith (2014) - see, Section 3.3.2 - who also focus on German cement
cartel. There are two differences in two works: First, this work does not centre on
a prosecuted cartel. Second, in this work, empirical strategy does not involve the
assumption of parameter equality across regimes for the variables of interest, hence
is more flexible.
This study contributes to a handful40 of empirical studies in the area of price
discrimination in spatial setting. I believe taking on a spatial price discrimination
framework is particularly important in order to embed the proactive detection into
anti-cartel enforcement. Theory suggests if the arbitrage opportunities are limited,
scale matters, consumer locations are observable, transportation is costly, price and
location are the only determinants of competitive power; producers can spatially
price discriminate. Some example industries are iron, steel, oil, cement, furniture,
lumber, ready mixed concrete, plywood, fertilizer and sugar. The methodology
developed here, can be directly applied to any of these industries. It should be noted
that, these industries have a long record of antitrust violations; possibly because
collusion is very profitable. Recall that main argument for proactive detection
is complementing leniency where it is most likely to fail, detection of the most
40“...the existing empirical literature does not address spatial discrimination despite the long
and litigious history of discrimination in the industry (Miller and Osborne, 2014, p.222)”.
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profitable cartels. Therefore, the framework in this paper is a good starting point,
as it can immediately be applied in any of these potentially problematic sectors.
3.5 Estimation
3.5.1 OLS Estimation
Table 3.3 presents the OLS estimates. This involves estimating,





























jltc + υjltc (3.1)
where t is month, j is provider, l is location, c is consumer; zpjltc refers to demand
shifters; χkjltc refers to supply shifters; θj refers to provider fixed effects; and
dependent variable, pjltc is the delivered price. Results are reported for six different
specifications. The estimations are done by gradually adding control variables,




, and NBRjlc interact
with regime indicators, γcoll, γcomp, and two different pricing equations, one for each
regime, are estimated.
In all specifications dependent variable is the delivered price charged by provider j, to
customer c, at location l, in month t, pjltc. Besides interactions of regime indicators
and market power indicators, all specifications include, a constant, facility fixed
effects, γj; an indicator variable marking the regime switch, γcollt ; and an indicator
variable marking presence of a vertical relation between provider and buyer, γverticaljc .
Baseline specification includes an indicator variable marking large buyers, γlargec .
Specification 2 adds, γownjl , the indicator variable marking presence of multiple nearby
production facilities of the provider. Specifications 3 − 6 extend Specification 2,
each by adding a different control. Specifications 3 and 4 add demand side controls;
Specification 3 controls for transaction volume, vjltc; Specification 4 controls for
buyer size via using total transaction volume, V¯lc, rather than γ
large
c . Specifications
5 and 6 add supply side controls; Specification 5 controls for capacity utilization41,
Ujt; Specification 6 controls for energy price index
42, EIjt.
The estimations in this chapter build on heteroscedasticity robust White standard
41Utilization values are not available for 5 % of the observations, thus this specification bases
on slightly less observations then first four specifications.
42Compared to Specification 5, energy index value is not available for an additional 1.5 % of
the observations.
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Table 3.3: OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




t 0.5739*** 0.5963*** 0.6140*** 0.6129*** 0.5941*** 0.6045***
(0.0432) (0.0427) (0.0424) (0.0425) (0.0439) (0.0427)
γcollt 0.2209*** 0.2274*** 0.2429*** 0.2483*** 0.2146*** 0.2157***





t 0.0241*** 0.0240*** 0.0252*** 0.0252*** 0.0247*** 0.0244***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
γcollt -0.0036* -0.0040* -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0041* -0.0045**




t -2.2726*** -2.2243*** -2.2539*** -2.2634*** -2.3427*** -2.2464***
(0.2161) (0.2133) (0.2132) (0.2134) (0.2205) (0.2132)
γcollt -0.5948*** -0.6015*** -0.7218*** -0.7111*** -0.7172*** -0.5557***
(0.2061) (0.2048) (0.2031) (0.2040) (0.2140) (0.2055)
γverticaljc -0.6874 -0.8542* -0.3822 -0.4408 -0.4055 -0.8443*
(0.4891) (0.4854) (0.4856) (0.4853) (0.5601) (0.4862)
γcollt 8.5669*** 8.6725*** 8.6777*** 8.8061*** 9.1892*** 10.1274***
(0.5513) (0.5434) (0.5412) (0.5421) (0.5902) (0.6768)
γlargec -4.2383*** -4.3811*** -4.3169*** -4.3822***
(0.4810) (0.4804) (0.5084) (0.4791)
γownjl 4.6334*** 4.9119*** 4.8030*** 3.5905*** 4.6044***









Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
γj Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.4726 0.4770 0.4793 0.4764 0.4812 0.4783





t indicates competitive regime. γ
vertical
jc indicates vertical relation between provider and buyer. γ
large
c indicates
large buyers. γownjl indicates presence of multiple nearby production facilities of the provider. γ
j refers to provider fixed effects. ∆lj
is a measure of relative distance, and is multiplied by 0.1 before regression. NBRjlc is number of rivals. vjltc is the transaction
volume. V¯lc is total transaction volume. Ujt is capacity utilization. EIjt is energy price index. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
errors. Consequently, even though error variance is allowed to vary, error terms
are assumed to be independent, E [uiuj] = 0. However, since demand for the
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product is governed by spatial dynamics, independence assumption would be
unrealistic, particularly for observations coming from neighbouring locations. Any
ignored dependency of this sort should lead to underestimation of standard errors,
overestimation of test statistic, and overrejection. In this chapter, despite its
limitations, I stick to White standard errors. There are two reasons for this.
First, opting for White standard errors makes the implementation of GMM very
straightforward. Second, in this chapter, for the empirical outcome, the choice
of standard error structure is inconsequential. To expand on this; as thoroughly
discussed in Chapter 5, the most frequently used remedy in addressing dependency
across error terms is using clustered standard errors. This involves defining
observations coming from nearby locations as a cluster, and letting E [uiuj] 6= 0
for the observations within the same cluster; while, retaining independent error
term assumption for observations from different clusters43. Note that in this chapter,
empirical strategy involves comparing the parameters governing the relation between
price and measures of market power across two time periods, competition period and
collusion period. Findings suggest estimated difference is so large that the choice
of standard error structure becomes inconsequential in deciding if the parameters
are equal across regimes. This is illustrated in Table 3.4 for measures of local




. Basing on Specification 2, parameter equality across
regimes is tested under different standard error structures, i.e. White standard
errors, standard errors clustered at customer level, standard errors clustered at
county level, standard errors clustered at province level. Naturally, clustering
affects inference. The standard errors quadruple, estimates become less precise,
and confidence intervals widen. However, the hypothesis tests still favour parameter
inequality across regimes.
Table 3.4: Clustering
H0 = β1 − β2 = 0
∆jl
None Customer County Province
Difference 0.3637 0.3637 0.3637 0.3637
Standard Error 0.020 0.0801 0.0872 0.0873
t-stat 6.99*** 4.54** 4.17*** 4.17***
(∆jl )
2
Difference 0.0286 0.0286 0.0286 0.0286
Standard Error 0.0026 0.0044 0.0046 0.0056
t-stat 11.07*** 6.58*** 6.23*** 5.20***
Going back to the estimation results in Table 3.3, findings suggest that vertical
relations do not matter for pricing. The point estimate is small and insignificant
43See, Section 5.2.2 for inference issues, cluster robust variance estimator, the conditions for its
consistency and other potential remedies.
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across all specifications44. If present, any preferential treatment for vertically related
buyers is marginal. This is not surprising, as using distribution channels is not the
norm in the industry. In contrast, being a large buyer translates as lower price. A
buyer in top 5 % in terms of total procurement volume would enjoy 4.1 − 4.7 %
lower price. Note that the same effect is captured also by Specification 4, where
large buyer dummy is replaced with total volume of purchases.
Specification 2 suggests that the effect of multiplant ownership is also significant.
However, in contrast to hypothesis of Hortac¸su and Syverson (2007) that multiplant
ownership brings distributional efficiencies, and eventually lower price, OLS
estimation suggests that multiplant ownership brings higher price. Note that the
estimate varies in size across specifications; 2, 3 and 6 suggest a point estimate
around 4.6− 4.9 % with similar precision. Point estimates in specifications 4 and 5
are lower and less precise. The estimate is lowest in Specification 5, which controls
for capacity utilization. This suggests that coefficient estimate might be capturing
effects related to volume.
Specification 5 suggests that 1 % increase in capacity utilization leads to 1.8 %
reduction in price. Yet, again the effect is very imprecise, only significant at 10 %
level. In contrast, Specification 6 suggests a precise point estimate for the energy
index; energy price has a pass through of 6.4 %. As expected, the impact of including
supply shifters on the coefficient of market power measures is marginal.
Specification 3 incorporates transaction volume. In this study, we give particular
importance to relation between transaction volume and market power at each
location. To see why, initially, assume transaction volume is not a function of
price (price taker customer), but price is a function of transaction volume; so that
following is the true model
pi = α0 + α1∆i + α2vi + α3χi + α4zi + ei
where i refers to transaction, zi, and χi are demand and cost shifters, satisfying
E[∆iχi] = 0 and E[∆izi] = 0. Note that if the estimated model is
pi = δ0 + δ1∆i + δ2χi + δ3zi + ζi
the omitted variables formula suggests that linear projection coefficient for ∆i would
44This result might also partially be governed by measurement error. During refinement of data








E[∆i(α0 + α1∆i + α2vi + α3χi + α4zi + ei)]
E[∆2i ]
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Note that it is difficult to assess E[∆ivi]. Since returns at high market power
locations are higher then returns at low market locations, particularly when capacity
utilization is high, providers might choose to limit their bulky operations to closer
regions.
As seen in Specification 3, plugging transaction volume directly as a regressor suggest
a precise but small impact of transaction volume on pricing. Among the variables
of interest, the impact is most pronounced on the nonlinear effects related to ∆jl in
the collusion period. Coefficient of quadratic term is no longer significant at 10 %,
and in comparison to Specification 2, point estimate drops 40 %, although it is not
possible to make an inference about how informative this drop is.
The estimates for local market power indicator are robust to the inclusion of other
control variables, particularly in the competitive regime. In competition, lowest and
highest point estimates are 6 % apart for linear effects, and 4 % apart for nonlinear
effects. The point estimates are lowest in the baseline model, and gradually increase
as more variables are added. In the collusion period, in all specifications nonlinear
effects are weak in absolute terms and significant at 5 % only for Specification 6.
Note that regime switch first affects the price via regime change indicator, γcollt .
This may be interpreted as the immediate impact. Basing on Specification 2, the
estimate is 8.9 %. Second, regime switch affects price via its interaction with ∆jl ,
(∆jl )
2 and NBRjlc. OLS estimates suggest that the relation between price and
measures of market power is distinctly different across regimes. Responsiveness of
price to market power, as captured by the coefficients of market power measures, is
much higher in competitive regime. In fact, using estimates from Specification 2,
and calculating average price predicted at the expected values of covariates in two
regimes, the effect of regime switch increases to 12.7 %.
Results suggest that presence of more rivals is associated with lower price, both
in competition and collusion; however, in the latter case, the effect is small and
imprecise. In collusion, the presence of an additional rival has 0.60 − 0.72 %
downward effect on price. In competition, point estimate almost triples is more
precise; it rises to 2.22 − 2.34 %, while lower bound of confidence interval is above
1.8 %.
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However, before elaborating on the findings further, we need to reconsider how
transaction volume is incorporated into the analysis.
In general form, volume and price are simultaneously determined as they interact
with, local market power measure ∆i, observable exogenous demand and cost shifters
features (zi, χi), and unobservable shocks (ei, µi). Take the following system in the
unrestricted form,
pi = α0 + α1∆i + α2vi + α3χi + α4zi + ei,
vi = β0 + β1∆i + β2pi + β3χi + β4zi + β5ti + µi
(3.3)
where ti to corresponds to exogenous demand shocks with no impact on supply.
This implies following reduced form equation for volume,
vi = β0 + β1∆i + β2(α0 + α1∆i + α2vi + α3χi + α4zi + ei)
+ β3χi + β4zi + β5ti + µi
vi(1− β2α2) = (β0 + β2α0) + (β1 + β2α1)∆i + (β3 + β2α3)χi
+ (β4 + β2α4)zi + β5ti + (β2ei + µi),







(1−β2α2) , γ1 =
β1+β2α1
(1−β2α2) , γ2 =
β3+β2α3
(1−β2α2) , γ3 =
β4+β2α4




pi = α0 + α1∆i + α2(β0 + β1∆i + β2pi + β3χi + β4zi + β5ti + µi)
+ α3χi + α4zi + ei
pi(1− β2α2) = (α0 + α2β0) + (α1 + α2β1)∆i + (α3 + α2β3)χi+
(α4 + α2β4)zi + α2β5ti + (ei + α2µi)








(1−β2α2) , δ1 =
α1+α2β1
(1−β2α2) , δ2 =
α3+α2β3
(1−β2α2) , δ3 =
α4+α2β4
(1−β2α2) , δ4 =
α2β5
(1−β2α2) .
First, it is straightforward to see, since vi and pi both depend on ei and µi, it is not
possible to have a consistent estimate for vi if price is simply regressed on it. This is
the well-known simultaneity bias. One solution for this is employing an exogeneity
assumption. One way of doing this is considering consumers as price takers. In that
case, vi is allowed to be determined by factors other than price. In Equation 3.3,
this would correspond to setting β2 = 0. Alternatively, one might assume vi to be
orthogonal to all observables, implying β1, β2, β3 = 0. As mentioned earlier, some
studies using customer level data, benefit from an assumption of exogeneity of either
form.
In most studies that use consumer-level data, the correlation between the
regressor and the error term ... is usually ignored. ... This correlation
might still be present, for at least two reasons. First, even though
consumers take prices and other product characteristics as given, their
optimal choice from a menu of offerings could imply that econometric
endogeneity might still exist (Kennan, 1989). Second, unless enough
control variables are included, common unobserved characteristics, could
still bias the estimates (Nevo, 2000b, p.544).
However, since in this study we are concerned with the relation of price and measures
of market power, if this relation is not affected, endogeneity induced bias via vi may
be regarded as a minor setback. Formally, the impact of plugging vi directly into



































































































Equation 3.6 illustrates that in a simultaneous system, any relation between
regressor and error structure, say in the form of an omitted variable, multiplies
throughout the system and inflates the bias by extra terms. Also note that the
intuition behind price taking customer is more visible in 3.6. Setting β2 = 0 is
sufficient to eliminate the inflation coming from the interplay of variable of interest












Therefore, the consequence of imposing restriction in a supply demand system
will be determined by how realistic this restriction is within that system. For
example, within an established buyer/seller relation, buyers might ask discounts
for large shipments. Also, if the returns to scale is increasing, providers might have
motivations to give discounts. Moreover, from a dynamic perspective, if signing
large customers now increases the chances of serving them later, providers might be
inclined to give price concessions. Thus, for these reasons or others45 if the suspicion
is α2 and β2 might not be very small, it is best to refrain from restricted form.
Fortunately, in this study, it might be possible to assess the consequence of imposing
β2 = 0. First let us consider transaction volume. Recall that ti is a demand shifter,
with no impact on supply. Using the variation in ti, and the corresponding variation
in price, it is possible to estimate sensitivity of pricing to transaction volume. To
45As quoted from Nevo (2000a) above, these all can be characterised as “common unobserved
characteristics”. Also see, Angrist and Pischke (2009) for endogeneity and bad controls.
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Second, let us consider the variable of interest. In an IV setting, using the moment
conditions from the exogenous variable, initially first stage is estimated. Next using
fitted values, price equation is retrieved. Therefore, price equation would look like,
pi = α0 + α1∆i + α2vˆi + α3χi + α4zi + ei




E[∆i(α0 + α1∆i + α2vˆi + α3χi + α4zi + ei)]
E[∆2i ]
Orthogonality of the instrument to the error structure assures that any relation
between regressor and error structure is not multiplied throughout the system. Then
the estimate can converge to α1 +
E[∆iei]
E[∆2i ]





Next, within an IV setting, a similar estimation is made and the consequences of
imposing exogeneity assumption is assessed.
3.5.2 GMM Estimation
Estimation strategy is identical to 3.1; measures of market power, interact with
regime indicators, γcoll, γcomp, and two different pricing equations, one for each
regime, are estimated. Difference between OLS and GMM is the introduction of
transaction volume as a control in an IV framework. Recall that products X, Z and
T are linked in an input-output chain. The primary purpose of X, is to produce Z.
Primary purpose of Z is to produce T . Alternatively speaking, any production of T
(recall that we refer T production at location l at time t as tnplt), creates a demand
for Z. Any production of Z creates a demand for X46.
Here, the objective is using aggregate monthly T volume that is within a radius of
ri as an instrument for X activity at each X location in a GMM framework. This is
consistent with other works in the literature, e.g. (Brander and Ross, 2006, p.353),
(Ro¨ller and Steen, 2006, p.331), (De Roos, 2006, 1090-1), (Hu¨schelrath et al., 2013,
pp. 111-2)), where output data from vertically related industry is used to identify
pricing equation in the manner described above47. tnplt satisfies both conditions of
46See, Figures 2.1, and 2.2.
47X, T relation has also been used in the literature in IV framework in identifying pricing
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being a good instrument48. First, there is the strong relation between X production
and tnplt; X demand is almost entirely governed by tnplt; consequently, tnplt is
relevant49. Second, even though X demand is governed by, tnplt; this relation is
one directional. The weight of X, in production of T is marginal, and fluctuations
in tnplt are typically governed by macroeconomic aggregates. Consequently, tnplt is
valid50.
Initially, ri is set to r¯, an industry rule of thumb which marks the limit distance
within which it is profitable to ship Z; later, I experiment with alternative values,
0.6r¯, 0.8r¯. Since the information about T volume (T Index, tnpdt) is coming from the
license information about production to be made, initially, in addition to current
value, four lagged values (license information in the preceding months) are also
included. Results suggest that periods immediately following licensing do a poor job




Table 3.5 summarizes the first set of results. In all specifications dependent variable
is delivered price charged by provider j, to customer c, at location l, in month t,
pjltc. Beside interactions of regime indicators, and measures of market power, all
specifications employ an indicator variable marking the presence of an additional
nearby facility controlled by the provider, γownjl ; an indicator variable marking
the regime switch, γcollt ; and an indicator variable marking presence of a vertical
relation between provider and buyer, γverticaljc . Specification 7 is a slightly modified
form of baseline OLS regression as it does not include any variable capturing
the buyer size. Specification 8 adds the transaction volume, which is potentially
endogenous. Specification 9 provides an IV solution to the endogeneity problem. In
this specification, instead of the moment condition used in OLS, E[viei], the moment
condition building on the instrument, E[tiei] is used.































We face a cyclicality. Estimation of β requires Sˆ, which requires βˆ.
equations. At this point, I am not citing specific examples to keep the industry undisclosed.
48See, Davis and Garce´s (2009) (p.442-444) for a discussion about conditions of a good
instrument.
49Also known as rank condition, and typically is formalized as E [tivi] 6= 0.
50Also known as exclusion restriction, and typically is formalized as E [tiei] = 0.
51See, Baum et al. (2003, 2007), and Hansen (2016), pp.280-3.
78
Table 3.5: GMM Estimates - I
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)




t 0.6114*** 0.6129*** 0.6265*** 0.6265*** 0.6331*** 0.6175***
(0.0426) (0.0425) (0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0554) (0.0427)
γcollt 0.2459*** 0.2483*** 0.2703*** 0.2703*** 0.2784*** 0.2392***





t 0.0251*** 0.0252*** 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0254***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0021)
γcollt -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0019




t -2.4307*** -2.2634*** -0.9470** -0.9468** -0.5567 -2.0249***
(0.2118) (0.2134) (0.4328) (0.4328) (0.4955) (0.2474)
γcollt -0.8425*** -0.7111*** 0.3599 0.3603 0.6884 -0.5655**
(0.2020) (0.2040) (0.4242) (0.4243) (0.4929) (0.2270)
γverticaljc -0.2917 -0.4408 -1.6679** -1.6684** -2.0994** -0.4994
(0.4846) (0.4853) (0.7680) (0.7680) (0.8826) (0.5053)
γcollt 8.6480*** 8.8061*** 10.0244*** 10.0246*** 10.2979*** 8.7162***
(0.5440) (0.5421) (0.7374) (0.7375) (0.8186) (0.5467)
γownjl 4.3564*** 4.8030*** 8.2526*** 8.2527*** 8.9707*** 5.6312***
(0.6907) (0.6871) (1.1944) (1.1945) (1.3532) (0.7846)
vjltc -0.0484*** -0.4278*** -0.4278*** -0.5301***
(0.0051) (0.0887) (0.0888) (0.1025)
V¯lc -0.0001***
(0.0000)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
γj Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F (2, N) 17.183 17.183 17.183 101.193
GMM(C) 40.255 40.255 33.742 4.334
J 7.929 7.969 6.880 NA
RPT 10.77 16.76 24.06 NA 21.37 13.46





t indicates competitive regime. γ
vertical
jc indicates vertical relation between provider and buyer. γ
own
jl indicates
presence of multiple nearby production facilities of the provider. γj refers to provider fixed effects. ∆lj is a measure of relative
distance, and is multiplied by 0.1 before regression. NBRjlc is number of rivals. vjltc is the transaction volume. V¯lc is total
transaction volume. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Specification 9, this problem is addressed by separating the estimation into two
stages. First, an initial matrix is used to estimate βˆ. This is used to retrieve initial
eˆi, to be used in computation of an initial Sˆ. Basing on initial Sˆ, βˆ is re-estimated.
Using updated values, Sˆ takes its final form. Specification 10 employs a similar
strategy, but does not stop at two stages, keep estimating and re-estimating until
both βˆ and weighting matrix converge52. Finally, Specification 11 overcomes the
52Known as iterated GMM estimator.
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cyclicality by changing the optimization problem. Estimation of weighting matrix


















is estimated by numerical optimization53.
Results suggest that choice of estimator has no effect on coefficients of ∆jl and
(∆jl )
2. The patterns in OLS survive GMM estimation54. Linear term is significant
in both regimes. It is larger in competitive regime, and more precise. Quadratic
term is only significant for competition. Estimates in OLS and GMM are very close,
suggesting little contamination for ∆jl from endogeneity. In IV setting, the coefficient
for number of rivals is smaller for competition period; GMM point estimates are less
then half of OLS point estimates.
Second set of specifications are summarized in Table 3.6. All specifications, follow
Specification 9; while controlling for multiplant ownership, vertical relations, and
production facility fixed effects, regime indicators are interacted with measures of
market power. However, there are small differences across specifications as they
test the sensitiveness of results to assumptions employed in the construction of the
instrument.
Recall that Z, similar to X, is costly to transport. Consequently, demand for Z (and
eventually demand for X), which originates from T production, is regional. Thus,
empirical strategy involves using T activity within a defined radius, ri. Specifications
9, and 13 − 14, focus on spatial variation and use alternative radii as the cut-off
point for ri to explore the consequences of cut-off decision. Specification 15 focuses
on product variation, and instead of index of aggregated T production, it uses
only index of highly processed T products (N1P2, N2P2). Specification 17 adds
month fixed effects to Specification 9 in order to capture the impact of unobservable
time varying shifters. Specification 16 uses seasonally unadjusted data along with
month fixed effects to explore if the findings are affected from seasonal adjustment
methodology.
Findings suggest that estimates for ∆jl and (∆
j
l )
2 are robust to the choice of cut-off
point, using highly processed products as demand shifters, inclusion of month
fixed effects, or using seasonally unadjusted demand indices. The difference across
estimates is marginal at best. However, an interesting finding is about, Ramsey/
Pesaran Taylor test statistic. Also known as RESET adjusted for IV setting, the test
aims to detect functional misspecification in the form of neglected nonlinearities55.
To this aim, upon estimation, dependent variable is regressed on the squares of
53Continuously updated estimator.
54Convergence in GMM and OLS estimates should not be surprising. As De Roos (2006) points
out, when variations in market patterns are governed by changes in firm behaviour, rather than
demand and cost considerations, IV and OLS estimates are more likely to converge (p.1094).
55See, Baum et al. (2007) (pp. 497-8) for RESET in IV setting.
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optimal forecast values56. Specifications 16− 17 suggest that there is no evidence of
neglected nonlinearities if month dummies are involved. This is important, because
nonlinearities associated with indicator of local market power has a central role
in this study. High value of RESET test statistic in estimations in Table 3.5
indicates presence of left over nonlinearities in the residuals. Rejection of left over
nonlinearities after introducing month fixed effects suggests that nonlinearities are
time varying rather than spatial, hence not related to indicator of local market
power.
Even though, sensitivity of pricing to transaction volume is not at the centre
of this work; some interesting patterns emerging from the estimation should be
noted. First is the gradual increase in the responsiveness as the cut-off radius is
increased. Recall that in interpreting results from an IV estimation, there are two
approaches. First is global. This is essentially choosing an appropriate instrument
with the assumption of homogeneity in the population, i.e. patterns across different
subgroups in the population are not distinct. In this case, the results are interpreted
informative about the characteristics of the population in general. Second approach
is local. Assume there are multiple instruments available. Different instruments give
different estimates. In this approach, this variation is taken informative locally. Each
instrument reflects the effect on the group it is most likely to represent (compliant
subgroup).
In our setting, when the radius is fixed to 0.6r¯, T production only within this radius
is used to instrument demand for X. The compliant population in this case would
be (i) producers of X who produced X, as a result of T production within 0.6r¯ radius
of Z producers they serve. However when the radius is increased to r¯, in addition to
(i), compliant population would include (ii) producers of X who produced X, as a
result of T activity within r¯−0.6r¯ radius of Z producers they serve. It may be that Z
producers consider serving distant T locations if transaction volume is big enough.
Yet, distant locations are characterised by higher transportation cost. Thus, serving
distant locations might only be possible with “better that usual” X procurement
conditions (e.g. lower X price). If X producer knows that operations of Z producer
within r¯ − 0.6r¯, is contingent on better terms, a price concession might be given,
as for X producer, less profit would be an improvement from no profit. Thus, it
is intuitive to think sensitivity of pricing to transaction volume for transactions
in (i) and (ii) should differ. The increase in coefficient of vjltc in absolute terms
as the radius is expanded might be capturing this heterogeneity. Also note that
when nature of the product varies (instead of the aggregated index, index of highly
processed T products is used, i.e. Specification 14), there is little impact on the
estimate for transaction volume. Given product homogeneity, this is also intuitive.
Basing on Specification 9, Figure 3.6 illustrates the predicted effect of ∆jl in two
regimes. Recall that ∆jl = min(dkl)− djl should approximate to χkl − χjl, the cost
difference between potential competitor and dominant competitor at each location.
Moreover, higher positive values of ∆jl should represent transactions in home market,
56Pesaran-Taylor version uses optimal values.
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Table 3.6: GMM Estimates - II
(9) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)




t 0.6265*** 0.6242*** 0.6173*** 0.6295*** 0.6063*** 0.6104***
(0.0510) (0.0468) (0.0432) (0.0487) (0.0443) (0.0466)
γcollt 0.2703*** 0.2630*** 0.2551*** 0.2699*** 0.2770*** 0.2827***





t 0.0259*** 0.0257*** 0.0256*** 0.0257*** 0.0252*** 0.0254***
(0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0025)
γcollt -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0031




t -0.9470** -1.3291*** -1.8987*** -1.0973*** -1.5979*** -1.3407***
γcollt 0.3599 0.0364 -0.3998 0.2145 -0.0497 0.1462
(0.4242) (0.3627) (0.2649) (0.3668) (0.3286) (0.3702)
γverticaljc -1.6679** -1.2996* -0.7847 -1.6037** -0.6908 -0.9090
(0.7680) (0.6649) (0.5366) (0.6941) (0.5826) (0.6497)
γcollt 10.0244*** 9.6944*** 9.1649*** 9.7195*** 15.0511*** 15.3270***
(0.7374) (0.6606) (0.5776) (0.6838) (0.6782) (0.7256)
γownjl 8.2526*** 7.2333*** 5.7743*** 7.6399*** 6.6455*** 7.3077***
(1.1944) (1.0706) (0.8444) (1.0593) (0.9011) (0.9966)
vjltc -0.4278*** -0.3142*** -0.1555*** -0.3742*** -0.2791*** -0.3518***
(0.0887) (0.0776) (0.0510) (0.0704) (0.0669) (0.0748)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
γj Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
γt No No No No Yes Yes
F (2, N) 17.183 15.959 22.785 12.719 17.376 17.017
GMM(C) 40.255 19.363 4.920 28.098 17.502 32.407
J 7.929 9.019 14.920 41.0274 8.687 4.321
RPT 10.77 20.15 15.87 17.72 1.24 0.84





t indicates competitive regime. γ
vertical
jc indicates vertical relation between provider and buyer. γ
own
jl indicates
presence of multiple nearby production facilities of the provider. γj refers to provider fixed effects. ∆lj is a measure of relative
distance, and is multiplied by 0.1 before regression. NBRjlc is number of rivals. vjltc is the transaction volume. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
large negative values should refer to transactions destined to rival home market.
Values around zero should refer to overlapping market. Regarding the relation
between price and measures of local market power, there are four empirical findings.
First relates to the size of the predicted gap between competition and collusion
around the neighbourhood of zero – overlapping markets. In fact, setting ∆jl = 0,
and all other covariates to mean, price impact of the regime change is predicted to
be 12.4 %57. Second, for high values of ∆jl (home market), predicted price converges
57Bases on Specification 9.
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Figure 3.6: Estimated Relationship between Price and ∆jl
(a) Price and ∆jl (b) Price, NBRjlc and ∆
j
l
across regimes. In these regions, market power of the incumbent provider is already
high; thus, explicit collusion should not lead to further notable increases in price.
These are illustrated in Figure 3.7.
Third empirical finding is about how spatial variation in local market power is
related to spatial variation in price. As elaborated in Chapter 1, under competition
spatial distribution of price is a function of relative costs of dominant competitor,
and potential competitor.
• In home market, dominant competitor is an effective monopolist; rivals do not
constrain its pricing; hence, market power is at maximum. Note that there
is still variation in price. Price should increase with distance at home market
due to higher transportation cost.
• In overlapping market, as dominant competitor serves locations that are less
costly for potential competitor, market power of dominant competitor declines,
and price falls.
Spatial distribution of price over locations with varying degrees of market power is
illustrated in the Figure 3.8a, and Figure 3.8b.
Note that ∆jl is the relative proximity of dominant competitor and potential
competitor to each location, and is designed to reflect cost differences, hence the
local market power variation. Consequently, price should be declining sharply with
∆jl , if it mimics local market power accurately. Figure 3.8c depicts that estimated
relation between ∆jl and the price is consistent with the expectations. This suggests
that ∆jl might actually be capturing local market power variations. Providers suffer
considerable price cuts to extend their operations to regions where they are not
protected by cost advantages. The more disadvantaged they are relative to least
cost rival, the larger is the required price cut - an effect captured by quadratic term.
Under collusion, cartel, by adjusting the market power of its members in those
parts of the market in which otherwise would have been competition, allows its
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members to price monopolistically at each location. Consequently, price increases
with distance in all directions. In this case, ∆jl should not be capturing any market
power related effects, as each provider, independent of its level of cost relative to
rival has undisturbed market power. This is illustrated in Figure 3.9a, and 3.9b.
This brings us to our fourth empirical finding: interestingly, estimation suggests
a significant relation between ∆jl and price also in collusion. The point estimate
for the linear term is much smaller and the coefficient for quadratic term is not
significant. Not finding large effects is hardly surprising. There is no reason for firms
to make drastic changes in pricing, when collusion ensures against being undercut.
However, the question arises: what does ∆jl capture if not market power? The most
intuitive answer would be cheating. The theoretical framework above depicts a
perfect collusion. Nevertheless, voluntarily or involuntarily firms might extend their
operations, infringing the collusive agreement. Marshall and Marx (2012) comment
on this as follows:
“Specifically, if the cartel has agreed to a price, then each cartel member
will consider whether it can secretly offer some buyers a slightly lower
price, and thereby capture additional sales and additional profits. ... It
is not necessary for a cartel to deter all secret deviations in order to be
profitable. Some amount of secret deviations may occur and might be
tolerated by cartel. ...From the perspective of cartel, the implications
of unintentional deviations and secret deviations are quite different.
... Mistakes are quickly acknowledged by upper management, they fall
in the realm of unintentional deviations and can be addressed through
reallocations. ... Mistakes can happen, but successful collusive structures
typically specify methods by which redistributions can be made to correct
mistakes (pp.105-6 & 128).”
An intentional deviation would entail a price cut to convince the consumer to
purchase from the cheating party. This behaviour is probably more associated with
overlapping markets, because the pay-off associated with under cutting declines
as cheater serves customers closer to rival. Similarly, one might also expect
unintentional deviations to be more common on overlapping market rather than
home markets ; as the incumbent producer would be dominating his own home
market, confusion about customers in this region is less likely.
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Figure 3.7: Market Power and Price:
Home Market and Overlapping Market
(a)
(b)
• Theoretical prediction: Large
price difference between collusion
and competition at locations where
both dominant competitor and
potential competitor are equally
good options for customers.
• Locations with higher positive
values of ∆jl should represent
transactions in home market, large
negative values should refer to
transactions destined to rival home
market. Values around zero should
refer to overlapping market.
• Theoretical prediction: Price
should converge across regimes in
home market.
• Empirical finding 1: Large
differences in price across regimes
when ∆jl = 0.
• Empirical finding 2: At locations
with large ∆jl , price in both regimes
converge.
Figure 3.8: Interpreting Price,











• Theoretical prediction: Price
increases with cost of provider
in home market ; price falls in
overlapping market even though
cost increases.
• Price decline in overlapping market
is related to gradual decline in
local market power of dominant
competitor.
• ∆jl is designed to capture local
market power effect by relating
relative distances of the provider
and the best alternative to each
location.
• Empirical finding 3: Market
power is significant in competition,
both linearly and quadratically.
Providers suffer large price cuts to
serve customers closer to rivals.
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Figure 3.9: Interpreting Price, Distance










• Theoretical prediction: Price
increases with cost in all directions.
• If firms are colluding, the link
between measures of market power
and pricing is broken. It is the
collusive agreement that assures
maximum market power at each
location.
• ∆jl is designed to capture local
market power variations by relating
relative distances of the provider
and the closest rival to each location.
Hence, under collusion, it should
capture nothing.
• Empirical finding 4: In collusion,
market power is positively but only
linearly related to price. The
relation is much weaker than that in
competition, but is significant.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, building on the theoretical framework in Chapter 1, I take on the
suspicious patterns identified in Chapter 2 that are consistent with a regime switch
in the market from collusion to competition. Controlling for demand and cost
shifters, I investigate these patterns further, and explore if observed patterns are
more consistent with collusion or competition.
In devising the empirical strategy, I consult to empirical literature concerned with
the identification of collusion, particularly Bresnahan (1987). Consequently, in this
study, estimation builds on explaining pricing behaviour, and particularly its relation
with ∆jl , relative proximity of the provider and its closest rival to the buyer. The
idea is after controlling for factors influential in pricing, ∆jl acts as an indicator
of variations in local market power measure, the cost difference between potential
competitor and dominant competitor at each location. Findings indicate that i)
when market power of provider and the closest rival converge, there is a large price
difference between suspected collusion period and competition period ii) at locations
where the provider has large market power, price in both periods converge, iii) in
suspected competition period, local market power indicators are both linearly and
quadratically related to pricing; providers suffer large price cuts to serve buyers
that are gradually closer to the closest rival, iv) in suspected collusion period, local
market power indicator is positively but only linearly related to price, and the linear
relation is much weaker than that in competition. These findings are interpreted as
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further evidence for a regime switch from collusion to competition. The results also
suggest that level of market power each provider has on a buyer is very important





Ex Post Evaluation in
Competition Policy: Damages,
Mergers and a Bridge between
Two
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the literature on ex post evaluation of competition policy
actions (henceforth, retrospectives). Retrospectives typically take a competition
policy action after the action has been taken, and empirically identify its impact
on a variable of interest, i.e. price, output, quality. Table 4.1 illustrates how
frequently different competition policy areas are studied in retrospectives; they
almost exclusively cover mergers1 and collusion2.
The objective of this chapter is exploring the literature surrounding ex post
evaluation of competition policy actions in order to identify empirical strategies
that might be used next chapter, in estimating the overcharge associated with
1In this work, I ignore the distinction between mergers and acquisitions. In the application of
competition law, the assessment of transactions that change concentration in the market, base on
the concept of “change of control”. Consistent with policy practice, here I refer to any transaction
that lead to a change of control as a “merger”.
2Article 101 of EU treaty prohibits “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the internal market.” Therefore, Article 101 is not exclusively about collusion; but also
vertical agreements, and other types of horizontal agreements, e.g. horizontal cooperation
agreements. However, in this chapter, I focus only on ex post studies of collusion and mergers.
3Event studies use financial market information (typically stock prices) and estimate the impact
of a competition authority decision basing on the appreciation / depreciation in the stocks of the
involved undertaking(s) around the decision time. Some examples for collusion are Bosch and
Eckard (1991); Gu¨nster and van Dijk (2016); Thompson and Kaserman (2001).
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Table 4.1: Ex Post Evaluation Literature by Policy Area3
Source: Table 2 in Davies and Ormosi (2012).
the hypothetical collusion identified in Chapter 3. To this aim, first, I look at
the literature associated with ex post analysis of collusion (henceforth, collusion
retrospectives).
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, collusion retrospectives (Appendix 2 provides a detailed
record) can be taken into two main groups. First group of works use structural
estimation. This most commonly involves estimating demand parameters and
inferring price cost margins under different conduct assumptions. Second group of
works use reduced form strategy of varying complexity. This might involve before and
after, simple comparison of patterns in the dependent variable before and after the
regime switch; dummy variable approach, identifying the impact of collusion using
an indicator variable while controlling for demand and cost shifters; forecasting,
estimating the parameters for demand and cost shifters only for competition period
and forecasting the counterfactual of collusion using these parameters; yardstick
and difference-in-difference (henceforth, DiD), comparing the market affected from
collusion to a similar yet unaffected market.

















4 B & A stands for before and after, DiD stands for difference-in-difference. Before and after
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In search of empirical strategies to be used in estimating overcharge, next I turn
to merger retrospectives. Similar to collusion retrospectives, merger retrospectives
can be broadly taken into two categories; structural estimation and reduced form
estimation. However, differing from collusion retrospectives, reduced form merger
retrospectives almost always use DiD (see, Table 4.1, and Appendix 3), and
frequently use customer level data. Due to compatibility in methodology and
data, I also provide an account of reduced form merger retrospectives, along with
discussions about merits and limitations of DiD in this context. A comparison
of DiD based collusion retrospectives and merger retrospectives leads to following
conclusions: i) Two lines of literature are unexpectedly disconnected. ii) Compared
to merger retrospectives, collusion retrospectives are in a stage of infancy. iii)
Merger retrospectives provide great insight to collusion retrospectives. iv) In
particular, merger retrospectives that study mergers with spatial nature offer (so far
unexploited) empirical strategies and identification techniques that can be replicated
in studying the effects of collusion in similar setting. Inspired from methodologies
used in merger retrospectives, I propose two alternative identification strategies to
identify the impact of a regime switch from collusion to competition: i) using home
markets – locations characterised by monopolistic pricing even in competition, hence
are unaffected by the regime switch – as the control group for the counterfactual
of regime switch (continuation of cartel and associated monopolistic pricing in
overlapping markets); consequently, capturing the impact of the treatment, as a
deviation of price in home markets from price in overlapping markets. ii) interpreting
the regime switch as a treatment, which, at each location, produces heterogeneous
effects that is inversely proportional to the level of local market power the provider
enjoys at that location.
This chapter is organized as follows: Next section presents collusion retrospectives
– excluding DiD studies – and methodologies employed. Third section introduces
DiD methodology, and presents collusion retrospectives, and merger retrospectives
that use DiD in comparison with each other. Fourth section outlines the proposed
methodology. Fifth section offers a critical evaluation of the proposal. Final section
concludes.
4.2 Collusion Retrospectives: Methodology and
Literature
This section, introduces alternative methodologies (with the exception of DiD)
employed in collusion retrospectives, and associated literature. However, before
this introduction, some cautionary remarks should be made: First, in classifying
the literature, I prefer a slightly modified version of Davis and Garce´s (2009) -
structural estimation on one side, and reduced form estimation techniques, i.e.
is essentially not an estimation, but a simple comparison. It is included among reduced form
techniques only for practical purposes.
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before and after, dummy variable approach, forecasting, yardstick and DiD, on the
other (pp. 352-368). This differs from the classification in more recent works, which
commonly follow Oxera (2009) - comparator based, financial analysis based, market
structure based. Second, the literature I cover is not confined to damage estimation.
Occasionally, I extend to price wars, historical cartels, supply management programs
(also known as marketing orders) and market power estimations5. Third, even in
many cases it is possible to generalize the methodology, I exclude limited literature
on estimation of damages related to other infringements, i.e. vertical restraints
abuse of dominance/monopolization)6. Fourth, at the risk of being repetitive, I
should iterate the cautionary remark in Section 3.3; it is not always straightforward
to classify works between detection literature and damages literature, as some works
aspire to do both. In these cases, when a judgement is to be made, own positioning
of the paper, the literature it covers, and the gravity of the analysis are taken into
account. However, to avoid being repetitive further, I refrain from covering the
works I covered in Chapter 3.
Verboven and van Dijk (2009), illustrate the intuition in damage estimation as
follows7. Suppose there are two parties, each active on a different level of the same
production chain: buyers (plaintiffs), and providers (defendants). Buyers purchase
product x from providers and have the following profit function:
pi = pqb − C (w, qb) (4.1)
where p is the price of the product buyers sell, qb is the output of the same product,
C (w, qb) is the cost which for simplicity can be taken to be only a function of qb and
input price, w. The providers form a cartel and make an infinitesimal price increase,
dw. Ignoring second order effects, Verboven and van Dijk (2009) track the impact
of this small price overcharge on buyer profit in order to “highlight key channels”














− ∂C (w, qb)
∂w




Multiplying both sides by dw and using Shepard’s Lemma to relate change in cost
5At this point Connor (2014) deserves a special mention. In an attempt to provide a data
set for overcharge estimations Connor (2014) refers to about 60 studies that have an econometric
dimension, which serve as a solid starting point.
6For more information, see, Davies and Ormosi (2012); OECD (2016).
7See, p.463.
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dpi = qbdp+ pdqb − ∂C (w, qb)
∂w
dw − ∂C (w, qb)
∂qb
dqb
= −qxdw + qbdp+ dqb
(




Consequently, Verboven and van Dijk (2009) identify three channels via which
cartel’s infinitesimal price increase can affect buyers’ profits. First channel is price
overcharge effect ; it captures the impact of cartel overcharge on the procurement
cost. Second is the pass-on effect ; it captures the extent plaintiff manages to pass
cost increases to its own customers. Third is the output effect ; it captures any
decline in profits due to reduced volume of production.
Estimation of all three effects is only possible within a structural framework. In
contrast, in a typical reduced form setting, the second and third effects are ignored.
Empirical estimation centres on estimating the impact on price – the price overcharge
effect, or simply overcharge. Next, I am going to present the methodologies and the
literature on structural estimation and reduced form estimation respectively.
4.2.1 Structural Estimation of Damages
This subsection takes the structural estimation literature under three groups: (i)
works that use perfect competition in forming benchmark, (ii) works that use
imperfect competition in forming a benchmark, (iii) works that estimate damages
within a dynamic framework. This subsection concludes with a short discussion
about feasibility of applying structural estimation in the next chapter.
Perfect Competition as the Benchmark: Estimating a System of
Equations
First set of works employ the assumption that in the absence of collusion, market
would be characterised by perfect competition. In this line of literature, supply
is modelled as a function of price and supply shifters; demand is modelled as a
function of price and demand shifters. In a simultaneous equations framework,
demand and supply together determine the equilibrium price and quantity, which
form the competitive benchmark. Damages are measured as the divergence from
this benchmark (Brander and Ross, 2006, p.347-349).
An example is Normann and Tan (2014), tracking the West German high voltage
cable industry in 1958–1990. In 1958–1974, German high voltage cable industry
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was subject to competition law like any other industry. In 1975, an exemption from
antitrust law was granted to the industry, with the hopes that this would promote
efficiency gains and technological progress. The exemption was taken back in 1985,
and the industry was returned to the jurisdiction of competition law. In the study,
the empirical strategy is identifying the impact of exemption using annual data.
Supply, demand, profit and capacity equations are estimated in a simultaneous
equation setting. Results suggest that annual impact of cartel on price is 16–19 %.
As a result of the inelastic demand, the impact on quantity was much smaller, 2%.
The findings do not indicate any efficiency gains, or technological progress during
the exemption period, only a wealth transfer from consumers to producers.
Another example isBra¨nnlund (1989), exploring the impact of monopsonic practices
of pulpwood producers on sawtimber and pulpwood markets in Sweden using
1954–1984 data. Sawtimber is used as an input in furniture, and production is
characterised by many small scale firms. Pulpwood is used for production of pulp and
eventually paper; pulp production is characterised by fewer firms. During the period
under investigation pulpwood producers either use a common procurement office, or
openly collude. Empirical objective is exploring the direct impact of monopsonist
practices directly on the pulpwood market, and indirectly on the sawtimber market.
Since pulpwood is already characterised by monopsony, empirical strategy is
modelling the market that would be under the counterfactual of collusion; in
this case, perfect competition. To identify the impact in both pulpwood and
sawtimber markets, two markets are modelled in interaction with each other within a
simultaneous equations framework. Results suggest that transition from monopsony
to perfect competition would translate as 28 % increase in pulpwood production
and 78 % increase in price. Higher price would lead to reallocation of capacity
to pulpwood, which in turn would bring a contraction of sawtimber production.
The estimates for sawtimber market suggest 10 % reduction in the volume, and
accompanying 18 % increase in price.
Some others example using this methodology include Hausman (1980, 1984) and
Tan (2009) exploring the coal industry in 17th and 18th century in UK; Shepard
(1986), studying SMP employed by orange producers in California and Arizona;
French and Nuckton (1991), focusing on a raisin SMP.
In this methodology there are three challenges. First, simultaneity is a challenge
for identification. Estimation requires using exogenous demand variations to
identify supply side, and using exogenous supply variations to identify demand
side. Finding exogenous shifters is not an easy task. Second, results are sensitive
to the functional form. Even though linearity or log linearity are considered
as reasonable approximations, estimations typically include sensitivity analysis to
various functional forms. Third, accuracy of damage estimation relies on perfect
competition being the counterfactual. If market instead is characterised by imperfect
competition, estimates would overestimate the impact of collusion (Brander and
Ross, 2006, p.347-349). This brings us to second group of works in the literature;
the studies accommodate some degree of market power in the benchmark for
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competition.
Departing from Perfect Competition
In this line of literature, the analysis typically starts with the estimation of
demand. On the supply side, ideally one would like to work with marginal cost,
which exceptional cases aside, is not observable. Some use average cost as an
approximation. Others acknowledge its unobservability, and infer it.
Probably the most well-known example of this approach is Nevo (2001). Empirical
objective is to assess the competitiveness of ready to eat cereal (RTEC) industry
which is commonly believed to be collusive. At the first stage, using customer level
data, and employing discrete choice estimation techniques8, demand is estimated.
Upon retrieving parameters from demand side, at the second stage, price cost
margins are inferred under three different assumptions regarding conduct: (i)
firms are making single product profit maximization, and their profits are entirely
determined by their ability to differentiate themselves from rivals; (ii) firms are
competing under portfolio effects, and their profits are also a function of their ability
to offer a brand portfolio; (iii) top 25 brands are joint profit maximizers, and their
profits are determined by the collusion. Results suggest under first two assumptions
margins go as high as 42 %; while in collusion expected margin would be 72%.
At the final stage, an observed indicator of actual margins is compared with, the
inferences from three different models. Proposed collusive conduct (collusion among
top 25 brands) is rejected9.
Another example is Asker (2010), studying a bidding ring of collectable stamp
dealers that were operational from late 1970s to late 1990s. Cartel employs an
innovative collusive strategy. Parties hire an agent, in this case a taxi driver. Before
each auction10, the agent collects quotes from all ring members about their true
valuation of each lot. This is the “knock-out” auction within the ring. When the
auction actually takes place, the ring is represented by the agent. Agent is bounded
by the maximum bid in knock-out session br. If the auction concludes with a price
higher than the knock-out session, the ring loses the auction. If the auction concludes
with a price lower than the knock-out session, the ring wins the auction and pays
bf . There is a profit for the ring that is equal to br − bf . Table 4.2 illustrates
the distribution of this profit among members of the ring. For example assume
that ring wins the auction for 6750$; and also assume that in knock-out session,
three ring members reported valuations higher than 6750$. The ring members who
report valuations below the winning bid get nothing. Each member of the ring,
except the winner, that reported a valuation higher than the winning bid receives
a side payment from the winner. The payment increases with own knock-out bid
8Nevo (2001) follows Berry et al. (1995) in demand estimation.
9For another work with a similar methodology also see Mariuzzo et al. (2009) which study Irish
Automobile industry.
10The auctions are English auctions.
95
Table 4.2: Side Payments Example
Source: Table 1 in Asker (2010).
and decreases with the number of bidders that reported a valuation higher than the
winning bid. The winner takes the item.
Data contains information from both actual auctions and knock-out auctions.
Impact of the cartel is identified in two different models. First model interprets
the knock-out auctions as the true valuation of the cartel members. In this
interpretation, if the cartel was not present, the price in an auction won by the
ring would have been the second highest valuation in knock-out auction; thus, in
this case the overcharge is equal to the difference between the auction price and
second highest knock-out bid. This estimate is considered as the “naive estimate”,
as it ignores that side payments increase with own knock-out bid, which creates an
incentive to overbid. Second model embeds the collusive strategy in a structural
framework. Findings suggest significant overbidding behaviour, which mitigates the
collusive harm by increasing the winning bid. True damages are significantly (around
50 %) less than the naive estimates. Cartel also harms the non-member rivals by
forcing them to inflate their bids. Damages suffered by non-member rivals are equal
to the damages suffered by sellers.
Some other examples using this methodology include De Roos (2006), exploring
lysine cartel; Igami (2015), which studying International Coffee Arrangement - a
supra national cartel.
There are three challenges in this approach. First, estimation is difficult to
communicate to a non-professional audience, which makes it less popular in a
court hearing. Second, in this approach, estimation requires explicit imposition
of a conduct assumption (Bresnahan, 1989, 1010-16). Consequently, accuracy of
damage estimation critically relies on the accuracy of the imposed market structure.
Third, competition is most frequently defined within a static framework. Ignoring
features of the market that relates to dynamic competition might lead to inaccurate
estimates. This brings us to third group of works in the literature; the studies that
accommodate dynamic considerations into the analysis.
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Estimation in a Dynamic Setting: Switching Regression Models
Works in this group focus on a long time frame and incorporate dynamic
considerations – most frequently incentive to cheat – into the analysis.
One of the most well-known studies in this fashion is Porter (1983). The aim is
empirically testing Green and Porter (1984) which works as follows: Under repeated
interaction, each firm sets the output, and observes the market price, which naturally
is the result of demand and output decisions of all firms. Under collusion, firms
cannot differentiate negative demand shocks, from cheating. To deter cheating,
colluders employ a trigger price which is less than collusive price. If price is below
the trigger, they revert to Cournot for a fixed time period. If price is above the
trigger, they adhere to collusion. Incentive compatibility condition dictates that
cheating can only happen if the expected cheating pay-off (net of Cournot) in one
period, is larger than the expected stream of profits foregone by triggering a regime
change. Cartel can influence members’ decision to cheat by adjusting the trigger
price and/or length of punishment period. Therefore, collusive strategy might be a
self-enforcing equilibrium.
Note that transposing to a dynamic setting has strong implications. First, two
behavioural outcomes that differ entirely from a static point of view, collusion
and competition, may actually be two occasional outcomes of the same long run
process. Second, price war is the result of the inability of the firms to distinguish
demand shocks from cheating. Then it follows that what governs price wars might
be demand shocks. Note that it is not necessarily only negative demand shocks that
destabilize collusion. Any improvement in market conditions that pushes the output
towards static collusive levels, increases the returns to cheating at the same time. To
maintain incentive compatibility, cartel must increase either the punishment period
or the trigger price (Porter, 1983, pp. 301-302).
Porter (1983) seeks to identify the occasional switches between competition and
collusion in an historical cartel, Joint Executive Committee (JEC). Cartel is formed
by railroad companies shipping grain from Chicago to the East Coast. JEC, predates
the Sherman Act, so it is well-documented. Using a switching regression model
with two regimes, collusion and competition periods are identified, and supply and
demand parameters are estimated. The estimates suggest that price predicted by
dynamic collusion is between price predicted by static collusion and Cournot. Under
collusion, total revenue is 11 % higher than competitive levels1112.
Working on OPEC pricing in 1973–2004, Almoguera et al. (2011) build on Porter
(1983) by incorporating a competitive fringe. The findings indicate that OPEC
11There is reason to believe these are conservative estimates. Ellison (1994) builds on Porter
(1983) by incorporating serial correlation on demand side and Markov structure in transition
between collusion and punishment. The estimates suggest that the impact of collusion is higher
than previously believed (p. 42-43).
12For another work with similar methodology see Grant and Thille (2001), which focus on gas
lamb oil trust in Ontario Canada in the 19th century.
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is better characterised as a non-cooperative Cournot game, which is occasionally
interrupted by collusion rather than the other way around. Similarly, Fabra and
Toro (2005) use daily data from Spanish electricity market in 1998 build on Porter
(1983), by modelling a Markov transition between collusion and punishment13 and by
experimenting with alternative triggers: market share, concentration (HHI), revenue
and average market price.
Applicability of Structural Estimation
On the plus side, structural estimation has many strengths. First, since data from
competitive periods/regions is not necessary to estimate competitive benchmark, it
has low data requirements. Second, it allows researcher to experiment with multiple
market structures. Third, it allows estimating price overcharge, output effect, and
pass-on effect separately. Consequently, regarding any change in conduct, it makes
a welfare assessment possible (Brander and Ross, 2006, p.349-351).
However, as mentioned above these strengths are coupled with some challenges.
Above I mentioned identification issues associated with simultaneity of demand and
supply; sensitivity of results to functional form; difficulty in communicating to a
non-professional audience; sensitivity of results to conduct assumption; impact of
ignoring dynamic considerations on the estimates. In our setting, there are some
other factors that complicate usage of structural estimation techniques. First, data
set is consumer level transaction data. This means market power of providers vary;
consequently, assuming perfect competition and estimating system of equations
would not be appropriate. Second, data set spans 18 months. This includes
a collusive period, a transition period, and presumably a competition period.
However, it is not straightforward to identify if transition is complete; or, if so
when it had been complete (and competition started).
As a result of these complications, I do not engage in structural estimation, and
leave it as a potential direction for future research. Rest of the analysis focus on
reduced form estimation techniques.
4.2.2 Reduced Form Methodologies
In reduced form analysis, the aim is estimating the impact of on price (the overcharge
effect, or simply overcharge). Output effect, and pass on effect are ignored.





13Similar to Ellison (1994).
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where ORt is the overcharge rate p
m
t is the observed collusive price, p
c
t is the price
that would have prevailed in the absence of collusion, or but-for price. Since pct is
the only unknown, for this approximation to work, an accurate prediction of pct must
be made.
Next four subsections present alternative approaches in reduced form estimation;
namely, before and after, dummy variable approach, forecasting and yardstick
method. DiD methodology and literature are explored in the next chapter in
comparison with merger retrospectives.
Before and After
Before and after uses only time series of the cartelized product. First, collusion
and competition periods are identified. If collusion covers t-j and t, estimate for
the but-for price – price that would have been observed in the market absent the
collusion – bases on price from t-j-k to t-j-1 and/or from t+1 to t+l. Typically,
as the estimate, average price in the competitive period(s) is (are) used. As Davis
and Garce´s (2009) point out, it is difficult to suggest that there is a great deal
of economics involved in before and after, since demand and cost shifters are not
controlled for14. It should rather be perceived as a simple approximation, which
might be significantly biased unless demand and supply are exceptionally stable
(p.354-56). Moreover, if there are multiple episodes of competition and collusion, it
might be difficult to modify the analysis15.
An example of this approach is Notaro (2014), estimating the overcharge in pasta
cartel in Italy. Italian competition authority, AGCM, fined pasta producers for
a total of 12.5 million Euros. AGCM claimed that using cost shocks as a cover,
pasta producers agreed to fix the list price during October 2006 – March 2008. In
the study, basing on monthly industry level data in 2000 – 2009, the impact of the
cartel on price is estimated. Naturally, this requires identifying the impact of the cost
increases and regime switch. In the study, before and after analysis corresponds to
comparing the average price in cartel period and competition period. The difference
in two periods is approximately 15 %.
Another example is Nelson (1993), studying the second hand police car auctions in
New York City. Police cars are renewed after certain age and mileage; the old cars
are sold. The study tracks an alleged conspiracy in these auctions. As the case is
settled in early stages of investigation, there is no information with regards to exact
form of coordination, or to the identities of colluders. However, an initial screening
suggests that March–May 1990 is the most suspicious period. Data set includes
winning bid, reference price, number of firms, and quality measures are available
for 340 vehicles sold at 13 auctions in January 1990 – May 1991. Additionally a
14Friederiszick and Ro¨ller (2010) and Maier-Rigaud and Schwalbe (2013) consider dummy
variable approach and forecasting as special cases of before and after method. I follow Davis
and Garce´s (2009) (and majority of the literature) and consider each of them separately.
15See Davis and Garce´s (2009), Figure 7.3.
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measure of expected price (“book value”), which base on price of similar car models,
is available for each auction. In the study, before and after is used as one of the
methods to estimate overcharge. Average price–expected price ratio in competition
period is multiplied by average expected price in collusion period to give but-for
price estimate.
Some other examples in the literature include Bolotova et al. (2008b); Howard and
Kaserman (1989).
Dummy Variable Approach
In dummy variable approach16, using all the available data (t-j-k to t+l) price, pi,
is regressed on control variables i.e. demand and cost shifters zi, χi; and a variable
of interest ri, an indicator variable marking collusive periods.
pi = α0 + α1zi + α2χi + α3ri + vi (4.4)
The coefficient of the indicator variable, α3, is interpreted as the impact of collusion
on price. The dummy variable approach is an improvement over before and after
method, as it includes demand and cost controls. Its validity does not depend on
a specific structural form. It is intuitive and easy to communicate (Brander and
Ross, 2006, p.353). However it still involves relatively strong assumptions: The
regime switch is instant. The impact of collusion on price is captured exclusively by
a dummy variable. The set of variables and how they affect the price are identical
across regimes17 (Nieberding, 2006, p.368-69).
Some of these assumptions can easily be relaxed. Parameter equality across regimes
can be addressed by interaction dummies. The impact of the instant regime
switch assumption can be mitigated by introducing transition dynamics. Some
challenges are more difficult to address. First, identification requires data from
both infringement and non-infringement periods. Data should ideally be spanning
a relatively short period of time, as time period under investigation expands,
structural features of the market that is assumed to be constant are susceptible
to change. At the same time, data should include variation high enough to
make precise identification possible. Second, it is known that cartels have phases.
Ability to increase price might differ within the life span of the cartel. Averaging
out the impact might give imprecise estimates. Third, collusion is known to be
proceeded by unsustainably harsh periods of competition, price wars18. In that
case using the precartel price to form the competitive benchmark is likely to lead
to underestimation of but-for price, and overestimation of harm. Similarly, using
postcartel period might also be problematic. The experience of explicit collusion
16Also known as indicator variable approach.
17Known as the assumption of parameter equality across regimes.
18Such as a punishment phase in a dynamic collusion model.
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might make tacit collusion easier, and the effect of collusion might stay on the
market (Brander and Ross, 2006, p.351-55)19.
An example of this approach is Cramton and Schwartz (2002), tracking the
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) electromagnetic spectrum licenses.
FCC auctions are structured as simultaneous bidding in multiple rounds. At each
round, parties submit bids or update their bids for the blocks20 they are interested.
Bidding continues until the round in which no single bid is increased. When bidding
ends, licenses are granted to highest bidders. It is claimed that six firms have been
practising code bidding in 40% of the auctions: The last three digits of the bids of
these six bidders were carrying a message to co-conspirators about licence numbers
they should withdraw from. Receiving the message, other members stopped being
aggressive in the indicated license. In the study, estimating the impact of code
bidding on the winning bid is one of the empirical objectives. To this aim, a variation
of the dummy variable approach is used. Winning bid is regressed on the variable
of interest, an indicator variable implying presence of code bidding; and control
variables, i.e. regional demographics, regional income, competition in the auction.
Results suggest that colluders maintained 27–36 %21 reductions in the winning bids
in relation to non-coordinating parties.
Another example is Asmat (2016), studying the DRAM cartel. Investigation was
triggered by an immunity application form a cartel member, and ended with a
settlement agreement. The infringement involved information sharing and price
coordination, and covered July 1998-June 200222. As part of the settlement, the
parties agreed to pay a total of 330 million Euros23.
Asmat (2016) analyses the impact of the conduct on products that are at different
stages in their product-cycle. DRAM industry, similar to many high-tech industries,
introduces products in successive “generations”. Over time, innovation leads to
improvement, e.g. faster processing, higher storage; so, new generations replace
older ones. The production is characterised by learning by doing; the cost in the next
period is partly determined by the level of output this period. It is hypothesized that
under these conditions, collusion in newer generations is more difficult to sustain:
Incentive to cheat is present in every cartel, as colluders might prefer to trade higher
gains in this period with a stream of potential high gains in the future. However,
in newer generations, the incentive to cheat is fortified, as cheating also providers
a strategic edge in the next period in the form of lower cost in relation to rivals.
Interestingly, in contrast to newer generations, in older generations, the incentive
to collude is fortified. Collusion is easier to sustain in older generations; it not only
19Brander and Ross (2006) also suggests that tacit collusion may also be facilitated by damages
claims following prosecution. If cartel members anticipate that damage estimates depend on
postcartel pricing (more aggressive postcartel pricing leads to lower estimates for but-for price,







allows higher returns in the older generation sales, but also transfers some part of
the total demand to newer generations. Under learning by doing, this translates
as lower cost in the next period. It follows that collusion might be characterized
by some form of partial collusion: colluding in older generations and competing in
newer generations.
Using firm level quarterly data covering 1988–2011 and 11 different generations,
the impact of collusion on quantity and price are explored using dummy variable
approach. Results support theoretical predictions: For older generations, collusion
reduces the output sold. After the collapse of the cartel in 2002, trend reverses and
output expands. The impact of collusion on price is estimated as 25 %. Regarding
newer generations, sales increase with transition to collusion. This is accompanied
by a reduction in price. The estimates for the price reduction goes as high as 70 %.
Some other examples in the literature include Bolotova et al. (2008b); Boshoff (2015);
Hausman (1980, 1984); Howard and Kaserman (1989); Hu¨schelrath et al. (2013,
2016); Laitenberger and Smuda (2015); Madhavan et al. (1994); Mncube (2014);
Nelson (1993); Notaro (2014).
Forecasting
Forecasting, is proposed in response to the limitations of dummy variable approach.
Assume a cartel is active from t-j to t and both price and control variables are
observable from t-j-k to t+l. In a typical forecasting exercise, at the first stage,
price is first regressed on control variables using the data from t-j-k to t-j-1 and/or
from t+1 to t+l in a reduced form setting24. Parameters retrieved from this
regression are treated as parameters governing pricing behaviour under competition.
At the second stage, parameter estimates interact with independent variables in the
collusive period. This gives predicted values for the price that would have been
observed under the competition counterfactual.
As an improvement over the dummy variable approach, there is no assumption of
parameter equality across regimes. Since the estimation involves only parameters in
competition, forecasting remains agnostic about the parameters in collusion. Note
that, since there is no parameter equality across regimes, the impact of collusion
is not confined to the coefficient of dummy variable. Moreover, in forecasting,
the consequences of instant regime switch assumption might be mitigated by the
choice of competition period. Finally, since the aim is estimating the competitive
benchmark, adherence to collusive agreement over time is also less relevant.
Improvements suggest that the forecasting estimates should be less biased. True
that may be; there is a cost. Limiting the available data to competitive period
reduces precision of estimates. Choosing between two methods involves a trade-off
24Technically, if only postcartel data is used to establish competitive benchmark, more precise
term would be backcasting. However, literature rarely makes this distinction. See Nieberding 2006,
p.369 or Werden et al. 1991, p.343 for this distinction.
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between unbiasedness and efficiency (Howard and Kaserman, 1989, p.381).
An example is Lee and Hahn (2002) tracking the impact of 1997 financial crisis on
collusive incentives in South Korea. Prior to the crisis, common understanding was,
the construction industry is highly collusive. The crisis had a great impact on the
construction sector. In one year, construction industry shrank by 37 %. Collusive
incentives were replaced with survival instincts; many firms exited and remaining
ones started to compete to stay in the market. The empirical objective is assessing
the likelihood of a regime switch from collusion to competition and assessing the
impact of this regime change on price. Using bidding data from 63 firms active
in construction projects during 1995–2000, Lee and Hahn (2002) first identify two
distinct regimes: precrisis (collusion), and postcrisis (competition). Price before
crisis is 13 % higher than the price after. Second stage is the overcharge estimation.
Basing on data from competitive period, they forecast but-for price for the collusion
period. Results suggest that cooperation in the construction sector increased price
14.3–16.3 %.
Another example is Boshoff (2015) tracking the bitumen cartel active in South
Africa. The competition law in South Africa was adopted in 2000; prior to which,
bitumen firms were running a legal cartel. After collusion being illegal, firms
adopted a more discrete approach. They used industry association as a medium of
coordination. Association determined a pricing formula to regulate the changes in
wholesale price. South African Competition Authority fined bitumen producers 68
million South African Rand. The forecasting analysis corresponds to first retrieving
coefficient estimates using country level data from a panel of other countries, then
interacting these estimates with values of South African independent variables.
Some other examples in the literature include Howard and Kaserman (1989); Lee
(2000); Nelson (1993); Notaro (2014).
Yardstick Method
Yardstick method requires identifying a market i) similar in terms of market
structure, demand conditions, and cost structure, ii) not suffering from collusion.
This might be a similar product in the same geographical market or the same
product in another geographical market. If a market satisfying these two conditions
is identified, it might be easier to control for demand and cost shifters (Davis and
Garce´s, 2009, p.360). Another benefit of yardstick approach is that it might help
dating the start (end) of conspiracy by identifying the time when parallelism in
benchmark market and affected market ceased (re-emerged) (Brander and Ross,
2006, p.346).
An example is Carlton et al. (1995), studying the antitrust case that surrounds
the Ivy League Schools and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In May
1991, US Department of Justice (DoJ ) announced that an antitrust case had been
filed against 8 Ivy League schools and MIT. DoJ claimed that these universities
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regularly met in “Overlap Meetings” and in these meetings they were agreeing on
how to determine the size of family contribution and the scholarship25. Carlton
et al. (1995) explore DoJ allegations and investigate if the conduct had any impact
on the price using yardstick method. By tracking 225 private and public schools in
1984–1990, the behaviour of the defendants is compared to the behaviour of the rest
of the colleges. Price is regressed on many factors, including participation to Overlap
Meetings. The results suggest that price differences across schools are primarily
governed by structural features, e.g. public vs. private, quality, and income level of
the enrolled students. Participation to Overlap Meetings has no significant impact
on price.
Another example is Lee (2000), focusing on school milk auctions in Dallas Forth
Worth in 1980s. Eleven firms were prosecuted of bid rigging; nine reached a
settlement with the state. In order to estimate the overcharge Lee (2000) suggests
a fusion of forecasting and yardstick. Recall that forecasting requires modelling
competitive behaviour and retrieving parameters using competitive period data.
Using these parameters but-for price is retrieved. However, Dallas Forth Worth
data does not have enough observations in competition period. Parameters in
competition period are retrieved using data from San Antonio, which has a similar
market structure but is not contaminated with collusion. Comparing actual price
and but-for price, the overcharge estimate ranges in 9.3–15.45 %, averaging 11.74
%.
However, the most popular yardstick methodology is DiD, which is explored in the
next section.
4.3 Ex Post Analysis and Difference-in-Difference
The intuition of DiD methodology within the framework of ex post analysis is best
illustrated by Ashenfelter et al. 2009, (pp. 6-9). Consider following pricing relation







t + υt (4.5)
where pTt is the price in the treatment market at time t, δ
T
0 is the intercept; γ
T
t
captures any factor that impact pricing over time (i.e. demand, cost shifters); γpostt
is an indicator for posttreatment period. Equation implies that at any time t, price
in the treated market is determined by three factors: i) initial price level, δT0 ; ii)
time varying factors that influence price, γTt ; iii) treatment, γ
post. Without properly
controlling time varying factors, it is not possible to estimate δ1 consistently.
One way of controlling time varying factors is including them into the model. If the
25https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1991/325032.pdf.
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researcher believes that the time varying factors are related to observable demand
shocks, zt and cost shifters, χt in the following way,
γTt = α0 + β1zt + β2χt + t (4.6)
by plugging zi and χi into Equation 4.5, it is possible to identify the impact of the
treatment in the treatment market. Resulting pricing relation in this case is the same
with the one in the dummy variable approach, Equation 4.4. Note that consistency






= 0; all time varying factors
that might impact pricing and change around the treatment time are controlled.
If not, δ1 fails to capture exclusively the impact of the treatment; it also captures
other treatments hidden in υt.
Another way of controlling time varying factors is using a control market. Sticking










t + ϑt (4.7)
where pCt is the price, in control market at time t; µ0 is the intercept; µ
C
t captures
any time varying factor; and γpostt is an indicator for posttreatment observations.
In this case, using difference in price across markets and difference in price before
and after treatment, it is possible to eliminate the impact of time varying factors on
price and to identify the impact of the treatment if
• Two markets have similar demand and cost conditions26, implying γTt −µCt = 0,
• Control market is not affected from the treatment, implying µ1 = 0.
4.3.1 Collusion Retrospectives and Difference-in-Difference
Collusion retrospectives, on top of any challenges associated with reduced form
techniques, highlight two challenges specific to DiD. First is the increased data
requirements. In addition to the treatment market, now the researcher needs data
from the control market as well. Note that not any market can be a control market.
It must have similar demand and cost conditions, yet must be unaffected from the
treatment (Hu¨schelrath et al., 2013, p. 103). Second challenge is disentangling the
impact of the treatment and the co-occurring factors. Therefore, the researcher
must be sure about absence of any unobservable co-occurring factor that is affecting
the treatment market uniquely and having an impact on price. (Coatney and Tack
26Similarity in demand and cost conditions is not considered as sufficient by some. I am going
to revisit this issue later.
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2014, p. 431, Oxera 2009, p. 61). In other words, for identification, it might be an













A typical DiD specification would look similar to,








s + i (4.8)
where, the treatment is the regime switch; zst refers to demand shifters; χst refers to
cost shifters; γpostt is an indicator variable that marks posttreatment observations;
and γtreateds marks the treated observations, the locations affected from the regime
switch. Consequently, α3 captures the impact of unobservable factors that change
over time, while α4 captures the impact of unobservable time-invariant differences
between treated and not treated regions. α5 is the coefficient the researcher is after; it
captures average treatment effect, the impact of the regime change. Some examples
in the literature using this specification would include Erutku and Hildebrand
(2010); Hu¨schelrath et al. (2013); Laitenberger and Smuda (2015); McCluer and
Starr (2013).
An example collusion retrospective with DiD is McCluer and Starr (2013), studying
the Marshfield/Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) case. Marshfield offers multispecialty
physician services. BCBS offers health care plans. In 1994, BCBS went to
court, and accused Marshfield and its rivals of market allocation and price fixing.
McCluer and Starr (2013) describe the economic analysis done by BCBS consultants.
Marshfield and 8 surrounding counties are defined as the treatment market. Rest
of the Wisconsin is defined as the control market. Estimation is done using
BCBS individual claims data. After controlling for the differences across individual
characteristics, i.e. sex, age, marital status; the differences in insurance plans, i.e.
comprehensiveness of the plan, type of the employer; and the differences in county
characteristics, i.e. income, unemployment rate, population growth, findings suggest
that around 50 % of the price increase in the treatment market is associated with
collusion.
Another example is Laitenberger and Smuda (2015), studying the European
detergent cartel. They use transaction data in estimating overcharge. First,
dummy variable approach is employed. This involves estimating independent
pricing equations for each group of competitors (colluders, private brands, and
independent manufacturers), while controlling for product characteristics, retailer
specific features and demand and cost shifters, and capturing the impact of collusion
by an indicator variable. The results suggest that cartel increased price 6–7 %.
Private labels followed the cartel and increased their price 2.6 % in an umbrella
pricing fashion, but independent brands did not. Basing on these findings at the
second stage DiD is used. In this, independent manufacturers, whose behaviour
is relatively less contaminated by the cartel, are taken as the control group. DiD
estimates are around 6-7 %, similar to dummy variable approach estimates.
Another frequently used specification, is a variation of Equation 4.8.
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t + υi (4.9)
Here, γpostt and γ
treated
s are replaced with location and time fixed effects, γ
s, γt. Some
examples in the literature using this specification would include Coatney and Tack
(2014); Kamita (2010).
Kamita (2010) studies airline market in Hawaiian archipelago, in particular the
impact of the antitrust immunity given to two incumbents in July 2002. Hawaiian
archipelago is compared with two different control markets: (i) these with similar
cost structure, i.e. West Coast flights; (ii) these with similar demand structure, i.e.
East Coast flights. Estimations suggest that list price increased 48–129 % as a result
of the immunity. However the effective price (net of discounts) increased 10–18 %.
High price stretches to 2.5 years after immunity expires.
Some other collusion retrospectives in the literature that use DiD include Coatney
and Tack (2014)27; Erutku and Hildebrand (2010); Hu¨schelrath et al. (2013, 2016).
4.3.2 Merger Retrospectives and Difference-in-Difference
Even though there had been previous attempts to analyse the impact of mergers,
the popularity of merger retrospectives increased in early 2000s. There are at least
two reasons for this.
First is the poor performance of the US Government in challenging hospital mergers
in 1990’s. Fales and Paul (2014) provide a detailed record of government’s defeats
in courts28. In many cases, the courts ruled in favour of the defendants on
the grounds that government failed to i) establish product market, ii) establish
geographical market, iii) show emergence of market power after merger, or iv) show
anticompetitive effects. Conducting merger retrospectives was one of the measures
FTC took in order to convince courts on the effects of mergers29. FTC staff published
three papers30 (Haas Wilson and Garmon, 2011; Tenn, 2011; Thompson, 2011). In
fact, following retrospective analysis, one of the mergers – Evanston/Highland Park
– has been successfully challenged and the transaction was modified after it was
closed31. Second reason for the increased popularity of merger retrospectives is the
27Coatney and Tack (2014) study the impact of an antitrust investigation, rather than a cartel.
28See, Figure 1, p. 33 for a summary.
29Other measures included more selective challenging, modernization of geographical market
definition, and developing a new theory of harm building on bargaining power of hospitals and
insurance companies.
30For a brief summary of the merger retrospectives in FTC regarding hospitals, see, Farrell et al.
(2009).
31This is particularly interesting because parties reported the merger under Hart–Scott–Rodino
Act (1976), and government took no action. Consequently, parties closed the transaction. FTC
challenged the case retrospectively 3 years after closure. Modification to the transaction involved
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emergence of empirical evidence, e.g. GAO (2004); Hastings (2004), which associate
merger activity in petroleum industry with price increase. FTC took the evidence
seriously, and conducted many petroleum merger retrospectives, e.g Taylor et al.
(2010) (in reply to Hastings (2004)); Hosken et al. (2011); Silvia and Taylor (2013);
Simpson and Taylor (2008); Taylor and Hosken (2007)32. The retrospectives rapidly
spilled over to other industries in collaboration with great names in the program
evaluation literature such as Orley Ashenfelter33. Next part presents this literature
and the methodologies with an emphasis on the empirical strategy employed. I
take merger retrospectives in three groups: i) conventional merger retrospectives, ii)
merger retrospectives that use spatial variation in identifying treatment and control
groups, iii) merger retrospectives that take a treatment intensity approach.
Conventional Merger Retrospectives
It is safe to say that merger retrospectives are most frequently conducted in
petroleum industry. The list includes Hosken et al. (2011)34, Jime´nez and Perdiguero
(2014)35, Kreisle (2015)36, Silvia and Taylor (2013)37, Simpson and Taylor (2008)38,
Taylor and Hosken (2007)39 40. There are a large number of common features
across these studies. Treatment market is chosen from regions which are most
adversely affected from the merger. This is followed by a thorough evaluation of
treatment market conditions, i.e. sources of supply; distance to supply; potential
outages, and capacity constraints; presence of merging parties; intensity of rivalry;
local formulation of gasoline; local environmental regulations. Next, the market
that best approximates to the conditions in the treatment market is taken as the
control market. Typically, Oil Price Information System (OPIS) data is used41. At
the wholesale level, this involves refiner specific price quotes; at the retail level,
this involves transaction data from stations accepting fleet cards. The empirical
strategy is regressing the price difference between treatment and control markets on
an indicator variable, which marks the treatment time, and other indicator variables
a behavioural commitment; each Evanston hospital was required to negotiate separately with
insurance companies. See, Fales and Paul (2014) for details (pp. 31-32, FN. 14-15).
32FTC publishes a yearly paper in Review of Industrial Organization, themed “Economics at
the FTC” summarizing the input FTC Bureau of Economics provided to antitrust enforcement.
It is also possible to track the wave of merger retrospectives in petroleum and hospitals in 2005,
2006, and 2009.
33See, Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010); Ashenfelter et al. (2013, 2014, 2009).
34UDS/Tosco merger.
35DISA/Shell merger.
36Western Refining/Giant Industries merger.
37Sunuco/El Paso and Valero/Promcor mergers.
38Marathon Ashland/Ultramar merger.
39Marathon/Ashland merger.
40Hastings (2004); Hastings and Gilbert (2005); Houde (2012); Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013);
Taylor et al. (2010) are also petroleum merger retrospectives. They are explored in the upcoming
sections.
41Jime´nez and Perdiguero (2014), study a European merger, hence do not use OPIS data.
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for calendar months42:




m + υi (4.10)
In this specification, pTi is the price in treatment market, p
C
i is the price in control
market, γm represents calendar month and captures seasonality, γpostt is an indicator
variable marking the posttreatment observations, hence the variable of interest.
Generally separate estimations are made for wholesale vs. retail, regular gasoline
vs. diesel, or branded vs. unbranded.
In hospital merger retrospectives (Haas Wilson and Garmon (2011)43, Thompson
(2011)44, Tenn (2011)45) empirical strategy is similar; analysis centres on the
provision of general acute care services for inpatients, in particular the relation
between hospitals and the insurance companies. Retrospectives are concerned with
the impact of increase in hospitals’ bargaining power on price. They typically use
individual level claims data provided by insurance companies. Merging parties are
taken as the treatment group; hospitals of similar nature46 in the rest of the state
constitute the control group. Empirical strategy is identifying the impact of the
merger via regressing price on a variable of interest; hospital fixed effects; and a set
of controls, i.e regional demographics, and insurance plan characteristics, hospital
characteristics47.
Definition of treatment and control groups is similar in airline merger retrospectives
(Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010)48, Gayle (2008)49, Luo (2014)50, Dobson and Piga
(2013)51). Routes unaffected from the merger – these in which merging parties do
42Occasionally some controls are employed as well. Taylor and Hosken (2007) use crude oil
price, Simpson and Taylor (2008) use indicator variables marking pipeline raptures. Jime´nez
and Perdiguero (2014) follow a more conventional DiD specification, like Equation 4.8, and use
transport cost and gasoline price as control.
43Evanston Northwestern Healthcare/Highland Park Hospital, and Provena St. Therese Medical
Centre/Victory Memorial Hospital mergers in Chicago.
44Summit Hospitals/Sutter Hospitals merger in San Francisco, California.
45New Hanover Regional Medical/Cape Fear Memorial Hospital merger in North Carolina.
46If merging parties are teaching hospitals, the control group is composed of teaching hospitals.
Similarly, large hospitals, hospitals with residential programs are compared with similar hospitals.
Federal hospitals, and hospitals that were party to another recent merger are eliminated from the
control group.
47Tenn (2011); Thompson (2011) prefer a less conventional multi stage approach. At the first
stage, price is regressed on a set of controls, and a set of indicator variables each marking a quarter
and hospital combinations. At the second stage, for each hospital, price change from pretreatment
to posttreatment is calculated. This is done by taking the averages of the posttreatment and
pretreatment quarter effects respectively, and subtracting the latter average from the former. At
the final stage, price change is regressed on an intercept and an indicator variable marking merging




51Ryan Air/Buzz and Easy Jet/Go Fly mergers.
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not operate together – are taken as the control. Methodology involves regressing
price on a variable of interest and a set of controls, e.g. flight characteristics, route
characteristics, airport characteristics, or demographics, using a specification similar
to Equation 4.8
FMCG52 merger retrospectives (Friberg and Romahn (2015)53, Tenn and Yun
(2011)54, Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010)55, Weinberg (2011)56, Weinberg and Hosken
(2013)57 differ from other retrospectives as competition is defined on product
space. Consequently, merging party products are taken as the treatment group58.
Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010); Weinberg (2011); Weinberg and Hosken (2013) take
private label products as the control group; Friberg and Romahn (2015); Tenn and
Yun (2011) take rivals that are not affected by the merger as the control group.
In the analysis, scanner data is used. Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) employ a
specification similar to














m + υi (4.11)
for product s, city c, time t, calendar month m where, γcs is city-product fixed
effect. γpostt is an indicator marking postmerger observations. γ
m is an indicator
for calendar month and captures seasonality. γtreateds marks merging party products.
Other FMCG retrospectives also follow similar specifications59. Friberg and Romahn
(2015); Weinberg (2011) replace γpostt with time fixed effects
60. Weinberg and Hosken
(2013) add cost indicators (price for crude petroleum for motor oil merger, and price
of corn syrup for maple syrup merger) as controls.
Some other examples in the literature that use similar methodology are Aguzzoni
et al. (2014), looking at a merger of two videogame outlets, Game/Gamestation, in
52FMCG can be defined as products that are geared towards household consumption and
typically consumed, and replaced rapidly, e.g. foodstuffs, cosmetics, cleaning products, and
drugstore products. See, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5375_en.htm.
53Carlsberg/Pripps merger in Sweden.
54Pfizer/Johnson & Johnson merger.
55Quaker State/Pennzoil, Log Cabin/Mrs. Butterworthy, Guinness/Metropolitan,
Always/Tambrands, General Mills/Chex mergers.
56Always/Tambrands merger.
57Quaker State/Pennzoil, and Log Cabin/Mrs. Butterworthy mergers.
58Friberg and Romahn (2015) track a case that involves divesture. Consequently, in addition
to merging parties, the divested brand, and the third party acquiring the divested brand are also
taken as part of the treatment group. Tenn and Yun (2011) are primarily concerned with the
performance of divested brands. Therefore treatment group is the divested brands.
59An application of a similar empirical strategy to another industry is done by Ashenfelter
et al. (2013), studying a merger of two producers of home appliances, Whirlpool/Maytag, using
scanner data. The merger reduces the number of domestic producers from four to three. Parties
considerably overlap in the production of cloth washers, dryers, dishwashers, and refrigerators.
These appliances constitute the treatment group. The overlap is little to none in the production
of freezers, cooktop, oven, and ranges. These appliances constitute the control group.
60Friberg and Romahn (2015) use aggregated data, so they employ only product fixed effects.
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the UK; Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2005) studying a banking merger in US,
Bank Boston/Fleet; DGComp (2015) focusing on in mobile telecommunications,
T-Mobile/Telering merger in Austria, and T-Mobile/Orange merger in the
Netherlands.
Using Spatial Variation
Some works in the literature use spatial variation in identifying the impact of the
merger. An example is Hastings (2004), studying regional effects of a petroleum
merger, Thrifty/ARCO, using a private data set that provides station level
information, i.e. individual characteristics and posted price. Empirical objective is
identifying the impact of elimination of an independent brand, Thrifty, on the other
stations. Naturally, this requires a local analysis; elimination of Thrifty stations
would have an effect on the behaviour of another station only if that station was
close to a Thrifty station before the merger. The stations that were in close proximity
to a Thrifty station before the merger constitute the treatment group. On the other
hand, merger will have no impact in regions where there were no Thrifty stations
before merger. The stations in these regions constitute the control group. Hastings
(2004) identify the impact of merger via












s + υi (4.12)
where s is station, c is city, t is month. γct refers to city time fixed effects. γs
refers to station fixed effects. γcontractst is an indicator variable that controls for
a contractual change. γcompst is the variable of interest; it is an indicator variable
marking the stations which were competing with a Thrifty station before the merger.
For control stations, the indicator takes value 0 both before and after the merger. For
treatment stations, it takes value 1 before the treatment, and 0 after the treatment.
The findings suggest that the merger had significant effect on retail price; stations
that were previously competing with independent brands to raise price 5 cents per
gallon, which corresponds to 50 % of retail margins (Taylor et al., 2010, p.1269).
Methodology offered in Hastings (2004) has been employed in similar settings by
others. First study is a work by FTC staff and primarily is about replicating
the methodology in Hastings (2004) using a more comprehensive dataset. Taylor
et al. (2010) suggest that the impact of the merger on price was marginal at best.
Second study Houde (2012) focus on regional effects of another petroleum merger,
acquisition of Sunoco bu Ultramar, in Quebec City Canada, using a private data set
that provides station level information, i.e. individual characteristics, posted price.
Houde (2012) builds on Hastings (2004) via estimating a separate treatment effect
for the merging parties, and competitors61.
Another example is Aguzzoni et al. (2016), studying Waterson/Ottakar merger in the
UK retail book market, and Argentesi et al. (2016) studying C1000/Jumbo merger in
61See, p. 2172.
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Dutch retail grocery market have similar empirical strategy. First step is identifying
the regions affected from the merger. Employing market definitions used by the
competition authority, the geographic markets in which parties were competing with
each other before merger (overlap regions) are identified. In these regions, after the
merger, the number of competitors drops by one. In other regions (non-overlap
regions), number of competitors remains unchanged. Using a matching approach,
overlap regions (treatment markets) are matched with non-overlap markets on the
basis of demand indicators, i.e. demographics, social and economic indicators;
measures of competition, i.e. number of rivals, regional HHI; or cost indicators,
i.e. housing price. Finally, the impact of merger is identified by regressing price on
a variable of interest, indicators of demand and cost, and measures of competition
in a conventional DiD specification. Findings indicate that neither Jumbo/C1000,
nor Waterson/Ottokar merger had an impact on price.
Final example I cover here is Allen et al. (2014), studying an undisclosed merger
in the Canadian mortgage market, using insurance administration data at contract
level. In regions where activities of merging parties overlap, the merger reduces
the number of available lenders by one. These locations are taken as treatment
market. On the other hand, in other regions where only one or none of the merging
parties is present, the merger has no impact. These locations are taken as control
market. Naturally, the impact of the merger depends on the number of remaining
lenders in the market. To homogenize the treatment effect, Allen et al. (2014)
limit the treatment and control regions to areas in which borrowers have 5-8 lender
options. In the study, three different DiD estimations are done. First specification is
a variant of Equation 4.9, where dependent variable, transaction mortgage rate net
of government bond rate, is regressed on a variable of interest, region and time fixed
effects, and a set of controls, i.e. borrower income, credit score, residential status
of the borrower, existing debt, the price of the property, loan to value indicators62.
Second specification interacts the controls with posttreatment indicator and adds
linear and quadratic time trends. Third, Allen et al. (2014) combines DiD and
matching, where the markets are matched with four closest neighbours on the basis
of propensity score. Findings indicate a small increase in mortgage rates, 6 basis
point, associated with the merger63.
Treatment Intensity
As the examples given so far illustrate, the works that use spatial variation to
identify the impact of a merger, benefit from this variation in the determination
of treatment and control groups. Outlets of the parties to the transaction, and
their close competitors are considered “treated”, while further away regions are
considered “not treated”. Little attention is paid to the variations in the intensity
62See, Table D2 in online appendix.
63This corresponds to 5 Canadian Dollars increase in monthly payments for a mortgage of
150,000 Canadian Dollars. Considering the analysis is confined to areas with 5-8 lender options,
small size of the estimate should not be surprising (p. 3379).
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Figure 4.2: Spatial Clusters
Source: Figure 2 in Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013).
of the treatment within the treated regions. The assumption here is that two outlets,
one located right across the street to merging party outlet, and the other right on the
border separating treated and not treated regions; both receive the same treatment.
Works in this part challenge this assumption, and exploit variations in the intensity
of treatment.
Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) study regional effects of an Austrian petroleum
merger, acquisition of Arai by BP, using a public data set that provide station
level information, i.e. individual characteristics, posted price. The idea is that
the distribution of treatment effect might be governed by the distribution of the
stations, and the identity of merging parties. Consider five gasoline stations in one
dimensional world that are controlled by three rival undertakings A,B,C. Let the
researcher be interested with the impact of a merger between A and C. If before
merger the sequence of the stations is A1 − B1 − C − B2 − A2, after the merger,
the intensity of the competition will be unchanged. Instead, if the sequence of the
stations is B1 − A1 − C − A2 − B2, after the merger, as a result of clustering of
A stations, only B1 − A1, and A2 − B2 will be competing with each other. In two
dimensional world, Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) propose measuring clustering as
follows: Consider in the market, there are three undertakings with multiple stations,
A,B,C, and a number of independent stations, F , each belonging to a different
undertaking. Let the stations be distributed as illustrated in Figure 4.2.




/Ni, where, kmii refers to number of stations in any cluster mi; Mi refers
to number of clusters; Ni refers to number of adjacent stations. To understand
the index better, let us follow the example in Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013): the
circled station B, has six adjacent neighbours; meaning Ni = 7. Seven stations are
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distributed on five clusters (two independent – one cluster each, and clusters of two
B, three C, one A); meaning Mi = 5. Employing the formula, the spatial clustering














. If the independent station
that is circled in the figure is acquired by one of the multi station undertakings,
the index value changes. The size of the change depends on the identity of the
acquiring undertaking (and the distribution of stations). If the acquiring firm is B,
total number of clusters falls by one and size of SC increases. If the acquiring firm
is A, change in SC is zero because A does not have any stations neighbouring the
acquired independent station (p. 665).
In this context, the treatment group is defined as the stations with a change in
clustering index; the control group is defined as the stations with no change in
clustering index. Empirical methodology builds on Hastings (2004). Specification
used in estimation is a variation of















λlzst + υi (4.13)
where s is station, t is time. γt refers to time fixed effects. γs refers to station
fixed effects. zst refers to time variant station characteristics, i.e. amenities in the
station, size of the station, working hours, land price; and regional characteristics,
i.e. number of commuters, tourism indicators, population density. γBPst marks
stations subject to merger. γcompst , as in Hastings (2004), indicates station s was
competing with an Arai station premerger. SCst is the variable of interest. “The
change in spatial clustering can be considered a treatment’ effect of a change in a
continuous variable indicating if and to which extent a location is affected by the
merger (p.665)”. The findings provide valuable insight. Results suggest that even
though the impact of the merger in overall price level is insignificant, there are
sizeable local increases in price.
Chone´ and Linnemer (2012) study the effects of a merger of two Paris carpark
operators, GTM and Vinci, using a public data set providing outlet specific
information, i.e. individual characteristics, posted price. Chone´ and Linnemer
(2012) note that the approach in Hastings (2004) involves a separation of the stations
into two groups: treatment, the outlets that were close to acquired stations before
the merger; and control, the stations that were not close to an acquired station.
However, this is simply an approximation; as in this approach only first order effects
are considered. Treatment effects can pass on to other stations, in particular those
in close proximity to the acquired stations. Including stations that are somewhat
affected from the treatment into the control group contaminates the control group
and leads to inconsistent estimates.
Assume there are six outlets l, i, j,m, n, o, controlled by five undertakings
(i,m), (j), (l), (n), (o), as marked with + signs in Figure 4.3. r marks the limiting
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distance that a rival can influence the behaviour of another rival. Consider a merger
of (i,m) and (j). Outlets of the merging parties that were competing with each
other before the transaction (outlets that are in r radius of each other), are directly
exposed to the merger. These outlets are defined as “exposed of degree zero”, E0 (r).
Outlets that are not directly exposed to the merger themselves, but are competing
with an outlet that is directly exposed are defined as exposed of degree one, E1 (r).
The outlets that are not E1 (r) themselves, but are competing with an E1 (r) outlet
are defined as exposed of degree two, E2 (r), and the iteration goes on. Finally,
F k (r), corresponds to the outlets that are exposed at order k or less. For instance,
F 1 (r) refers to the subset of E0 (r) outlets, i, and j; and E1 (r) outlets, m, and
l. The premise is that the risk of contamination of control group is minimized if
the outlets that are not exposed to the merger at any order, the subset of outlets
in 1 − F k (r), constitute the control. In the Figure 4.3 these are outlets n, and
o. Accordingly, depending on what the researcher is interested in, treatment group
may include either only firms that are directly exposed to merger, E0 (r); or firms
that are exposed of higher orders F k (r). Chone´ and Linnemer (2012) offer three
valuable insights about this methodology. First, it is straightforward to use the
methodology for “any event that affects particular group of outlets”. Second, the
methodology can easily be generalized the product space. Third, via estimating
a separate treatment effect for each degree of exposure, E1 (r) , E1 (r) ...E∞ (r),
if “competitive interactions are simple enough”, the researcher might capture the
“treatment intensity” (pp. 637-639).
The estimation builds on a simple specification












s + υi (4.14)
where s is outlet, t is time. γt refers to time fixed effects; γs refers to outlet fixed
effects. γpostt marks posttreatment observations. γ
treated
s marks the treated group,
either E0 (r) or F k (r). Findings are provocative. If degree of exposure is ignored,
i.e. control group includes outlets that are indirectly exposed to the merger, the
impact of merger on price is insignificant. If control group is composed exclusively
of the outlets that are not exposed to merger at any order, results suggest 3 % price
increase.
4.4 Forming a Bridge between Collusion and
Merger Retrospectives
In this section, drawing from theoretical framework and identification techniques
employed in merger retrospectives, in a DiD setting, an alternative empirical strategy
to estimate collusive overcharge is proposed. Even though, in the next chapter this
proposed strategy is applied, discussion in this section should be taken in the broader
context of estimating overcharge in a spatial setting. Issues specific to the application
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Figure 4.3: Degree of Exposure
Source: Figure 1 in Chone´ and Linnemer (2012).
carried on in Chapter 5 are covered in that chapter. It should also be stressed that
strategy proposed here should be thought as an addition to the existing strategies,
rather than as a strategy replacing existing ones.
DiD is very frequently employed in merger retrospectives. Merger retrospective
literature, in its “extensive” state, offers powerful insights for the collusion
retrospectives, which, in comparison, is at its infancy. Primary reason of this
divergence is data availability. Merger proceedings are more transparent in nature.
Parties would like to convince both the authorities and the public that they are
not doing anything wrong. Therefore, after the merger has been concluded, they
are more willing to disclose their analyses, which typically rely on consumer or
transaction level data, and employ more refined empirical strategies. On the other
hand, collusion proceedings are held more private. Since damage proceedings are
contingent on an infringement decision, i.e. decision of an authority that finds
the parties guilty, the discussion is not about if parties had done something wrong;
rather, it is about the damage associated with that action. Therefore, after a damage
litigation, parties are less willing to disclose their analyses. This is a setback for the
collusion retrospectives; the analysis is confined to either publicly available data
or the third party data, which in turn has a natural toll on the set of available
empirical strategies to be used, and/or industries to be studied. In our case, however,
availability of consumer level data makes importation of estimation strategies from
merger retrospectives possible.
DiD involves comparing two markets; one is subject to the treatment and the other is
not. Upper left panel of Figure 4.4 illustrates the empirical strategy in a conventional
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Figure 4.4: Comparing Methodologies
merger retrospective. Suppose there are seven facilities controlled by five different
undertakings in two neighbouring regions. Assume, B1 is acquired by undertaking
E. A conventional merger retrospective would start by setting a control market,
such as Region II, which is not too far away so that demand and cost conditions
differ, but not too close so that there is a risk of spill over. The impact of merger
is identified using the deviation of price in Region I from Region II. This empirical
strategy is frequently employed in retrospectives studying hospital mergers, e.g.
Haas Wilson and Garmon (2011); Tenn (2011); Thompson (2011); or, retrospectives
studying mergers in petroleum industry, e.g. Hosken et al. (2011); Silvia and Taylor
(2013); Simpson and Taylor (2008); Taylor and Hosken (2007). If the competition
in the market is on the product space, empirical strategy is modified; in this case,
comparison is not between affected regions and unaffected regions; but, between
affected brands and unaffected brands, e.g. Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010); Friberg
and Romahn (2015); Tenn and Yun (2011); Weinberg (2011); Weinberg and Hosken
(2013). Alternatively, if the data has rich spatial variation (preferably at outlet
level), it is possible to use spatial variation in the determination of treatment and
control groups. An example of this is illustrated in lower left panel of Figure 4.4.
In the same market, this time assume that D1 is acquired by undertaking B. In
this approach, outlets of the parties to the merger, and their close competitors
are considered “treated”, while further away regions are considered “not treated”.
This is similar to taking coloured triangles as the treatment group, and rest as the
control group. The impact of merger is identified using the deviation of price in two
groups. This is the empirical strategy in Aguzzoni et al. (2016) in studying retail
book market; Argentesi et al. (2016), in studying retail grocery; Allen et al. (2014),
in studying mortgage services; and Hastings (2004); Houde (2012); Taylor et al.
(2010) in studying retail gasoline. Finally, since some outlets are affected from the
treatment more than others, third option is using the variation in the intensity of
treatment in identification. An example of this is illustrated in upper right panel of
Figure 4.4. Consider again the example of D1 being acquired by undertaking B. Let
the colouration in the triangles reflect the intensity of the treatment on each outlet,
which is governed by the distribution of the outlets, providers and the identity of
merging parties. By employing a continuous variable indicative of variation in local
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treatment intensity – a variable that changes only due to treatment and proportional
to the intensity of treatment at that location – it is possible to identify the impact of
the merger. Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013), studying changes in local concentration
index in retail gasoline market; and Chone´ and Linnemer (2012), studying variations
in degree of exposure to merger car park market are examples in this fashion.
It is possible to use empirical strategies in merger strategies as an inspiration in
identifying the impact of a regime switch from collusion to competition. The
theoretical framework suggests that home markets ; locations characterised by
monopolistic pricing even in competition, are unaffected by the regime switch. These
regions are governed by monopolistic behaviour both before and after the treatment.
On the other hand, overlapping markets, which would have been characterised by
collusive pricing if the collusion was sustained, are now characterised by competitive
pricing. Consequently, I first propose using uninterrupted monopolistic behaviour
in home markets as the counterfactual of the regime switch in overlapping markets.
Lower right panel of Figure 4.4 illustrates the proposed strategy. In the same market,
consider that a complete cartel was operational. Then a regime switch occurs and
cartel brakes down. My first proposal involves taking the coloured triangles - outlets
that would have been subject to monopolistic pricing both in competition, and
counterfactual of the regime switch, the continuation of the cartel - as the control
group; while taking other outlets as the treatment group.
Also note that the theoretical framework suggests that under collusion, collusive
agreement ensures that each provider enjoys undisturbed market power at each
location. However, under competition price within overlapping markets is
proportional to market power each provider enjoys at a given location, which in
turn is proportional to difference in cost across providers. At the locations where
cost difference disappears, market power of the provider is low, and price under
competition is forced towards cost. Consequently, regime switch would have a big
impact on price. If cost difference across providers is high even in competition,
market power of the provider is also high. Consequently, price in both regimes
will be similar and regime switch would have a small impact on price. It follows
that within overlapping markets, the impact of regime switch on price – the size
of the overcharge – is inversely proportional to the market power of the provider
under competition. Building on this, secondly I propose estimating the overcharge
in a treatment intensity framework. I interpret regime switch as a treatment which
produces heterogeneous effects at each location that is inversely proportional to
difference in cost across providers at that location. In that regards, to approximate
cost difference at location l, I use a measure of relative proximity, ∆lj; the distance
between the closest rival k and location l (dkl) net off the distance between provider
j and location l (djl); so that ∆
l
j = dkl − djl.
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4.5 Managing Expectations: A Critical Analysis
of the Proposed Approach
In merger retrospectives, criticisms64 towards DiD is thoroughly discussed. Next,
these criticisms are taken under three headings: i) Atheoretical nature of DiD and
the choice of counterfactual, ii) Problems and solutions in choosing control, iii)
Exogeneity of treatment. In the discussion of merits and limitations of DiD in the
context of merger retrospectives, finding consensus occasionally becomes challenging.
To provide a balanced view, when there are conflicting views – particularly relevant
for i) and iii) – first, I provide highlights of the arguments of both sides. Second,
(where applicable) I provide remedies proposed in the literature to address potential
limitations. Finally, I link the discussion that is defined in the context of merger
retrospectives with the empirical strategy proposed to estimate overcharge, to
understand if proposed limitations are mitigated or aggravated in the latter context.
This section concludes with a brief discussion about the applicability of the proposed
methodology in other settings.
Atheoretical Nature and the Choice of the Counterfactual
One of the most common criticism towards DiD is the lack of a formal model
of competition or collusion. This criticism targets both at general methodology,
and at the identification of control group (OECD, 2016, p.50). Following,
Davies and Ormosi (2012): “Since much depends on evaluation of the nature of
the counterfactual, this means that a key part of the methodology-identifying an
appropriate control group-is also atheoretical. As such, there is a danger that the
choice of counterfactual (control group) is constrained by “what is out there”, that
is, the best of a set of alternatives, none of which is entirely appropriate (p.781).”
It should also be noted that, some view lack of theoretical foundation as a strength.
DiD is data driven. Some prefer results being determined by “what is out there”
over results being determined by “untestable theoretical assumptions”(Davies and
Ormosi, 2012, p. 781). Lack of a structural framework also has other benefits; it
lowers data requirements; it allows the analyst to remain agnostic about the market
structure or the conduct and circumvents the complexities regarding from multiple
equilibrium (OECD, 2016, p.50).
The proposal here sits in between “atheoretical” and “atheoretical”. It is true that
this work does not include a fully fledged model65; however, proposed empirical
strategy still gets its inspiration from simple theoretical intuition.
64In this chapter, I am limiting the discussion to issues of consistency. Issues of inference are
taken in Chapter 5.
65It should be stressed that even though this work does not build on a fully fledged theoretical
model, this should not be taken as a prescription. One possible direction for future work is
employing a more complex framework to be used in construction of a counterfactual in a spatial
setting.
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Problems and Solutions in Choosing Control
In merger retrospectives, typically non-merging rivals, or regions or products that
are not affected from the merger66 constitute the control group. If the merger
has a geographical dimension, meaning that competition is local, it is common to
compare price in the treatment region with price in a region that is close enough to
be affected from the same demand and cost shocks, but far enough so it is sheltered
from the treatment. In this case, the challenge is managing this proximity tension
(Ashenfelter et al. 2009, p.9, Werden 2015, pp. 289-290)67. Using non-merging
rivals is more frequently preferred if competition is on the product characteristics
space. This case also has its challenges. Every horizontal merger creates some
“externality” on the rivals, which affect their pricing behaviour. Ignoring this
externality would be too “naive” (Nevo and Whinston 2010, p.74). In realization
of this limitation, with the hope that externalities would be least prominent for
“private label products”, this group of products are frequently used as the control
group. However, not everyone is convinced that this is a good idea. Nevo and
Whinston (2010) suggest that, building control group on private labels might be
particularly problematic if the marginal cost is not constant, private label producers
have some market power, or they strategically interact with branded products (p.74).
Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) warn that branded goods, and private label products
might be disproportionately affected from income shocks (p.437). Davies and Ormosi
(2012), basing on their experience in United Kingdom supermarket industry, find the
premise of irrelevance of externalities for private label products “highly contestable”
(p. 782).
Another challenge in choosing control is that similarity of demand and cost
conditions is a necessary condition of compatibility between treatment and control
markets; yet, it is not a sufficient condition. In this regard, similarity of level of
competition and institutional features in treatment and control markets are also
important.
Simpson and Schmidt (2008) show that two markets facing exactly the same
demand and cost shifters might perform differently if they have different propagation
mechanisms. As a case in point they employ simple case of linear demand and
constant non-zero marginal cost; in this case, any cost shock would have full pass
through in perfect competition, and partial pass through in monopoly. Therefore, to
ensure compatibility with treatment market, control market should be chosen so that
the level of competition in both markets are similar; consequently, the same shocks
are propagated similarly. Preceding literature also held this perspective. Davies and
Ormosi (2012); Jime´nez and Perdiguero (2014); Ulrick and Sacher (2015); Werden
(2015) acknowledge the propagation issue in reference to Simpson and Schmidt
66See, OECD (2016), pp. 48-49 for some examples.
67A similar tension exists in choice of posttreatment period. On one hand, researcher would
like to capture both short and long term effects of the treatment, hence would prefer to keep the
posttreatment period long. On the other hand, as the time period extends, there is an increased risk
of structural change in either treatment or control market which would threaten the compatibility
of two markets (Davies and Ormosi, 2012, p. 780).
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(2008). Similarly, in exploring the impact of a merger in Canadian mortgage market,
Allen et al. (2014) restrict the sample to borrowers having 5-8 alternative potential
lenders; in tracking the impact of a bank merger, Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool
(2005) estimate a distinct impact for each borrower group that face varying number
of potential lenders.
To see the importance of institutional features, contractual relations in gasoline
markets (see, Hastings (2004); Taylor et al. (2010)) is a good example. In gasoline, it
is common for the wholesalers (refinery level) to be also active in retail (station level).
There are multiple types of contracts governing the relation between wholesalers and
retailers, and each imply different levels of control of the former, on the latter. On
one end, there are stations owned by the wholesalers. These are under direct control
of the wholesalers. On the other end, there are independent stations. In this case,
relationship between retailer and wholesaler is confined to procurement. A merger
between two wholesalers both active in the retail level, typically have three impacts
at retail level: i) One rival is eliminated. ii) Retail stations that belong to acquired
firm are rebranded. iii) New contracts are drafted between the merged entity and
the stations that were originally working with the acquired wholesaler. Typically,
merger retrospectives are concerned about estimating the impact of the elimination
of the rival. However, it is challenging to identify this impact when there are multiple
treatments68.
Fortunately, literature also offers i) some tools to assess if compatibility of treatment
and control group is at risk, ii) potential remedies if there are compatibility issues.
In the assessment of the degree of compatibility issues, the first methodology
suggested is complementing DiD with demand estimation. If estimation reveals
that the cross-price elasticities between control and the treatment brands are low,
risk of contamination should not be high (Friberg and Romahn, 2015, p. 5). Second
methodology is conducting a formal test of compatibility of treatment and control
markets69. This involves testing if the treatment and control groups have a “common
trend70” in pretreatment period71. As in Friberg and Romahn (2015)72 and Weinberg
and Hosken (2013), this might involve simply regressing price on a set of time
invariant fixed effects and trend variables, while allowing trends to vary across
treatment and control groups. Consider a merger in a market which competition is
in product space; formal test builds on
68Variation in institutional structure is not the only reason for multiplicity of treatment.
Another merger preceding the merger of interest might be distorting estimates (DGComp, 2015,
p. 66).
69See, Aguzzoni et al. (2016); Ashenfelter et al. (2013); DGComp (2015); Friberg and Romahn
(2015); Weinberg and Hosken (2013).
70Also referred as treatment and control groups have parallel trends. In this work, both concepts
should be thought interchangeable.
71In some other retrospectives, common trend assessment is confined to an eyeball approach;
evolution of price over time is plotted for treatment and control groups and a judgement is made
about similarity of two plots.
72See, Appendix Table 2, p. 15.
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c + υi (4.15)
In this specification, s refers to brand, c refers to cities/regions, γci refers to
city/region fixed effects, γtreatedi and γ
control
i refer to treatment and control groups,
and t is a linear time trend. Estimation uses only pretreatment data and is followed
by a formal test of α1 = α2.
Alternatively, as in Ashenfelter et al. (2013) a more general specification might be
employed (p.252):
























where, j refers to treated products; h refers to control products; s refers to product;
and t refers to time. In this specification, γpret , and γ
post
t are pretreatment and
posttreatment indicators; γCs marks the control group; γ
T
s marks the treatment
group; and xTsj, x
C
sh are controls for treatment and control groups respectively, i.e.
product characteristics, brand. There are three differences between Equation 4.15
and 4.16. The latter i) employs controls rather than fixed effects, ii) allows parameter
estimates for control variables to vary across treatment and control groups, iii) use
both pretreatment and posttreatment data. The estimation is followed with a formal
test of α2 = 0
Finally, as in Ashenfelter et al. (2013) it is possible to employ time fixed effects
rather than trends.






















s + υi (4.17)
In this specification, γtl is time fixed effect. Estimation uses both pretreatment and
posttreatment data, and is followed by a formal test of δl = 0 for pretreatment
periods, both jointly and marginally.
When it comes to addressing potential compatibility issues, one proposition is
using other techniques from treatment effects literature, such as propensity score
matching, e.g. Aguzzoni et al. (2016); Allen et al. (2014); Argentesi et al. (2016);
Dobson and Piga (2013); or synthetic cohorts, e.g. DGComp (2015). Propensity
score matching builds on modelling the probability of being treated, the propensity
score, using observable characteristics of treated and untreated participants. For
each treated participant, control group is customized by the propensity score.
Synthetic cohort is the process of constructing a hypothetical control group, when
none of the available alternatives are good enough. Artificial control is established
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by weighting untreated participants, where the weights are chosen to minimize
the pretreatment distance between the treatment group and the synthetic control
(OECD, 2016, pp. 47-48).
Note that in a merger retrospective research objective is identifying the impact of
collusion on price. In a DiD setting, this requires taking a good control market that
would serve as the counterfactual of no merger. Two necessary conditions for a good
control market are similarity in demand and cost conditions to treatment market,
and being unaffected by the merger. However, as mentioned earlier, these conditions
might fall short of ensuring compatibility between treatment and control markets
if propagation of the shocks are dissimilar in two markets. Risk of difference in
propagation mechanisms increase along with the degree of deviation between level
of competition in treatment and control markets.
It should be noted that complications associated with differences in propagation
mechanism should be less worrying for the proposed methodology. In the proposed
framework, the regime change from collusion to competition is taken as the
treatment. The propagation mechanisms in i) overlapping markets before treatment
(in collusion), ii) home markets before treatment, iii) home markets after the
treatment, and iv) the counterfactual of the collapse of collusion, the continuation of
the cartel; all are characterised by monopolistic behaviour. Therefore local variations
in competition and market power should be immaterial for price determination.
Note that there are two implicit assumptions in this approach: First is the similarity
of monopolistic behaviour under collusion and monopoly. This equality might not
hold if price is also governed by strategic considerations. Second is the homogeneity
in the enforcement of collusive strategy at each location. Even though, in theory,
price in all regions is governed by collusive agreement, in practice, there might
be voluntary and involuntary deviations from the agreement. This might cause
deviations of average competitiveness in overlapping and home markets in effect73.
Exogeneity of Treatment
In merger retrospectives, treatment exogeneity assumption is challenged on two
different levels. First, some question the exogeneity of the decision to merge. The
argument is as follows: Treatment effects literature is quasi-experimental; hence
the results should ideally be drawn from randomized control trials. However, it is
difficult to consider mergers random. Merging is one of many possible reactions
of market participants to the events that happened, are happening, or expected to
happen (Nevo and Whinston, 2010, p. 74). In the words of Werden (2015):
DiD estimation is widely applied by economists to ‘natural experiments’,
73It should also be noted that in collusion retrospectives it might be easier to modify empirical
strategy for any violation of these assumptions, as the retrospectives typically proceed a court case.
Case file might include some assessment about strategic concentrations; or presence of deviations
from agreement, and the time period and the locations they concentrate on.
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like mergers, which lack the randomization and careful control
of laboratory experiments. Researchers typically assume the
‘unconfoundedness’ of a natural experiment. With merger retrospectives,
this means that no unobserved determinant of price was part of the
rationale for merger. For example, it means that the acquiring firm
did not act on information unavailable to the econometrician indicating
that the acquired firm was about to enjoy higher price. Violation of the
unconfoundedness assumption causes the estimate of the merger effect to
be biased. Researchers applying DiD estimation to natural experiments
argue that the conditions under study ‘approximate the conditions of
a controlled experiment’, but critics often are sceptical ... Mergers, ...
offer only non-randomized, uncontrolled experiments (p.289)74.
Second, some question exogeneity of the identity of merging parties. The critics
suggest that firms might have preference for some firms over the others. It is difficult
to think “selection into the treatment group” as random (OECD, 2016, p.47). In
the words of Dafny (2009)
... most observational or reduced-form analyses of the impact of mergers
fail to address fundamental selection problems arising from the fact that
mergers are not randomly assigned. These studies typically compare
outcomes of merging firms with those of nonmerging firms. The resulting
estimates suffer from a classical selection problem, as merging firms are
likely different from nonmerging firms in unobserved ways that affect the
outcomes of interest. ... any omitted factor that is correlated with the
outcome measure as well as with the probability of a merger will generate
biased estimates of the impact of a merger. (p. 524).
In this context, Dafny (2009) gives the example that a financially distressed firm,
be it party to the merger or not, is more likely to cut cost and reduce price.
Consequently, it is difficult to claim that cost cuts, and price reductions that
happened after merger, would not have happened in the absence of merger.
Despite being heavily criticized, the assumption of exogeneity is employed by many.
However some justify the exogeneity assumption via conditions specific to the
studied merger. For example De Nijs (2012) claims that “The operation to merge
GTM with Vinci took place in December 2000. It aimed at constituting a world
leading group in construction and associated services. The merger was therefore
exogenous for the Parisian parking garage market, because Vinci and GTM did not
merge for their park activity. Importantly, this means that there is no selection bias
for merging parking garages (p.929)”. More relevantly for our purposes Hastings
(2004), suggests that “Thrifty Oil Company was a privately held company. The
owner was 75, and decided to retire and sell the company’s retail assets to ARCO.
74FN 10 is merged with the text.
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ARCO saw this as a good opportunity to expand market share (FN.9, 320)”, and
takes elimination of Thrifty as “locally exogenous”. Later, assessing methodology of
Hastings (2004), Nevo and Whinston (2010) suggest that considering “circumstances
of the acquisition”, it is reasonable to take the merger “exogenous to the local
market” as merger is “unlikely to be correlated with any unobserved factors that
would have changed prices in markets containing Thrifty stations differently from
prices in markets without them (p.73).”
When it comes to collusion, a case for both sides might be made. On one hand,
similar to mergers, collusion (or its breakdown) might be considered as a conscious
response to changing market conditions, hence it might be taken endogenous. On
the other hand, competition and collusion might be considered as two occasional
outcomes of the same long run process, e.g. Green and Porter (1984). In this
interpretation, breakdown of collusion would be governed by inability to identify if
low price is a result of unfavourable demand conditions or a rival cheating, which in
turn is governed by exogenous shocks75. However, when it comes to the proposed
methodology, as Nevo and Whinston (2010) comment, it should be more reasonable
to assume exogeneity if empirical methodology employs local variations in identifying
the impact of regime switch; the likelihood of regime switch to be correlated with any
unobserved factor that would have changed price in the treatment market differently
from price in the control market is not very high. Consequently, “it is plausible to
treat changes in spatial concentration in a local submarket as an exogenous shock
to a rival stations’ pricing decision, after controlling for fixed time and station-level
effects (Pennerstorfer and Weiss, 2013, p. 662, FN 5)”.
Applicability to Other Settings
Regarding the applicability of the proposal in other settings, the nature of the
competition in the market is very important. In our setting, product is homogenous,
competition is spatial; consequently, it is the relative proximity of alternative
providers that governs the decisions of buyers. It follows that in any other
homogenous product / geographic space setting the analysis should be immediately
applicable conditional on the availability of a comparable that set (consumer level
information on price; indicators of local market power; demand and cost shifters).
However, note that the empirical strategy relies on using high market power regions
as the counterfactual of collusion. This involves two inherent assumptions. First,
there are some locations, at which local market power is high enough, so they
can serve as counterfactual for collusion. If the level of market power - even at
the locations it is presumably highest – is not high enough compared to market
power under collusion, overcharge estimate would be downward biased. Second,
observable indicators of local market power are sufficiently good reflection of actual
market power provider enjoys at each location. For example, if buyers have
countervailing power, observable features may overstate the market power of the
provider. Alternatively, if the provider installs customer specific investment at the
75In addition to Green and Porter (1984), also see, Jones and Sufrin (2016) (p.656).
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premises of some buyers, this may act as switching cost; consequently, the observable
features might understate market power of the provider.
It is possible to generalize the empirical strategy to heterogeneous product / product
characteristics space setting. As Bresnahan (1987) suggests, even if competition is
in product characteristics space, providers will have heterogeneous market power
over different products in the product line they offer. Sticking to the automobile
industry that Bresnahan (1987) studies as an example, one can think of automobile
manufacturer Volkswagen. When it comes to mainstream models such as Golf
or Polo, it is plausible to think the competition would be high, i.e. there are a
number of other manufacturers producing models with similar characteristics. On
the other hand, market power of Volkswagen on a model like Beetle would be much
higher. Consequently, in estimating the impact of a regime switch from collusion to
competition on low market power models - Golf, Polo – high market power models
– Beetle – may be used as the counterfactual. However, it must be admitted that as
competition gets more multidimensional (as it might be in product characteristics





Empirical Application in a Spatial
Setting with Market Power
Heterogeneity
5.1 Introduction
In competition policy, compensation claims for the collusive harm in the form
of “the actual loss” – damnum emergens – and/or “the foregone profits” that
would have been obtained in the absence of collusion – lucrum cessans1 are called
damages. In many legal jurisdictions consumers are allowed to make private claims
if they prove they have been adversely affected. Consequently, an infringement
decision triggers legal proceedings and a debate forms about the magnitude of this
harm. In jurisdictions with a well-established legal culture of private litigation, e.g.
US, compensation payments can reach substantial amounts. Table 5.1 illustrates
the importance of damage proceedings in deterring cartel activity via providing a
breakdown of the monetary sanctions in Vitamins2 cartels. In US, private claims
cost cartel members more than the twice of the government prosecution. In Canada,
there is an even split between fines and private claims.
1For legal context, see, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:
OJ.L_.2014.349.01.0001.01.ENG.
2For legal context, see, EU Commission decisionhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003D0002.
3Table note: Source: Connor (2006c, Table 17A) To allow for the opportunity cost of capital
(i.e. the absence of prejudgement interest), fines and settlements are adjusted downward by the US
prime interest plus 1 % from the midpoint of the conspiracy to the year the cartel was fined; then
from the latter year, the figure is raised to $ 2005 using producer price index of the appropriate
region. i) The EU assigns by product, but most other fines and settlements are allocated by the
affected sales of the product and then within the product by company market share. US Private is
conservative. Converted C$1 to US$ 0.826 ii) includes private settlements for single damages to
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Table 5.1: Real Monetary Sanctions by Product3
Source: Table 13.2 in Connor (2007).
In a legal proceeding, typically, plaintiffs and defendants are both active in the
same production chain, but on different levels; plaintiffs are the buyers of products
provided by the defendants. Both sides make predictions about the world that
would-be in the absence collusion. The difference between the actual, and predicted
counterfactual is presented as the impact of collusion. Naturally, plaintiffs would
like to present this difference as large as possible while defendants would like to
present it as small as possible.
The impact of the cartel on buyers’ profit, or the damage, can be decomposed into
three effects: The impact of the collusion on price, or the overcharge effect, is the
additional payment buyer makes for each input procured. Output effect captures
the decline in profits due to production foregone associated with higher input price.
Pass-on effect is the recovery in buyers’ profits due to passing some of the rise in
input price to price of the product. In reduced form analysis, empirical estimation
centres on estimating the overcharge, ignoring other components of damage. This
work, follows the literature, and confines estimations to overcharge.
Empirical objective of this chapter is to estimate the hypothetical overcharge related
to a possible collusion4. To this aim, first, I employ the techniques frequently used in
collusion retrospectives: before and after, indicator variable approach, forecasting.
Overcharge estimates using these three methodologies are respectively 9.26 %,
11.14–13.98 %, 8.05–11.46%. Second, I import empirical strategies from merger
retrospectives. I initially estimate the overcharge using basic difference-in-difference
(DiD) by benefiting from spatial variation. I take regime switch as a treatment;
direct and indirect purchases that account for 51 % of the total.
4The term hypothetical overcharge draws on Nelson (1993) who study a similar case.
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identify the buyer-provider pairs that would be least affected from the switch (the
pairs that are most likely to be characterised by monopoly pricing even under
competition) as the control group; I estimate the impact of the treatment, as a
deviation of price in high market power regions from price in low market power
regions before and after the treatment. Next, I estimate the overcharge in a
treatment intensity framework. I interpret the regime switch as a treatment, which
produces heterogeneous effects at each location that is inversely proportional to the
level of local market power the provider enjoys at that location.
To my knowledge, this is the first collusion retrospective that i) uses spatial variation
in determining control groups, ii) takes on regime change within a treatment
intensity framework. This allows going beyond reporting a single overcharge
estimate, and commenting on spatial distribution of overcharge, particularly the
impact of variations of market power at each location on the overcharge at that
location.
Basic DiD specifications suggest that the variation in overcharge is strongly related
to DiD coefficient. It is shown that the impact of the regime switch is conservatively
estimated in the interval of 7.48− 11.25%. I also show that if the provider’s market
power at each location, as measured by relative proximity and number of rivals,
is taken as an indicator of degree of exposure to the “treatment”, market power
variations might lead variations in the price predicted for competition counterfactual,
consequently variation in overcharge estimate as high as 11.89 %. These findings
suggest that if the spatial dynamics are ignored, and single overcharge estimation is
made, estimation leads to; undercompensation in regions where the market powers
of dominant competitor and potential competitor converge; and overcompensation
in regions where the market powers diverge.
Finally, to address the inference problems associated with spatial dependency
across observations and DiD methodology, I apply various remedies proposed in
the literature. These include i) imposing an error structure using Conley standard
errors, ii) changing the level of variation in the data, iii) using effective number of
clusters rather than actual number of clusters in defining critical values, and iv) wild
cluster bootstrap. Results are robust to alternative methods of inference.
This chapter organized as follows. Next section outlines the empirical strategy.
Third section introduces inference issues related to DiD methodology and spatial
nature of the data, and potential remedies in addressing these issues. Fourth section
presents the estimations done by before and after, dummy variable approach and
forecasting. Fifth section presents DiD estimations. Final section concludes.
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5.2 Empirical Strategy, Methodology and
Contribution
In this chapter, empirical objective is to estimate the hypothetical overcharge related
to a possible collusion. To this aim, in the first stage, I use techniques that are
frequently used in collusion retrospectives. First, I employ before and after method.
This involves a simple comparison of the average price in collusion period and average
price in competition period, and using the latter as but-for price. However, there is
not a great deal of economics involved in before and after, since demand and cost
shifters are not controlled for. Second method, dummy variable approach, introduces
demand and cost shifters into the analysis. Price is regressed on a variable of interest
(ri), an indicator variable marking observations in the collusion period; and control
variables i.e. demand shifters, zi; cost shifters, χi. Formally,
pi = α0 + α1zi + α2χi + α3ri + vi (5.1)
The coefficient of the indicator variable, α3, is interpreted as the impact of collusion
on price.
Note that there are implicit assumptions in this approach. First, it is possible to
capture the impact of regime change solely by the indicator variable. Second, the
set of variables and how they affect price are identical in both regimes. Third
method, forecasting, relaxes these assumptions. In a typical forecasting exercise,
at the first stage, price is first regressed on control variables using only data from
competition period in a reduced form setting. Parameter estimates are treated
as representative of pricing behaviour under competition. At the second stage,
estimates are interacted with independent variables in the collusive period. This
gives predicted price that would have been observed under competition.
At the second stage, I import empirical strategies from merger retrospectives.
The theoretical framework suggests that home markets ; locations characterised by
monopolistic pricing even in competition, are unaffected by the regime switch. These
regions are governed by monopolistic behaviour both before and after the treatment.
On the other hand, overlapping markets, which would have been characterised by
collusive pricing if the collusion was sustained, are now characterised by competitive
pricing. Consequently, adopting the methodology in merger retrospectives, I
first propose using uninterrupted monopolistic behaviour in home markets as
the counterfactual of the regime switch in overlapping markets5. I estimate the
5An issue of importance is related to the difference in counterfactual in this chapter and that in
Chapter 3. Here, for low market power regions, the counterfactual of regime switch – continuation
of collusion – comes from the behaviour in high market power regions; if the market power is
high enough, I take the pricing behaviour under competition and under collusion close enough
to each other. In Chapter 3, in search of a regime switch, I explore suspicious patterns before
month 7. At each location, under competition I expect to find strong relationship with price and
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overcharge using basic difference-in-difference (DiD) by benefiting from spatial
variation. I take regime switch as a treatment and identify the buyer-provider pairs
that would be least affected from the switch (the pairs that are most likely to be
characterised by monopoly pricing even under competition) as the control group.
This involves using a specification similar to








l + i (5.2)
where, zlt refers to demand shifters; χlt refers to cost shifters; γ
post
t is an indicator
variable that marks posttreatment observations; and γtreatedl marks the locations
affected from regime switch. Consequently, α5 is the coefficient of interest; it
captures average treatment effect, the impact of the regime change.
Also note that the theoretical framework suggests that under collusion, collusive
agreement ensures that each provider enjoys undisturbed market power at each
location. However, this differs from competition under which price within
overlapping markets is proportional to market power each provider enjoys at a given
location, which in turn is proportional to difference in cost across providers. At
the locations where cost difference disappears, market power of the provider is low,
and price under competition is forced towards cost. Consequently, regime switch
would have a big impact on price. If cost difference across providers is high even
in competition, market power of the provider is also high. Consequently, price
in both regimes will be similar and regime switch would have a small impact on
price. Building on this, secondly I propose estimating the overcharge in a treatment
intensity framework. I interpret regime switch as a treatment which produces
heterogeneous effects at each location that is inversely proportional to difference
in cost across providers at that location. In that regards, to approximate cost
difference at each location, I use ∆lj.
To my knowledge, this is the first collusion retrospective that i) uses spatial variation
in determining control groups, ii) takes on regime change within a treatment
intensity framework. This allows going beyond reporting a single overcharge
estimate, and commenting on spatial distribution of overcharge, particularly the
impact of variations of market power at each location on the overcharge at that
location. This study also adds up to the developing literature on empirical studies
of collusion using consumer level data (see, section 3.4). Finally, as discussed in the
next part, this study attempts to connect empirical studies of collusion with the
literature that proposes remedies for the inference issues which are stemming from
spatial nature of data and DiD methodology.
local market power measure. Under collusion, I expect finding no (or weak) relation between
price and local market power. Therefore, benchmark for competitive pricing comes from simple
theoretical reasoning regarding competitive pricing; benchmark for collusive pricing comes from
simple theoretical reasoning regarding collusive pricing.
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5.2.1 Evidence of Collusion
Findings in previous chapters suggest that pricing behaviour in first seven months
is more consistent with collusion; pricing behaviour after month seven is more
consistent with competition. For the sake of brevity, here I simply take it that
a regime switch has happened in month seven. In the upcoming sections, I estimate
the hypothetical overcharge using various reduced form techniques with this prior.
5.3 Inference Issues and Remedies
In this part, potential risks to inference due to nature of the data and the
methodology are presented, and some remedies in minimizing their impact are
discussed.
The estimations in earlier chapters, use heteroscedasticity robust White standard
errors. This means that even though error variance is allowed to vary, error terms
are assumed to be independent from each other, E [uiuj] = 0. However, considering
demand for the product is governed by spatial dynamics, assuming independence
across observations coming from neighbouring locations may be unrealistic. Another
source of dependency across observations is due to variation in the data. Recall that
data has consumer × facility × location × month breakdown. However, our key
variable, indicator of local market power is invariant to customer identities and have
limited variation over time. This means “our unit of observation is more detailed
than level of variation (Bertrand et al., 2004, p. 254)”.
Bertrand et al. (2004) points to other challenges. They suggest that invalid inference
might be particularly relevant for DiD methodology. They point that in DiD, variable
of interest, DiD indicator, typically changes very little over time; it is a string of
zeros for untreated observations, and a string of zeros followed by a string of ones
for the treated observations6. In an attempt to illustrate inference issues in DiD,
Bertrand et al. (2004) embark on an empirical exercise. Using 900.000 observations
spanning 21 years and 50 US states, the impact of a randomly allocated placebo
policy is tracked. Results suggest that if the changes in the treatment status is
permanent, DiD indicator is significant in 67 % of the cases, providing a case for
over-rejection. The rejection rate drops to 5 % if the changes in the treatment status
are not permanent (treatment is turned on and off).
In their paper they also offer some remedies to inference issues, and using Monte
Carlo simulations, they assess the effectiveness of these remedies. They suggest,
limiting the level of variation in data, e.g. eliminating time dimension; parametric
solutions, e.g. imposing a structure on error terms; allowing arbitrary correlation
within clusters; and wild cluster bootstrapping. Results suggest that imposition of
6They also suggest two other aggravating factors; these are using long time series, and using
dependent variables that suffer from severe autocorrelation.
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a structure on error terms still leads to considerable over rejection (around 20 %).
Bootstrapping and allowing arbitrary correlation within clusters performs well when
number of clusters is large. In cases with small number of clusters, both solutions
work less admirably.
In our case, the dependency in error terms is spatial. A remedy to address
dependency of this kind is offered by Conley (1999). Taking on a Euclidean spatial
setting, each observation about an agent with a specific location si is regarded as
a realization of a random process. Around each location there are unobservables,
potentially affecting observations at that location, and at other nearby locations.
Therefore, distance between two locations si, sj also informs about the proximity
to common unobservables. In Conley setting, observations from nearby locations
are allowed to be highly correlated; as locations grow further apart, the dependency
decays in a linear manner and eventually becomes zero after a cut-off distance.
Conley standard errors fit well to our setting.
In order to calculate Conley standard errors, Stata code by Hsiang (2010) is used.
In this process, first challenge is extracting the spatial distribution of observations
and their distance from each other. Recall that in our setting, distance measure is
driving distance. However, Hsiang (2010) uses the Euclidean distance measured
from actual coordinates. Therefore as a first step, coordinates of X delivery
locations are retrieved. Second challenge is defining the cut-off distance beyond
which observations may be comfortably considered independent. Since X is used in
production of Z, and since transportation of Z is not viable after d¯, it makes sense
to use d¯ as the cut-off value. However, d¯ threshold is defined in driving distance.
Unless two points are connected by a perfect straight line with no elevation change,
driving distance will always be greater than the Euclidean distance. Therefore to
approximate equivalent value of d¯ in Euclidean space, first, average driving distance,
d¯, and average Euclidean distance in X transactions, d¯e, are calculated
7. Note that
the divergence between two measures of distance is determined primarily by factors
such as topography or road network. It is reasonable to assume that, Z producers are
subject to the same road network and same topography. Consequently, adjusting
d¯, by the deviation of two distance measures in X transactions should serve as
a fair approximation. This adjustment gives the threshold value d¯e, to be used
in calculating standard errors, where d¯e = 0.71d¯. It should be stressed that this
measure is used only as a cut-off to mark potentially dependent observations that
we are not comfortable assuming E [uiuj] = 0. Estimations still employ measures of
driving distance.





= 0 where t refers to month, even though they are at the same
location. However, since such imposition potentially lowers the standard errors, in
order to assess the most risky situation, no autocorrelation structure is imposed.
A second remedy is employing clustered standard errors that allow arbitrary
correlation within clusters. The researcher is happy to assume that E [uiuj] = 0
7All averages are volume weighted.
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for observations that belong to different clusters, but is less willing to make the
same assumption for observations in the same cluster. Following Cameron and

















where yi = βxi + ui, i = 1...N and 1[] is an indicator function that equals to 1 if

















It is easy to see that the estimate is heteroscedastic robust as well, as White‘s
heteroscedastic robust variance estimate is the special case of single observation in
every cluster. In studies with a spatial aspect, clusters are typically countries, cities,
markets or regions (pp.320-21). Similarly, in our setting, the level of clustering is
county level; there are more than 100 distinct counties.
Cameron and Miller (2015); Carter et al. (2017) provide a technical discussion of
the properties of the CRVE, and track the evolution of the relevant literature.
Accordingly, asymptotics of the CRVE kick in via number of clusters, G, rather than
number of observations, N . Hence consistency requires first G → ∞. Considering
that typically 50 clusters are considered sufficient (Cameron and Miller, 2015, p.341),
in our case, one would not expect any consistency issues. This judgement however
might be premature; because, another requirement for the consistency of CRVE is
cluster homogeneity, particularly, cluster size equality. Since the dataset is consumer
level transaction data, there is considerable heterogeneity in cluster sizes. In order
to elaborate on implications of this, we need to take a closer look on the relationship
between heterogeneity in cluster size and consistency of CRVE.
Heteroscedasticity robust variance estimator employs the assumption that E [uiuj] =
0; consequently, the error covariance matrix, E[uu′], is diagonal with N potentially
distinct values. In CRVE error covariance matrix becomes block diagonal;
within each cluster (or block) there is another error covariance matrix with extra
non-zero values (Baum et al., 2003, p.3). Following the example in Carter et al.
(2017), consider the case of 20 observations evenly split into two clusters. In
heteroscedasticity robust estimator, there would be 20 potentially distinct terms; in
CRVE there would be potentially 110 distinct terms. Consequently, CRVE estimates
are greater. Cameron and Miller (2015) decomposes this inflation in CRVE for the
regressor k via, τk, variance inflation factor. Formally,
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+ N¯g − 1
)
(5.5)
where ρxk is within cluster regressor correlation, ρu is within cluster error correlation,
N¯g is average cluster size, and V [Ng] is the variance in cluster size. If the number
of clusters is large enough, asymptotics kicks in and CRVE is consistent. However,
with finite number of clusters, as V [Ng] increases, it is more difficult for asymptotics
to kick in. Alternatively, to see this point, one can go back to example in Carter
et al. (2017). If 20 observations are split into two clusters, one of 19 observations,
and one of 1 observation, there will be 191 potentially distinct terms, an addition
of 61 terms compared to the case with the even cluster size. It is difficult to claim
asymptotics will kick in equally fast in both cases8.
Carter et al. (2017) and Lee and Steigerwald (2017) (henceforth CSSL) propose a
method to assess the impact of the disproportionate cluster sizes on inference. As
Equation 5.5 shows, the impact of clustering on inference depends on three factors;
cluster size, within cluster error covariance and the covariate correlation. They
develop a sample specific measure which takes these three factors into account and
scales down the actual number of clusters, and returns a measure of effective number





























In this setting, Ωg is within cluster error covariance matrix for cluster g, and a
′
k is
a selection vector of length k incorporating hypothesis being tested, i.e. in testing
βk = 0, it is k − 1 values of 0 followed by a single 1. In the case of γg = γ, Γ = 0
and G∗ = G (Lee and Steigerwald, 2017, p.3-4). CSSL claims that it is G∗ that
8CSSL also note that a similar problem might arise in the case that clusters are equal sized
but a cluster level covariate takes the same value across some of the clusters (Carter et al., 2017,
2), e.g. a DiD indicator where treatment is given to all observations in the cluster or not given at
all.
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governs the validity of inference, not G, or number of observations N . Therefore,
conventional hypothesis testing with CRVE should be used only if G∗ is high enough
for asymptotics to kick in (Carter et al., 2017, p. 1).
However, there is one problem; within cluster error covariance matrix is
unobservable. CSSL propose estimating G∗ by assuming perfect within cluster error
correlation via replacing error covariance matrix with an ng × ng matrix of 1s. This






























Note that using G∗A allows the researcher to assess the worst case scenario: perfect
error correlation within clusters. If even under worst case, G∗A is large enough
for asymptotics to kick in, conventional critical values can comfortably be used for
hypothesis testing (Lee and Steigerwald, 2017, p.4-5).
As case studies, CSSL compute the effective number of clusters in two well-known
papers in Labour Economics literature: i) Krueger (1999) that studies the STAR
experiment9, ii) Hersch (1998) that studies the impact of injury risks on wages. In
STAR experiment standard errors are clustered at classroom level, and there are 318
classrooms. Employing Equation 5.7 CSSL find that G∗A = 192. In Hersch (1998)
standard errors are clustered at industry level, and there are 211 industries. CSSL
calculate G∗A = 19. Results suggest that seemingly large number of clusters might
not always guarantee valid inference.
Recall that G∗A depends on hypothesis being tested, and covariates in the
specification. In our setting, calculations using CSSL method10 indicate that for key
variables G∗A is in the interval of 6− 40, more frequently in the interval of 10− 15.
Therefore, we cannot comfortably use CRVE with the hope that asymptotics to
kick-in. Consequently, I now turn to the literature surrounding the issue of inference
9Student teacher achievement ratio (STAR) experiment is conducted in 1980‘s in Tennessee,
US. Via randomly allocating teachers and students to different class sizes, the aim was quantifying
the relation between class size and academic success (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, 17-24).
10I express my sincere gratitude to Chang Hyung Lee, and Douglas G Steigerwald of University
of California, Santa Barbara for sharing Stata code “clusteff” with me. I also thank Chang Hyung
Lee for his comments and ideas during our correspondence.
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with few clusters.
First remedy offered in the literature to address inference problems associated with






G∗A − 1). The intuition
is straightforward: CRVE asymptotics kick in via number of clusters under cluster
homogeneity. Cluster heterogeneity pulls down the effective number of clusters.
Then it seems reasonable to rely on effective number of clusters instead of actual
number in hypothesis testing (Cameron and Miller, 2015, p. 348) (MacKinnon and
Webb, 2017, p. 236).
Second method proposed is wild cluster bootstrap. Suppose we are interested with
the hypothesis, βk = 0. The methodology is as follows: First, estimate the equation
using OLS without any restriction. Then calculate t-stat, tk, using CRVE. Second,
impose the hypothesis βk = 0, and run the restricted regression. Retrieve restricted
coefficient estimates and residuals, β˜, and ˜. Next, form a bootstrap sample of size
B by iteration. This sample follows the following data generating process
y∗jig = Xigβ˜ + ˜υ
∗j
ig (5.8)
where j is the number of iteration, g is cluster, υ∗jig is a random variable that
takes value either 1 or −1 with equal probability, and y∗jig is bootstrap dependent
variable. At the last step, using the newly formed bootstrap sample, estimate the
unrestricted equation again and retrieve t-stat, t∗jk . Bootstrap p-value is measured by
the proportion of number of iterations with |t∗jk | > tk, to total number of iterations,
B (Cameron and Miller, 2015, p. 344) (MacKinnon and Webb, 2017, p. 235).
It should be noted that, even though the strongest motivation for calculating wild
cluster bootstrap calculations is guarding against any risks to inference stemming
from few effective clusters, incorporation also has additional benefit of improving
inference when there are few treated or few untreated clusters. MacKinnon and





and wild cluster bootstrap using simulations for a sample of 50 clusters
and 2000 observations by varying, i) within cluster covariate correlation, ii) within
cluster error correlation, iii) cluster size and iv) number of treated clusters. Results
suggest that CRVE performs less admirably when number of treated, not treated
clusters are small, but wild bootstrap performs less admirably only if they are very
small11.
In computing the wild cluster bootstrap p-values, I use Stata code by MacKinnon
and Webb (2017)12. It is not only compatible with later versions of Stata; but also
11CRVE works well if number of treated clusters are higher than 17 and lower than 33, while
wild bootstrap performs well if number of treated clusters are higher than 7 and lower than 43
(p.241).
12I express my gratitude to James G. Mackinnon of Queen‘s University, and Matthew D. Webb
of Carleton University for making their code publicly available. I also thank Matthew D. Webb
for his comments during our correspondence.
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allows embedding i) Hsiang (2010) code for calculating Conley standard errors, ii)





critical values suggested by MacKinnon and Webb (2017) and Cameron and
Miller (2015).
5.4 Estimating Overcharge Using Techniques in
Collusion Retrospectives
5.4.1 Before and After
In this part, the impact of the cartel on price is approximated by before and after
method. This involves comparing average price in competition and collusion periods.
Recall that in this study consumer level data is used. pjltc represents the delivered
price charged by provider j, to customer c, at location l, in month t scaled by the
quantity weighted average price in competitive period, p¯13.
Figure 5.1a shows the evolution of price over time. Seventh month, marked by the
vertical line, represents the end of collusive period. Quantity weighted monthly
average price14 is represented on the y-axis. Blue horizontal line is the average price
in competition period15. Orange marks the minimum price in this period. Figure
5.1a shows that average price in collusive period is 12.28 % higher than competitive
period average.
In order to explore spatial distribution of overcharge, before and after method
is slightly modified. Recall that data set includes information about location of
the customer, l, and customer identity, c. First, (c, l) pairs, for which at least
one transaction is reported both before and after the regime switch are identified.
Second, for each (c, l) pair, the divergence between quantity weighted average price16
in collusive and competitive periods are calculated separately as,








where j is provider, t is month, r = 1, 2, r = 1 marks collusive regime, r = 0 marks
competitive regime.
Figure 5.1b, illustrates the distribution of overcharge. The mean and median are
respectively 9.26 % and 8.24 %. However, spanning an interval of -7.84 - 38.84 %,















































Figure 5.1: Before and After Method
(a) Average Price Patterns (b) Overcharge Distribution
5.4.2 Dummy Variable Approach
A conventional dummy variable approach would follow a specification similar to
Equation 5.1. This involves the assumption that the impact of collusion is captured
exclusively by a dummy variable. The set of variables affecting the price and the
way they affect price are identical in both regimes. Some examples are Cramton
and Schwartz (2002); Hu¨schelrath et al. (2016); Laitenberger and Smuda (2015);
Nelson (1993). Similarly, in this work, specifications (1) - (4) adopt this simplistic
approach.
Some works in the literature relax the assumption of parameter equality. Typically
this is done by expanding the specification in Equation 5.1 by interacting regime
indicators with some of the regressors. Naturally in these cases, reporting the
intercept shift alone would be insufficient, as regime change also impacts price via its
interaction with covariates. Therefore, it is common to fix the values of the covariates
to expected values and report a single overcharge estimate17. Some examples are
Boshoff (2015); Kamita (2010); Madhavan et al. (1994); Mncube (2014); Notaro




2 andNBRjlc, interact with a two level factorial variable, the dummy
for collusion, and two different reduced form pricing equations, one for each regime,
are estimated.
17See, Kamita (2010); Madhavan et al. (1994); Notaro (2014).
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In all specifications, dependent variable is the delivered price charged by provider
j, to customer c, at location l, in month t, pjltc. All specifications include a
constant and facility fixed effects, γj. Standard errors are clustered at county level.
Specifications 3, 4 also employ cluster fixed effects. As controls, all specifications





of rivals in a defined radius, NBRjlc; distance between provider and buyer, djl; an
indicator variable marking presence of a vertical relation provider and buyer, γverticaljc ;
an indicator variable marking presence of an additional nearby facility controlled by
the provider, γownjl ; index for the price of most commonly form of energy, EIjt; and
indices tracking regional demand, tnpl(t−i) where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, or tnptl. Variable of
interest is the indicator variable marking collusive regime, γcollt . Table 5.2 presents
the results. Last row presents the overcharge estimates. Since in specifications 1-4
the impact of regime switch is captured entirely by γcollt , overcharge estimates for
these specifications are equal to parameter estimates for γcollt . In specifications 5-6,




, NBRjlc. In these specifications
the impact of regime switch on price, is captured by comparing predicted price in
competition and collusion after fixing all covariates to sample averages.
EIjt, djl, γ
vertical
jc , are most frequently insignificant across specifications. Any relation
between these covariates and price does not survive allowing arbitrary within cluster
correlation. Demand indicators are frequently significant. All specifications suggest
large price difference associated with a regime switch. Findings indicate that
overcharge estimates are in the interval of 11.14-13.98 %. Specifications 5, 6 also
suggest that the impact of collusion varies greatly depending on the market power of
the provider at each location. In competition period, there are strong nonlinearities





not significant. Similarly, ∆jl and, NBRjlc are significant across all specifications,
with the exception of 4, 5. Since ∆jl and, NBRjlc have little variation over time, in
specifications 5, 6, their impact on price is captured by cluster fixed effects. Results
suggest that under competition providers suffer considerable price cuts in serving
locations that are closer to rivals, and locations in which there are greater number
of rivals. However, under collusion, relation of market power indicators and price
is much weaker, with no nonlinear component. It follows that the price that would
serve as the but-for price, and consequently overcharge estimates building on but-for
price, vary along with market power indicators.
Recall that there are potential inference issues stemming from potential spatial
dependency across observations. In specifications 1-6 this was addressed via using
clustered standard errors and allowing arbitrary correlation among observations
18Notes for Table 5.2: Dependent variable is the delivered price pjltc. t is month, j is provider,
l is location, c is consumer. γcollt indicates collusive, γ
comp
t indicates competitive regime. γ
vertical
jc
indicates vertical relation between provider and buyer. γownjl indicates presence of multiple nearby
production facilities of the provider. ∆lj is a measure of relative distance. NBRjlc is number of
rivals. Ujt is capacity utilization. EIjt is energy price index. djl is distance. t
−i
npdt refers to i
th
lag of monthly demand index. tnpdt refers to aggregate T activity around a given location over 18
months. Standard errors are clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.2: Dummy Variable Approach Estimates18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc
γcollt 12.0679*** 11.6355*** 11.1350*** 11.2561*** 8.9590*** 10.0651***
(0.9070) (0.8756) (0.8425) (0.8324) (1.2780) (1.2576)
γverticaljc -0.0213 -0.2875 0.0028 0.2836 0.1175 -0.2851
(1.5013) (1.4347) (1.5050) (1.6978) (1.6652) (1.4086)
γownjl 3.6074 4.9434** 5.7404*** 4.3393 4.1914 4.9162***
(2.3548) (1.9140) (1.8478) (3.0967) (3.0817) (1.8753)
djl -0.0037 -0.0047 -0.0283*** -0.1029* -0.0961* -0.0056
(0.0204) (0.0190) (0.0093) (0.0556) (0.0567) (0.0190)
EIjt 0.0330 0.0360* 0.0110 -0.0182 0.0003 0.0629***




























































γcomp ×NBRjlc -1.6143 -1.9957**
(2.3762) (0.7816)
γcoll ×NBRjlc 0.3508 -0.3371
(2.3089) (0.7683)
R-squared 0.4588 0.4562 0.4574 0.5874 0.6030 0.4716
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster FE No No No Yes Yes No
Overcharge 12.0679 11.6355 11.1350 11.2561 13.4608 13.9754
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within the same cluster. Some other remedies include using CRVE standard errors;
imposing an error structure; limiting the level of variation, e.g. collapsing data
to lesser number of dimensions; using feasible effective number of clusters rather
than actual number of clusters in defining critical values; and making wild cluster
bootstrap. Table 5.2 summarizes this information for the variable of interest, γcollt
indicator. First four rows presents the inference using clustered standard errors, as





. Seventh row presents Conley standard errors assuming that
dependency across observations decays linearly with distance. Final row presents
p-values using wild cluster bootstrap. Each of the three panels refers to different
level of data aggregation. Upper panel uses the same aggregation as used so far;
each transaction corresponds to a transaction in month t, to customer c, located at
l, by provider j. Middle panel keeps the month, provider and location dimension,
but eliminates customer dimension via aggregation. Lower panel further eliminates
the provider dimension and leaves month and location. It should be noted that
aggregation might necessitate a redefinition of the variable if that variable is affected
from that aggregation. This should be clarified with an example. In the case of no
aggregation, data is t× l× j×c, γverticaljc is an indicator variable marking presence of
a vertical relation provider and buyer. If data is aggregated to eliminate consumer
dimension, so that data is t×l×j, then instead of an indicator variable, a continuous
variable vrjlt is used; for each provider j, at location l, in month t, this is defined as
the ratio of total volume of transactions that go through a vertically related buyer
to total volume of transactions. If the data is further aggregated to t× l level, the
variable used is vrlt; this is defined as the ratio of total volume of transactions that
go through a vertically related buyer to total volume of transactions at location l, in
month t. When necessary, the same adjustment is made to other variables as well.
Results are robust to changes in inference strategy; γcollt is strongly significant with
clustered standard errors, with Conley standard errors, with wild cluster bootstrap,
or using critical values from feasible effective number of clusters.
5.4.3 Forecasting
First step in forecasting is to estimate pricing equations for competition period
and retrieving parameters governing that period while employing only competition
period data. Formally this corresponds to estimating an equation in the following
form











where, pjltc is the delivered price charged by provider j, to customer c, at location l,




jltc are respectively demand and supply
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Table 5.3: Inference – Regime Change Indicator, Dummy Variable Approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t× l× j × c
Coeff. 12.067 9 11.635 6 11.288 2 11.256 1 8.959 0 10.065 1
Clustered s.e. 0.907 0 0.875 6 0.833 6 0.832 4 1.278 0 1.257 6
t-stat 13.305 7 13.288 1 13.541 0 13.523 0 7.010 1 8.003 4
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 22.139 3 27.330 0 26.045 7 47.583 7 45.920 8 27.668 8
p-value, G∗A 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
Conley s.e. 1.798 2 1.580 0 1.372 9 1.195 1 1.141 6 1.304 2
p-value, wild BS 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7
t× l× j
Coeff. 11.384 3 11.042 0 10.757 9 10.923 6 8.403 2 9.191 7
Clustered s.e. 0.875 5 0.787 2 0.768 7 0.745 5 1.051 2 1.135 6
t-stat 13.003 1 14.027 7 13.994 5 14.653 5 7.993 7 8.094 5
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 24.916 7 26.588 3 26.018 2 61.958 8 53.171 0 22.462 2
p-value, G∗A 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.061 6 0.247 6 0.000 0
Conley s.e. 1.639 4 1.432 1 1.290 5 1.077 3 1.013 9 1.210 8
p-value, wild BS 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7
t× l
Coeff. 11.223 3 9.601 3 9.409 0 10.547 4 7.697 2 7.841 5
Clustered s.e. 1.457 1 1.467 7 1.471 2 1.312 1 1.547 8 1.773 6
t-stat 7.702 4 6.541 6 6.395 4 8.038 5 4.972 9 4.421 2
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 27.682 4 29.192 3 28.566 7 73.581 8 62.642 5 34.915 0
p-value, G∗A 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1
Conley s.e. 1.255 2 1.205 0 1.198 1 1.080 0 0.952 9 1.229 9
p-value, wild BS 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7
Notes: Each panel corresponds to different level of aggregation in data. In each panel, the coefficient of interest is regime change
indicator. Second row is the CRVE standard errors; third and fourth rows are associated t-statistic and p-values. Fifth row provides
G∗A, feasible effective number of clusters of CSSL; sixth row provides associated p-value. Seventh row is Conley standard errors.
Final row is bootstrap p-values.
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shifters. At the second step parameter estimates, δˆ0, λˆk, ρˆk, are interacted with the
values of covariates in the collusion period. This gives the prediction for the but-for
price, the price that would have been observed if competition was in effect.
In all specifications dependent variable is pjltc. All specifications include a constant
and facility fixed effects, γj. Standard errors are clustered at county level.
Specification 4 also employs cluster fixed effects. As controls, all specifications
employ an indicator variable marking presence of a vertical relation provider and
buyer, γverticaljc ; an indicator variable marking presence of an additional nearby
facility controlled by the provider, γownjl ; distance between provider and buyer, djl;
index for the price of most commonly form of energy, EIjt; and indices tracking
regional demand, tnpl(t−i) where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, or tnptl. Table 5.4 presents the results.
Average overcharge implied by the estimates is primarily governed by the variables
of interest that are indicative of market power, the indicator of local market power




; and number of rivals in a defined radius, NBRjlc.
The estimates for djl, γ
vertical
jc , are most frequently insignificant across specifications.
For EIjl, γ
own
jl evidence is mixed; the estimates are significant in some specifications,
insignificant in others. However, the estimated effect is imprecise, as standard
errors are large. tnpl(t−i) do a fine job in explaining pricing. All specifications
suggest large price difference associated with a regime switch. Findings indicate that
overcharge estimate is in the interval of 8.05-11.46 %. However, it is characterised
by considerable variation. This is shown in Figure 5.2 by calculating overcharge for
each provider-location pair via modifying Equation 5.9 with replacing forecast price,
pˆr=0
c¯l
, as the but-for price.








Going back to Table 5.4, findings suggest that in competition period there are strong
nonlinearities between indicator of local market power, ∆jl , and price. Consistent
with findings in dummy variable approach, ∆jl and, NBRjlc are significant, with the
exception of Specification 5, in which their impact on price is captured by cluster
fixed effects. Findings imply that a considerable part of the of the variation displayed
in Figure 5.2 is related to varying levels of market power at different locations. This is
shown more clearly in Table 5.5, where ∆jl , and NBRjlc are fixed to certain values,
where increases in ∆jl , and decreases in NBRjlc imply a progressively increasing
market power on the side of the provider. All other covariates are fixed at sample
averages. Findings indicate that variations in market power measures alone may
lead to variation in price predicted for the competition counterfactual as high as %
11.99.
Table 5.6 summarizes the findings from alternative methodologies used to ensure





are presented. Computations involve G∗A, p-values associated
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Table 5.4: Forecasting Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)




0.4128* 0.4322* 0.4653** 0.0256





0.0219*** 0.0219*** 0.0222*** 0.0223*
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0120)
NBRjlc -2.5710*** -1.8116** -1.3405* -0.4971
(0.6359) (0.8245) (0.7988) (3.1891)
γverticaljc -1.3240 -1.5091 -1.2587 -0.2815
(1.6426) (1.4709) (1.4612) (1.7862)
γownjl 2.9018 5.0018** 5.2504** 4.6793
(2.6472) (2.0664) (2.0470) (3.7098)
djl -0.0158 -0.0168 -0.0156 -0.0619
(0.0211) (0.0197) (0.0186) (0.0727)
EIjt 0.0798*** 0.0958*** -0.0036 -0.0297























R-squared 0.3870 0.3880 0.4373 0.5606
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster FE No No No Yes
Overcharge (%) 11.459 11.1636 8.2018 8.0558
Notes: Dependent variable is the delivered price pjltc. t is month, j is provider, l is location, c is consumer. γ
vertical
jc indicates
vertical relation between provider and buyer. γownjl indicates presence of multiple nearby production facilities of the provider. ∆
l
j is
a measure of relative distance. NBRjlc is number of rivals. Ujt is capacity utilization. EIjt is energy price index. djl is distance.
t−i
npdt
refers to ith lag of monthly demand index. tnpdt refers to aggregate T activity around a given location over 18 months.
Standard errors are clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




-10 -10 -10 -5 -5 -5 0 0 0 5 5 5 10 10 10
NBRjlc 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0
pˆ 100.6 101.9 103.2 101.2 102.6 103.9 103 104.3 105.7 105.9 107.2 108.6 109.9 111.2 112.6
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, Conley standard errors, and p-values using wild cluster bootstrap for
different level of aggregations19 of data. Inference strategy in this case matters to an
extent for the significance of the linear term. With the exception of Specification 4,
in which linear effects are captured by cluster fixed effects, p-value associated with
∆jl goes as high as 0.16; but more frequently is below 0.10; in many cases is below
0.05. For the quadratic term, p-value is never higher than 0.10, but most frequently,
lower than 0.01. I interpret these findings as there is a risk of invalid inference, but
that risk is not very high.
5.5 Difference-in-Difference
For DiD, first important step is construction of an appropriate counterfactual,
which requires description of the world if the treatment did not happen. Here,
we are tracking the impact of a regime switch from collusion to competition. In
coming up with the appropriate counterfactual for identifying the impact of the
regime switch, I use theoretical intuition. Some locations, home markets ; are
characterised by high provider market power. These locations are governed by
monopolistic pricing both in collusion, and competition; hence, are not affected from
the treatment, the regime switch. On the other hand, overlapping markets, which
would have been characterised by collusive pricing if the collusion was sustained,
are now characterised by competitive pricing. Consequently, I first propose using
uninterrupted monopolistic behaviour in home markets as the counterfactual of the
regime switch (continuation of the collusion) in overlapping markets.
19Recall that aggregating data to t× l necessitates a redefinition of ∆jl . In t× l aggregation, I
take volume weighted average ∆jl at location l, in month t. This is the reason for the divergence
of absolute values of coefficient estimates (first line) in first two panels and panel three.
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Table 5.6: Inference – Measures of Local Market Power, Forecasting

































t× l× j × c
Coeff. 0.412 8 0.021 9 0.432 2 0.021 9 0.465 3 0.022 2 0.025 6 0.022 3
Clustered s.e. 0.238 1 0.005 5 0.225 8 0.005 4 0.216 2 0.005 5 0.583 0 0.012 0
t-stat 1.733 9 3.980 9 1.914 6 4.053 8 2.152 7 4.005 6 0.043 9 1.857 8
p-value 0.085 5 0.000 1 0.057 8 0.000 1 0.033 2 0.000 1 0.965 1 0.065 5
G∗A 10.006 1 18.176 5 10.653 6 10.653 6 10.830 1 17.721 3 13.135 9 14.128 2
p-value, G∗A 0.113 6 0.000 9 0.082 8 0.002 0 0.054 8 0.000 9 0.965 7 0.084 2
Conley s.e. 0.178 9 0.002 9 0.173 4 0.002 8 0.155 8 0.002 8 0.255 8 0.005 3
p-value, wild BS 0.127 4 0.005 3 0.098 0 0.004 0 0.055 4 0.002 7 0.988 3 0.117 4
t× l× j
Coeff. 0.376 0 0.020 3 0.387 5 0.020 4 0.390 1 0.020 4 −0.369 8 0.023 8
Clustered s.e. 0.243 1 0.005 5 0.231 3 0.005 5 0.228 8 0.005 7 0.516 8 0.012 9
t-stat 1.546 8 3.719 5 1.675 2 3.732 1 1.705 2 3.571 2 −0.715 4 1.844 3
p-value 0.124 5 0.000 3 0.096 4 0.000 3 0.090 6 0.000 5 0.475 7 0.067 5
G∗A 32.603 4 14.654 1 30.898 5 30.898 5 30.991 0 13.758 8 13.753 4 15.082 1
p-value, G∗A 0.131 6 0.002 1 0.104 0 0.000 8 0.098 2 0.003 1 0.486 3 0.084 9
Conley s.e. 0.152 3 0.002 5 0.151 3 0.002 4 0.139 8 0.002 5 0.230 4 0.005 2
p-value, wild BS 0.142 7 0.004 0 0.113 4 0.002 7 0.108 0 0.002 7 0.518 2 0.136 0
t× l
Coeff. 1.684 8 0.033 5 1.772 3 0.036 0 1.743 1 0.035 6 1.531 1 0.036 3
Clustered s.e. 0.326 6 0.010 4 0.363 3 0.011 6 0.359 6 0.011 6 0.859 8 0.015 4
t-stat 5.158 8 3.231 1 4.878 4 3.099 1 4.846 8 3.077 1 1.780 8 2.363 2
p-value 0.000 0 0.001 6 0.000 0 0.002 4 0.000 0 0.002 6 0.077 3 0.019 6
G∗A 23.266 4 5.725 1 24.015 5 6.451 1 24.038 5 6.449 5 11.833 3 8.017 0
p-value, G∗A 0.000 0 0.019 1 0.000 1 0.019 2 0.000 1 0.019 8 0.100 6 0.045 7
Conley s.e. 0.150 4 0.003 9 0.157 5 0.004 2 0.147 9 0.004 2 0.521 4 0.007 4
p-value, wild BS 0.001 3 0.026 7 0.002 0 0.022 0 0.002 0 0.022 0 0.111 4 0.076 7




relative proximity measure, or its squared. Second row is the CRVE standard errors; third and fourth rows are associated t-statistic
and p-values. Fifth row provides G∗A, feasible effective number of clusters of CSSL; sixth row provides associated p-value. Seventh
row is Conley standard errors. Final row is bootstrap p-values.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of Price in Home and Overlapping Markets
(a) Evolution (b) Impact
Here, main challenge is drawing the border between home markets and overlapping
markets. Theoretical framework suggests that local market power of a provider is
governed by its local relative cost. Unfortunately, the cost at each location is not
observable. However, distance of each provider to each buyer is observable. Building
on relative proximity of a provider and its closest rival to each buyer, it is possible
to identify buyer-provider pairs in which provider has considerable transportation
cost advantage in comparison to even its closest rival. With this reasoning, I use
a measure of relative proximity, ∆lj; the distance between the closest rival k and
location l (dkl) net off the distance between provider j and location l (djl); so that
∆lj = dkl−djl. Figure 5.3 presents the evolution of market average price and average
price in transactions with top 5 % 10 %, and 12 % ∆lj. It is easy to see that price
in these transactions remained on high range longer, and when it finally felt, it did
not fall as much as the average price.
In the rest of the section, the transactions at the top 10% of ∆lj, and these at the
top 12 % are used as two different home market candidates. Note that it is difficult
to claim that observations with top 10 %, and 12 % ∆lj are unaffected from the
regime switch. Especially considering that it is the divergence in total cost not
transportation cost that governs market power, the nullification of transportation
cost advantages by disadvantages in production cost is possible. It follows that
defining home market purely on a relative proximity measure, may lead to inclusion
of some transactions that should be in overlapping market into home market.
However, note that even if that is the case, this would make the overcharge estimates
more conservative.
Also note that the theoretical framework suggests that under collusion, collusive
agreement ensures that each provider enjoys undisturbed market power at each
location. However, under competition price within overlapping markets is
proportional to market power each provider enjoys at a given location, which in
turn is proportional to difference in cost across providers. At the locations where
cost difference disappears, market power of the provider is low, and price under
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competition is forced towards cost. Consequently, regime switch would have a big
impact on price. If cost difference across providers is high even in competition,
market power of the provider is also high. Consequently, price in both regimes
will be similar and regime switch would have a small impact on price. It follows
that within overlapping markets, the impact of regime switch on price – the size
of the overcharge – is inversely proportional to the market power of the provider
under competition. Building on this, secondly I propose estimating the overcharge
in a treatment intensity framework. I interpret regime switch as a treatment which
produces heterogeneous effects at each location that is inversely proportional to
difference in cost across providers at that location. In that regards, to approximate
cost difference at each location, I use ∆lj.
Another important issue for the DiD estimation is identifying compatibility issues
across treatment and control groups. In addition to a simple eye-ball approach,
this involves testing formally if the treatment and control groups have a “common
trend” in pretreatment period. This is done in the next section.
Finally, literature favours a discussion regarding exogeneity of treatment, the regime
switch. A potential risk here is related to the decision to collude (alternatively
decision to stop colluding); one can claim, this decision can never be taken to be
exogenous, it is a as a conscious response to changing market conditions. Even
though this is a very legitimate concern, two factors make this concern less relevant
to the case at hand. First factor is the local nature of the analysis. As recognized
by the literature, e.g. De Nijs (2012); Hastings (2004); Nevo and Whinston (2010);
Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013), decision to collude is not likely to be correlated with
unobserved factors at the local level20. Second, there is some evidence that collapse
of the cartel may be related to negative demand shocks. Recall that X demand is
governed by movements in T preliminary analysis of data suggest that the collapse
of the cartel is occurring in the middle of contraction in the T activity. Considering
fluctuations in T are typically governed by macroeconomic conditions rather than
local conditions in X market, risk of treatment endogeneity diminishes further.
5.5.1 Testing for Common Trend
At the core of DiD sits the assumption that control group is a good representation
for the counterfactual of no treatment in the treated group; absent the treatment,
the trend in the outcome variable will be the same in both groups. One way
of assessing this is monitoring the trends of outcome variable in treatment and
control groups before treatment, and see if they are similar. This might involve a
20To give a more formal perspective, note that decision to collude can be thought to have two
dimensions, i) identities of colluding undertakings (j) and ii) timing of collusion (or its termination)
(t). Also note that time dimension of the data is short (18 months), and number of undertakings
is small. On the other hand, variable of interest, DiD coefficient, is an interaction of overlapping
market indicator, γoverlapjl , which is defined on provider (j) times location (l) basis, with γ
post
t
which is defined over time (t) basis. Differences in the level of variation between potential source
of endogeneity (j × t) and variable of interest (j × l × t) makes the risk small.
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simple visual comparison; evolution of outcome variable is plotted for treatment and
control groups and a judgment is made about similarity of two plots prior to the
treatment. Alternatively, a formal test may be employed21. In that regards, Friberg
and Romahn (2015)22 and Weinberg and Hosken (2013), offer simply regressing price
on a set of time invariant fixed effects and trend variables, while allowing trends to
vary across treated and untreated groups, and then formally testing similarity in
trends. Rewriting Equation 4.15,






Recall that in this specification, b refers to brand; l refers to cities/regions; γl refers
to city/region fixed effects; γtreatedb and γ
control
b mark treatment and control brands
retrospectively; and t is linear time trend. Estimation uses only pretreatment data
and is followed by a formal test of αˆ1 = αˆ2.
Table 5.7 presents the results of the application of this test to overlapping and home
markets. Specifications 1− 2 take top 10 % of ∆lj as the home market, while 3− 4
take top 12 % as the home market. Specifications 1, 3 use county fixed effects;
2, 4 use province fixed effects. All specifications employ facility fixed effects. In our
setting, treatment and control groups are marked by γoverlapjl , and γ
home
jl respectively;
consequently, hypothesis tested is Ho : γ
overlap
jl × t = γhomejl × t. As indicated in the
last two rows, I fail to reject trend equality in home and overlapping markets in all
specifications.
In testing common trend assumption, Ashenfelter et al. (2013) favours a more
general specification, where in addition to fixed effects also controls are employed;
parameter estimates are allowed to vary across treatment and control groups; and
both posttreatment and pretreatment data is used. Rewriting Equation 4.16,























Recall that in this specification, j refers to treated brands, i.e. parties to the merger;
h refers to control brands, i.e. private brands; b refers to brand; t is time; γpret ,
and γpostt are pretreatment and posttreatment indicators; γ
T
b marks the treatment
group; and xTbj, x
C
bh are controls for treatment and control groups, i.e. product
characteristics. Estimation is followed by a formal test of Ho : αˆ2 = 0; failure to
reject Ho is interpreted as an evidence for trend equality between treatment and
control groups.
21See, Aguzzoni et al. (2016); Ashenfelter et al. (2013); DGComp (2015); Friberg and Romahn
(2015); Weinberg and Hosken (2013).
22See, Appendix Table 2, p. 15.
151
Table 5.7: Tests for Common Trend Assumption - I
(1) (2) (3) (4)




× t 0.6822*** 0.7031*** 0.6550*** 0.6835***
(0.1225) (0.1190) (0.1248) (0.1185)
γhomejl × t 0.6542* 0.6155* 0.8676** 0.7688**
(0.3552) (0.3641) (0.3455) (0.3223)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster FE Yes No Yes No




× t = γhome × t
F Stat 0.00 0.04 0.28 0.05
p-value 0.9448 0.8333 0.5952 0.8181




overlapping market. γhomejl is home market. t is time trend. Standard errors are clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Table 5.8 presents the results of this test. Specifications 1−3 take top 10 % of ∆lj as
the home market, while 4− 6 take top 12 % as the home market. All specifications
use a constant, facility fixed effects, county fixed effects. 1, 4 use only fixed effects.
2, 5 add controls. 3, 6 add demand indices. With the exception of Specification 1, I
fail to reject trend equality in home and overlapping markets in all specifications.
As a final alternative, Ashenfelter et al. (2013) suggest to employ time fixed effects
rather than trends, while still allowing estimates to vary across treatment and control
groups. Rewriting Equation 4.17























Recall that in this specification, γtl is time fixed effect. Estimation uses both
pretreatment and posttreatment data, and is followed by a formal test of δl = 0
for pretreatment periods, both jointly and marginally. Table 5.9 summarizes the
findings. Specifications 1− 3 take top 10 % of ∆lj as the home market, while 4− 6
take top 12 % as the home market. All specifications use a constant and facility
fixed effects. 2 − 5 also employ cluster fixed effects. 2, 5 add controls. 3, 6 add
demand indices. Findings suggest that even though in some specifications it is
possible to find some deviations between overlapping markets and home markets,
more frequently, the month fixed effects in two markets do not deviate significantly in
the pretreatment period. Table 5.9 also presents test statistics for joint significance
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Table 5.8: Tests for Common Trend Assumption - II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ
pre
t × t -0.3320 0.3532* 0.3964* -0.1984 0.3497* 0.3608*






× t 0.4865** 0.0853 0.0203 0.3425 0.0949 0.0634
(0.2399) (0.2254) (0.2263) (0.2505) (0.2140) (0.2190)
γ
post
t × t -0.8919*** -0.7408*** -0.7605*** -0.8448*** -0.7552*** -0.8045***






× t -1.1875*** -1.4237*** -1.3663*** -1.2398*** -1.4067*** -1.3131***
(0.2016) (0.1763) (0.1719) (0.2029) (0.1957) (0.1957)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Demand Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Cluster County County County County County County






t is pretretment; γ
post
t is posttretment; t is time trend. Standard errors are clustered at county level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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of month fixed effects. With the exception of the specifications that only use fixed
effects, I fail to reject joint significance.
The results from three different strategies in testing common trend suggest that
prior to treatment the trends in treatment and control markets were statistically
“common”. Consequently, I now proceed to DiD estimations.
5.5.2 Estimations
At the most basic level, DiD estimation bases on








l + υi (5.11)
where γpostt marks posttreatment observations, γ
treated
l marks treated observations.
γpostt × γtreatedl is the variable of interest, as it captures the effect of the treatment
on the treated. However, in practice, researcher either employs some controls, i.e.




In this part, estimations are conducted within a fixed effects framework. This
involves estimating
















j + υjltc (5.12)
in the general form. pjltc is the delivered price; l refers to location; j refers to
provider; t refers to month; c refers to consumer. γoverlapjl , marks locations that are
impacted from the regime change; γpostt marks observations in posttreatment period.
All specifications include a constant and facility fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at county level. In specifications 2, 4, 7, and 9 county fixed effects are
used; in 5, and 10 province fixed effects are used. In specifications 1, 3, 6, and 8,
instead of location fixed effects, γoverlapjl is used; similarly, in 1, 2, 6, and 7 instead
of month fixed effects γpostt is used. Specifications 1− 5 set transactions at the top
10% of ∆jl ; specifications 6−10 set transactions at the top 12% of ∆jl as the control
group. The coefficient of interest is α1, the DiD coefficient. Table 5.10 presents the
23Some straightforward extensions include allowing parameter inequality across treated and not
treated groups, e.g. Allen et al. (2014); Ashenfelter et al. (2013); Weinberg and Hosken (2013);
allowing heterogeneity in treatment effects, e.g. Aguzzoni et al. (2014); Ashenfelter et al. (2013);
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2005); Friberg and Romahn (2015); Luo (2014); tracking multiple
treatments, e.g. Silvia and Taylor (2013); or, allowing impact of treatment to vary over time, e.g.
DGComp (2015); Hosken et al. (2011)
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Table 5.9: Tests for Common Trend Assumption - III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc
γm=2 0.5407 1.0445 1.5424 0.5336 1.3823 1.9229
(1.3330) (1.1803) (1.1558) (1.2182) (1.1520) (1.4193)
γm=3 1.3411 1.2617 1.3675 1.0189 1.9557 1.5083
(1.4073) (2.0657) (2.1239) (1.2790) (1.8074) (1.8633)
γm=4 1.1264 1.6746 1.7670 1.0457 2.4356 1.7388
(1.4440) (2.2541) (2.3622) (1.3194) (2.0605) (2.1277)
γm=5 2.3117 3.3943 3.7502 2.1482 3.7077 2.3170
(1.6559) (2.9531) (3.1163) (1.4932) (2.5315) (2.7568)
γm=6 5.8653*** 7.1876** 7.5233** 4.9562*** 6.9754*** 6.0144**
(1.9468) (2.8668) (2.9966) (1.7735) (2.5393) (2.7080)
γm=7 6.1909*** 6.7631** 6.9129** 5.4886*** 8.6637*** 7.2400**
(2.0394) (2.7507) (3.0468) (1.8537) (2.9961) (2.8616)
γm=1 × γoverlap
jl
-2.1114 2.4722 2.9405 -2.2418 -10.3780 -20.3997*
(3.2587) (16.6347) (17.0128) (2.9278) (12.2805) (10.5380)
γm=2 × γoverlap
jl
-3.1315 0.6398 1.7412 -3.2580 -12.5416 -22.0741**
(3.1080) (16.6698) (16.7886) (2.8041) (12.4484) (11.0137)
γm=3 × γoverlap
jl
-4.9659 1.7928 2.8153 -4.7682* -11.8549 -20.5663*
(3.1278) (16.3860) (16.5515) (2.7794) (12.7726) (10.6990)
γm=4 × γoverlap
jl
-4.6279 1.8079 2.8590 -4.6754* -11.9294 -20.3546*
(3.0242) (16.3682) (16.5211) (2.7266) (13.0073) (10.8636)
γm=5 × γoverlap
jl
-2.7462 3.0413 2.6557 -2.6904 -10.2166 -19.0515*
(2.9335) (16.0414) (16.1697) (2.5952) (13.0189) (10.4611)
γm=6 × γoverlap
jl
-4.7459* 0.8797 1.5654 -3.8770 -11.8117 -20.0350*
(2.7153) (16.0133) (16.1341) (2.4492) (12.8332) (10.3510)
γm=7 × γoverlap
jl
-5.3746* 0.7423 1.8696 -4.7410* -14.1818 -21.6767*
(2.8339) (16.4207) (16.5061) (2.5591) (13.9923) (11.4942)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes




= γt−1 × γoverlap
jl
= 0, t = 1, 2...7
F Stat 3.60 1.57 0.71 2.88 1.64 0.71




overlapping market. γm=it is month dummy for month i. Standard errors are clustered at county level.
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Table 5.10: DiD – Estimations with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)






-10.0142*** -8.2262*** -10.0764*** -8.1949*** -8.1117*** -9.1798*** -7.7115*** -9.1163*** -7.4871*** -7.7325***
(1.1048) (1.3114) (1.1319) (1.2786) (1.4563) (1.1478) (1.3328) (1.1874) (1.3460) (1.4254)
γ
post
t -1.6415* -3.2463*** -2.4858** -3.7941***




-4.0635 -4.0043 -3.9526 -3.7653
(2.9375) (2.8520) (2.6285) (2.5772)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No No No No No No No
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Cluster FE No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Province FE No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
R2 0.4418 0.5912 0.5805 0.7201 0.6307 0.4414 0.5912 0.5790 0.7198 0.6310






t is posttretment. Standard errors are clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
results.
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Table 5.11: Inference – DiD Variable, Specifications with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)






−10.014 2 −8.391 7 −10.076 4 −8.342 0 −8.111 7 −9.179 8 −8.339 0 −9.116 3 −8.035 3 −7.732 5
Clustered s.e. 1.111 2 1.301 1 1.134 9 1.259 2 1.460 9 1.153 8 1.339 1 1.198 6 1.320 1 1.419 0
t-stat −9.012 1 −6.449 9 −8.878 7 −6.624 8 −5.552 5 −7.956 0 −6.227 5 −7.606 0 −6.086 7 −5.449 1
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 15.406 7 18.678 8 15.372 2 18.679 2 5.356 3 18.636 3 21.867 0 18.461 7 21.861 9 6.335 5
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.002 1 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.001 3
Conley s.e. 1.385 8 1.051 7 1.132 9 0.760 5 0.966 6 1.235 3 0.903 0 1.037 2 0.737 4 0.881 3







−9.258 3 −6.438 4 −9.471 0 −6.523 1 −6.122 5 −7.873 2 −6.734 9 −7.936 7 −6.541 5 −6.070 2
Clustered s.e. 1.311 7 1.577 6 1.295 4 1.454 4 1.566 7 1.437 7 1.827 0 1.443 3 1.658 8 1.538 4
t-stat −7.058 2 −4.081 0 −7.311 5 −4.485 0 −3.907 8 −5.476 1 −3.686 3 −5.498 8 −3.943 6 −3.945 7
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.000 0 0.000 3 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.000 1
G∗A 8.309 9 22.578 5 8.312 6 22.597 6 6.383 3 10.746 9 25.972 0 10.670 4 25.988 8 7.048 5
p-value 0.000 1 0.000 5 0.000 1 0.000 2 0.007 0 0.000 2 0.001 1 0.000 2 0.000 5 0.005 5
Conley s.e. 1.249 4 1.021 3 0.985 6 0.750 3 0.887 4 1.157 3 0.998 5 0.960 5 0.849 2 0.892 7







−10.376 2 −9.532 9 −10.211 0 −9.404 1 −8.508 6 −8.102 3 −10.248 3 −7.658 3 −9.729 1 −7.786 2
Clustered s.e. 2.506 8 1.776 2 2.342 6 1.474 6 1.823 2 2.396 1 1.606 9 2.327 4 1.408 4 1.739 0
t-stat −4.139 1 −5.367 1 −4.358 8 −6.377 4 −4.666 8 −3.381 5 −6.377 8 −3.290 5 −6.908 1 −4.477 3
p-value 0.000 1 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 9 0.000 0 0.001 3 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 6.713 9 17.066 4 6.707 2 17.112 3 9.092 4 9.079 4 21.393 7 9.031 2 21.443 7 12.005 8
p-value, G∗A 0.004 8 0.000 1 0.003 7 0.000 0 0.001 1 0.008 0 0.000 0 0.009 3 0.000 0 0.000 8
Conley s.e. 3.088 6 1.136 7 2.978 9 0.840 9 0.997 7 2.809 7 1.029 3 2.713 0 0.765 3 0.884 2
p-value, wild BS 0.003 3 0.001 3 0.002 7 0.000 7 0.001 3 0.006 7 0.000 7 0.008 0 0.000 7 0.002 0
Notes: Each panel corresponds to different level of aggregation in data. In each panel, the coefficient of interest is DiD indicator.
Second row is the CRVE standard errors; third and fourth rows are associated t-statistic and p-values. Fifth row provides G∗A,
feasible effective number of clusters of CSSL; sixth row provides associated p-value. Seventh row is Conley standard errors. Final
row is bootstrap p-values.
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If home market is defined as top 10% of ∆jl , estimates suggest that the fall in price
in home markets is in the interval of 1.64 − 3.79%. However, 8.11 − 10.08% of
the price decrease in the overlapping market can be associated to regime change.
If the home market is defined as the top 12% of ∆jl , estimates for price fall in
home markets goes up to 2.48 − 3.79%, while price decrease in the overlapping
market that can be associated to regime change is 7.48 − 9.17%. Since expanding
home market threshold implies including transactions that are progressively more
competitive, this decline in coefficient estimates for DiD coefficient is consistent with
the theoretical framework.
Inference problems due to spatial dependency across observations and DiD
methodology are addressed by applying various potential remedies, e.g. collapsing





and wild cluster bootstrap. Table 5.11 summarizes this information for the variable
of interest, DiD indicator, γpostt ×γoverlapjl . First four rows present the inference using
clustered standard errors. Fifth and sixth rows present G∗A calculated via CSSL,




. Seventh row presents Conley standard errors
assuming dependency across observations decays linearly with distance. Final row
presents p-values using wild cluster bootstrap. Each of the three panels refer to a
different level of data aggregation.
Findings suggest that p-values calculated using clustered standard errors are in fact




, or wild cluster bootstrap. However, the difference
does not affect the inference; even using alternative methodologies to calculate
standard errors and p-values, the DiD coefficient is significant at conventional levels.
Employing Control Variables:






























where t is month, c is customer, l is location, j is provider. Note that this equation
incorporates p demand shifters, zpjltc and k cost shifters, χ
k
jltc. Control variables





of rivals in a defined radius, NBRjlc; distance between provider and buyer, djl;
an indicator variable marking presence of a vertical relation provider and buyer,
γverticaljc ; an indicator variable marking presence of an additional nearby facility
controlled by the provider, γownjl ; indices tracking regional demand, tnpl(t−i) where
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, or tnptl; indices tracking energy price and capacity utilization, EIjt and
Ujt. All specifications employ a constant and facility fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at county level. In specifications 5, 6, 11, and 12 county fixed effects,
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in other specifications, γoverlapjl is used. Similarly, specifications 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 11
use γpostt , while other specifications use month fixed effects. Specifications 1− 6 set
top 10% of ∆jl ; specifications 7 − 12 set top 12% of ∆jl as the home market. The
coefficient of interest is α1, the DiD coefficient. Table 5.12 presents the results.
Defining home market as top 10% of ∆jl , point estimates suggest that 8.33−11.25%
of the price decrease in the overlapping market can be associated with regime switch.





, γverticaljc , djl are frequently insignificant across specifications. Demand





t−1nplt have opposite signs in many specifications. However, in specifications 5, 10,
where demand indicators and capacity utilization are used together as regressors,
t−4nplt is no longer significant. Also considering, this pattern does not survive when
transaction volume is included in the estimation in an IV framework24, I do not take
it as a major concern.
Table 5.13 summarizes the results from alternative methods employed for valid
inference. Findings are very similar to the findings in Table 5.11. p-values calculated





wild cluster bootstrap. However, even using alternative methodologies to calculate
standard errors and p-values, DiD coefficient is still significant at conventional levels.
Basic DiD specifications suggest that using difference in price across control and
treatment markets and before and after treatment, the impact of the regime switch
is conservatively estimated in the interval of 7.49− 11.25%.
Treatment Intensity:
So far, spatial variation in the data is exploited in determining treatment and control
groups. Provider-buyer pairs that are unaffected from the regime change make up
the control group; pairs that are affected from the regime change make up the
treatment group. This involves the assumption that two locations, one right off the
overlapping market boundary, the other one right on the centre, have been exposed
to the same treatment. In this part, this assumption is relaxed, and variation in the
treatment intensity is exploited in the identification. This is done by employing a
continuous variable indicative of variation in treatment intensity at each location. In
order to provide the intuition behind this, I revisit Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013).
Rewriting the estimated equation,


















Recall that in this equation s is station; t is time; γt and γs are time and station
24See the estimations in Chapter 3.
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Table 5.12: DiD – Estimations with Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)






-11.2524*** -10.0864*** -10.0922*** -8.3757*** -10.1695*** -9.0116*** -9.0048*** -7.9884***




2.7356 3.9925 4.0438 1.6979 2.9873 3.0280
(3.7870) (3.1735) (3.1644) (2.8320) (2.5326) (2.5248)
tnpdt 0.0075 0.0150 0.0066 0.0158
(0.0409) (0.0442) (0.0410) (0.0423)
t−1
npdt
-0.1258*** -0.0916** -0.1264*** -0.0899**
(0.0329) (0.0403) (0.0328) (0.0393)
t−2
npdt
-0.0870*** -0.0741* -0.0862*** -0.0724*
(0.0303) (0.0384) (0.0303) (0.0375)
t−3
npdt
-0.0800** -0.0529 -0.0799** -0.0502
(0.0354) (0.0444) (0.0354) (0.0435)
t−4
npdt
0.1581*** 0.1466*** 0.1578*** 0.1466***




0.2829 0.3842 0.3917 -0.8667** 0.2590 0.3661 0.3735 -0.8767**





0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
NBRjlc -1.8473*** -1.3127* -1.3592* -2.0285 -1.8455*** -1.2963* -1.3483* -1.9377
(0.5911) (0.7207) (0.7065) (2.0878) (0.5811) (0.7185) (0.7036) (2.0822)
γownjl 3.3845 4.7360*** 4.6704*** 4.4102 3.3833 4.7487*** 4.6764*** 4.4518
(2.3053) (1.7430) (1.7532) (2.9285) (2.2887) (1.7419) (1.7519) (2.8753)
djl -0.0052 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.1308** -0.0064 -0.0032 -0.0027 -0.1305**
(0.0201) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0515) (0.0202) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0513)
γverticaljc 0.0864 0.4439 0.4450 1.2296 0.0343 0.4117 0.4129 1.2655











Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.4717 0.6049 0.6065 0.7075 0.4713 0.6040 0.6056 0.7078






t is posttretment. γ
vertical
jc indicates vertical relation between provider and buyer. γ
own
jl indicates
presence of multiple nearby production facilities of the provider. ∆lj is a measure of relative distance. NBRjlc is number of rivals.
Ujt is capacity utilization. EIjt is energy price index. djl is distance. t
−i
npdt
refers to ith lag of monthly demand index. tnpdt
refers to aggregate T activity around a given location over 18 months. Standard errors are clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.13: Inference – DiD Variable, Specifications with Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)






−11.252 4 −10.086 4 −10.092 2 −8.375 7 −10.169 5 −9.011 6 −9.004 8 −7.988 4
Clustered s.e. 1.207 2 1.146 7 1.163 3 1.277 3 1.273 7 1.245 1 1.256 2 1.235 7
t-stat −9.321 0 −8.795 6 −8.675 7 −6.557 6 −7.984 5 −7.237 5 −7.168 5 −6.464 6
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 13.421 5 14.610 4 17.640 9 19.067 6 17.324 1 18.674 7 20.866 2 22.182 1
p-value, G∗A 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
Conley s.e. 1.477 4 1.033 1 1.025 3 0.751 8 1.317 3 0.983 4 0.973 9 0.705 3







−10.665 1 −9.354 9 −9.378 1 −7.059 3 −8.959 6 −7.866 8 −7.869 5 −6.926 3
Clustered s.e. 1.435 0 1.347 2 1.368 1 1.418 4 1.595 8 1.456 4 1.471 2 1.357 2
t-stat −7.432 0 −6.943 8 −6.855 0 −4.976 7 −5.614 6 −5.401 7 −5.348 9 −5.103 4
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 7.452 1 8.392 3 9.721 6 23.238 8 9.879 7 10.910 4 12.467 9 26.857 6
p-value, G∗A 0.000 1 0.000 1 0.000 1 0.000 0 0.000 2 0.000 2 0.000 2 0.000 0
Conley s.e. 1.373 4 0.945 7 0.937 5 0.701 5 1.268 6 0.960 4 0.952 6 0.758 2







−10.718 5 −9.912 4 −9.656 0 −8.754 8 −9.074 5 −7.705 7 −7.410 5 −9.130 5
Clustered s.e. 2.291 2 1.870 3 1.863 5 1.636 3 2.127 8 1.901 5 1.899 8 1.503 8
t-stat −4.678 2 −5.299 8 −5.181 7 −5.350 5 −4.264 8 −4.052 4 −3.900 6 −6.071 5
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.000 2 0.000 0
G∗A 6.522 6 6.729 3 6.895 6 17.935 1 9.296 5 9.107 5 9.300 2 23.452 8
p-value, G∗A 0.002 7 0.001 3 0.001 3 0.000 0 0.001 9 0.002 8 0.003 4 0.000 0
Conley s.e. 2.397 2 2.182 9 2.178 6 0.873 8 2.147 1 1.895 4 1.892 0 0.799 9
p-value, wild BS 0.002 7 0.001 3 0.001 3 0.001 3 0.003 3 0.003 3 0.003 3 0.000 7
Notes: Each panel corresponds to different level of aggregation in data. In each panel, the coefficient of interest is DiD indicator.
Second row is the CRVE standard errors; third and fourth rows are associated t-statistic and p-values. Fifth row provides G∗A,
feasible effective number of clusters of CSSL; sixth row provides associated p-value. Seventh row is Conley standard errors. Final
row is bootstrap p-values.
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fixed effects; zlst refers to controls; γ
BP
st marks stations subject to merger; γ
comp
st
indicates that before the merger, station s was competing with a station that changed
ownership. Note that the impact of merger is governed by distribution of the stations
and the identity of the merging parties, and it is uneven across different locations;
some locations suffer large jumps in concentration, while some are only marginally
affected. To capture this heterogeneity, Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) propose
employing spatial clustering index, SC. This is a local measure of concentration
that varies at each location but have no variation over time in premerger period. It
changes only once, due to merger25, and in proportion to the impact of merger at
that location.
Here, I adopt the same methodology to a regime switch from collusion to
competition. At the locations where cost difference disappears, market power of the
provider is low, and price under competition is forced towards cost. Consequently,
regime switch would have a big impact on price. If cost difference across providers is
high even in competition, market power of the provider is also high. Consequently,
price in both regimes will be similar and regime switch would have a small impact
on price. It follows that within overlapping markets, the impact of regime switch
on price – the size of the overcharge – is inversely proportional to the market power
of the provider under competition. Building on this, I propose interpreting regime
switch as a treatment which produces heterogeneous effects at each location that is
inversely proportional to difference in cost across providers at that location. In that
regards, to approximate cost difference, alternatively local intensity of treatment at
each location, I use ∆lj and its squared.
However, there is a difference between ∆jl and spatial clustering index. The latter,
by design, is unchanged in pretreatment period, and changes only due to treatment,
while the former has some variation in the pretreatment period. Consequently,
I modify the empirical strategy in Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) by using a
specification of the following form:







































where t is month, c is customer, l is location, j is provider. γj γl, γt are respectively
provider, county and time fixed effects. zpjltc and χ
k
jltc are demand and cost shifters.




are zero in home markets
before and after treatment; and in overlapping markets before treatment; they are
nonzero only in overlapping markets after treatment. Specification 1, and 4 only
include fixed effects and variables of interest. Specification 2, and 5 include number
25Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) also note that entry and exit may affect the index as well (FN
9).
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Table 5.14: DiD – Estimations with Treatment Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)








0.6340*** 0.5777*** 0.6028*** 0.4907** 0.6264*** 0.5650*** 0.5910*** 0.4780**












0.0276*** 0.0287*** 0.0293*** 0.0312*** 0.0273*** 0.0280*** 0.0287*** 0.0306***






×NBRjlc -2.1984*** -2.1750*** -2.2158*** -2.1023*** -2.0741*** -2.1090***
(0.4890) (0.5199) (0.5369) (0.4834) (0.5072) (0.5252)
γverticaljc 1.1833 1.1039 1.2065 1.1287
(1.7772) (1.7259) (1.7791) (1.7282)
γownjl 2.2294 3.6553 2.2523 3.6796
(2.6679) (2.4997) (2.6725) (2.4971)
tnpdt 0.0019 -0.0051 0.0056 -0.0012
(0.0418) (0.0413) (0.0408) (0.0403)
t−1
npdt
-0.1027** -0.1039*** -0.1006** -0.1017***
(0.0396) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0382)
t−2
npdt
-0.0874** -0.0918** -0.0842** -0.0884**
(0.0385) (0.0382) (0.0379) (0.0375)
t−3
npdt
-0.0741* -0.0750* -0.0712* -0.0719*
(0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0429) (0.0428)
t−4
npdt
0.1151*** 0.1098*** 0.1191*** 0.1139***
(0.0379) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0370)
djl -0.0273** -0.0273**
(0.0128) (0.0128)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6982 0.7052 0.7072 0.7100 0.6980 0.7046 0.7066 0.709






t is posttretment. γ
vertical
jc indicates vertical relation between provider and buyer. γ
own
jl indicates
presence of multiple nearby production facilities of the provider. ∆lj is a measure of relative distance, and is multiplied by 0.1 before
regression. NBRjlc is number of rivals. djl is distance. t
−i
npdt
refers to ith lag of monthly demand index. tnpdt refers to aggregate
T activity around a given location over 18 months. Standard errors are clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
of rivals in a defined radius via interacting it with γpostt γ
overlap
jl as in variables of
interest. Specifications 3, 4, 7, and 8 introduce controls without any interaction. In
defining home markets, specifications 1−4 use top 10% of ∆jl ; specifications 5−8 use
top 12% of ∆jl . Standard errors are clustered at county level. Table 5.14 presents
the results.









are very precise and inclusion of controls has limited impact. Estimates
for ∆jl are more sensitive to inclusion of controls, in particular, inclusion of distance
between provider and buyer djl. This is intuitive, as distance variable potentially
captures some of the linear impact of local market power on price.
Building on the estimates in specifications 3, and 7 in Table 5.14, Table 5.15
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-10 2 101.1808 101.3545
-10 0 105.5309 105.5027
-10 1 103.3558 103.4286
-5 2 104.1948 104.3095
-5 1 106.3698 106.3836
-5 0 108.5449 108.4577
0 2 107.2088 107.2644
0 1 109.3839 109.3385
0 0 111.5589 111.4126
2.5 2 108.7158 108.7419
2.5 1 110.8909 110.816
2.5 0 113.0659 112.8901
summarizes the price predicted for competition. In this computation, ∆jl , and
NBRjlc are fixed to the values on the table, where increases in ∆
j
l , and decreases in
NBRjlc imply a progressive increases in market power of the provider. All other all
covariates are fixed at sample averages. Next these values interact with coefficient
estimates and give the predicted price for competition. Next these values interact
with coefficient estimates and give the predicted price for competition. Findings
indicate that if the provider’s local market power at each location, as measured
by relative proximity and number of rivals, is taken as an indicator of intensity of
the exposure to the “treatment” (regime change) at each location, market power
variations imply variations in price predicted for competition as high as 11.89 %.
Table 5.16 summarizes the results from alternative methodologies employed to





standard errors, and p-values using wild cluster bootstrap for different level of




. Findings are robust to alternative
methods of inference.
To sum up, overcharge estimates are 9.26 % with before and after; 11.14–13.98 %
with dummy variable approach; 8.05–11.46 % with forecasting; 7.48–10.08 % with
DiD specifications using fixed effects; 7.99–11.25 % with DiD specifications that use
controls. First thing to notice about the estimates is the convergence. Recall that
at any time t in posttreatment period, price in the treated market is determined by
three factors: i) initial price level, ii) time varying factors that influence price, iii)
treatment26. In accurately identifying the impact of the treatment, dummy variable
approach for example relies on controlling for other factors, i.e. demand and cost
shifters. In this approach, consistent estimation depends on controlling all time
varying factors that might impact pricing and that change around the treatment






= 0, where γpostt is the regime change
indicator, and υt captures the unobservables in the treatment market. On the other
26See, Equation 4.5.
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hand, DiD adopts a different strategy; the difference in price between two markets
(treated and not treated) before and after the treatment, is used in identifying the
impact of the treatment. In this case, two necessary conditions for consistency
are treatment and control markets having similar demand and cost conditions, and







= 0, where γTt − µCt corresponds to unobservables in the
treatment market net of unobservables in the control market. I take convergence
of results that use alternative identification assumptions as a suggestive evidence of
the exogeneity of the shock, the regime switch.
Second important result is about the relation between the variation in overcharge
and variation in local market power. This can be seen first via forecasting estimates.
As displayed in Figure 5.2, forecasting overcharge estimates suggest considerable
spatial variation; 11.99% of this variation might be explained by variations in market
power. Second, if the market is divided into high market power (home market) and
low market power (overlapping market) regions, DiD estimates suggest price in the
former has been 7.48 − 11.25 % higher than the price in the latter after treatment
even after controlling demand and cost shifters. Third, if the provider’s market
power at each location, as measured by relative proximity and number of rivals,
is taken as an indicator of degree of exposure to the “treatment”, market power
variations might lead variations in the price predicted for competition counterfactual,
consequently variation in overcharge estimate as high as 11.89 %. These findings
indicate that if the spatial dynamics are ignored, and single overcharge estimation is
made, estimation leads to; undercompensation in regions where the market powers
of dominant competitor and potential competitor converge; and overcompensation
in regions where the market powers diverge.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, building on the previous ones, hypothetical overcharge related to
a possible collusion is estimated. In estimating the overcharge, I first use the
techniques frequently used in collusion retrospectives, i.e. before and after, indicator
variable approach, forecasting. A simple comparison of average price before and
after the regime switch implies 9.26 % overcharge. Dummy variable approach point
estimates for the overcharge range in 11.14-13.98 %; while forecasting point estimates
range in 8.05-11.46%.
Second, in estimating the overcharge I find inspiration in empirical strategies that
are employed in merger retrospectives. I initially estimate the overcharge using basic
difference-in-difference by benefiting from spatial variation. I take regime switch as
a treatment and identify buyer-provider pairs that would be least affected from the
switch (the pairs that are most likely to be characterised by monopoly pricing even
under competition) as the control group; and capture the impact of the treatment,
as a deviation of price in high market power regions from price in low market power
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Table 5.16: Inference – Measures of Local Market Power, Treatment Intensity






















































t× l× j × c
Coeff. 0.634 0 0.027 6 0.577 7 0.028 7 0.490 7 0.031 2 0.626 4 0.027 3 0.565 0 0.028 0 0.478 0 0.030 6
Clustered s.e. 0.194 3 0.008 4 0.193 8 0.008 1 0.189 5 0.008 2 0.193 0 0.008 4 0.195 7 0.008 2 0.192 2 0.008 3
t-stat 3.263 1 3.275 3 2.980 7 3.518 1 2.589 1 3.818 9 3.245 0 3.244 2 2.886 6 3.400 4 2.487 4 3.688 9
p-value 0.001 4 0.001 3 0.003 4 0.000 6 0.010 7 0.000 2 0.001 5 0.001 5 0.004 5 0.000 9 0.014 1 0.000 3
G∗A 26.615 6 13.513 3 26.588 4 13.628 6 31.324 3 13.084 5 26.068 6 13.325 4 25.955 2 13.409 4 30.416 6 12.886 6
p-value, G∗A 0.003 0 0.005 8 0.006 1 0.003 5 0.014 5 0.002 1 0.003 2 0.006 2 0.007 7 0.004 6 0.018 6 0.002 8
Conley s.e. 0.087 6 0.003 6 0.087 7 0.003 5 0.089 8 0.003 4 0.086 3 0.003 6 0.086 6 0.003 5 0.088 8 0.003 4
p-value, wild BS 0.005 3 0.004 7 0.010 0 0.006 0 0.018 0 0.001 3 0.005 3 0.004 7 0.010 0 0.008 0 0.020 0 0.003 3
t× l× j
Coeff. 0.585 3 0.025 8 0.522 3 0.026 3 0.455 9 0.028 1 0.576 8 0.025 4 0.506 9 0.025 5 0.439 4 0.027 3
Clustered s.e. 0.234 0 0.009 8 0.227 5 0.009 1 0.213 5 0.008 9 0.234 1 0.009 8 0.231 9 0.009 3 0.218 8 0.009 1
t-stat 2.501 7 2.640 3 2.296 3 2.887 8 2.134 9 3.171 7 2.463 8 2.594 6 2.186 0 2.748 0 2.007 8 3.010 7
p-value 0.013 5 0.009 3 0.023 2 0.004 5 0.034 6 0.001 9 0.015 0 0.010 5 0.030 5 0.006 8 0.046 6 0.003 1
G∗A 28.664 3 12.290 3 28.254 2 12.389 7 36.165 0 12.153 2 28.301 3 12.114 9 27.722 0 12.145 5 35.207 3 11.922 0
p-value, G∗A 0.018 3 0.021 2 0.029 3 0.013 2 0.039 6 0.007 9 0.020 1 0.023 3 0.037 4 0.017 5 0.052 4 0.010 9
Conley s.e. 0.086 5 0.003 5 0.084 6 0.003 3 0.086 6 0.003 2 0.085 2 0.003 5 0.084 1 0.003 3 0.086 4 0.003 3
p-value, wild BS 0.024 7 0.016 0 0.044 7 0.019 3 0.052 7 0.007 3 0.028 7 0.017 3 0.050 7 0.023 3 0.066 7 0.010 7
t× l
Coeff. 0.643 5 0.026 8 0.645 3 0.030 0 0.548 6 0.030 8 0.617 6 0.025 8 0.642 2 0.029 9 0.539 3 0.030 5
Clustered s.e. 0.228 8 0.009 5 0.195 2 0.007 1 0.195 5 0.008 1 0.235 2 0.009 5 0.202 2 0.007 3 0.204 3 0.008 3
t-stat 2.812 3 2.811 8 3.306 3 4.221 1 2.805 5 3.786 5 2.625 3 2.709 2 3.176 6 4.124 0 2.638 9 3.689 1
p-value 0.005 6 0.005 7 0.001 2 0.000 0 0.005 8 0.000 2 0.009 6 0.007 6 0.001 8 0.000 1 0.009 3 0.000 3
G∗A 24.769 9 4.283 5 24.799 3 4.522 2 32.818 3 4.659 4 22.922 8 4.186 4 23.269 9 4.467 2 30.878 8 4.640 4
p-value, G∗A 0.009 5 0.044 6 0.002 9 0.010 4 0.008 4 0.014 6 0.015 1 0.051 0 0.004 2 0.011 6 0.012 9 0.016 2
Conley s.e. 0.090 4 0.003 6 0.082 3 0.003 1 0.083 1 0.003 2 0.093 0 0.003 6 0.084 6 0.003 1 0.085 9 0.003 3
p-value, wild BS 0.003 3 0.014 7 0.002 0 0.001 3 0.003 3 0.005 3 0.006 7 0.017 3 0.002 0 0.001 3 0.006 0 0.006 0
Notes: Each panel corresponds to different level of aggregation in data. In each panel, the coefficient of interest is interaction of
DiD coefficient with either ∆
j
l
, relative proximity measure, or its squared. Second row is the CRVE standard errors; third and
fourth rows are associated t-statistic and p-values. Fifth row provides G∗A, feasible effective number of clusters of CSSL; sixth row
provides associated p-value. Seventh row is Conley standard errors. Final row is bootstrap p-values.
regions. Next, I estimate the overcharge in a treatment intensity framework. I
interpret the regime switch as a treatment, which produces heterogeneous effects
at each location that is inversely proportional to the level of local market power
the provider enjoys at that location. Basic DiD specifications suggest that using
difference in price across control and treatment markets and difference in price before
and after treatment, the impact of the regime switch is conservatively estimated in
the interval of 7.48 − 11.25 %. If the provider’s market power at each location,
as measured by relative proximity and number of rivals, is taken as an indicator of
degree of exposure to the “treatment”, market power variations might lead variations
in the price predicted for competition counterfactual, consequently variation in
overcharge estimate as high as 11.89 %.
Finally, to ensure inference is valid, and not affected from spatial dependencies
across observations, and DiD methodology, I apply various remedies suggested in
the literature. These include using CRVE standard errors; limiting the level of data
variation, e.g. collapsing data to lesser number of dimensions; imposing an error
structure; using critical values basing on feasible effective number of clusters; and
wild cluster bootstrap. The results are robust to alternative methods of inference.
Findings indicate that overcharge displays considerable spatial variation basing on
market power of provider at each location. If the spatial dynamics are ignored,
estimation leads to; undercompensation in regions where market powers of dominant
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competitor and potential competitor converge; and overcompensation in regions




This work is an empirical analysis of collusion; in particular its detection and
estimating the overcharge associated with it, in a setting where no a priori knowledge
of collusion exists by using a consumer level data set.
At the first step, using simple markers proposed in the literature, I observe that
consistent with a regime switch from collusion to competition, stable relations in
the market are disrupted after month seven. Next, I take on these suspicious
patterns, and investigate further, while I control for demand and cost shifters; I
explore if observed patterns are more consistent with collusion or competition. To
this aim, I take the premise in Bresnahan (1987) about centring on the relationship
between price and local market power in identifying regime switch defined in an
heterogeneous product / product characteristics space setting to an homogeneous
product / geographic space setting. I propose taking cost difference between
potential competitor and dominant competitor at that location as a measure of local
market power. Consequently, estimation centres on explaining pricing behaviour,
and particularly its relation with indicator of local market power. Using OLS and
GMM, and via interacting a two level factorial variable, the dummy for first seven
months, with market power indicators, two different pricing equations are estimated;
one for first seven months, and the other for after month seven. Findings indicate
that i) at locations where market power of provider and the closest rival converge,
there are large price difference between two periods ii) at locations where the provider
has large market power, price in both periods converge, iii) before month seven,
local market power indicator is positively but only linearly related to price, iv) after
month seven, local market power indicator is both linearly and quadratically related
to pricing; providers suffer large price cuts to serve buyers that are gradually closer
to the closest rival. These findings are interpreted as further evidence for a regime
switch from collusion to competition.
The results also suggest that level of market power each provider has on a buyer
is very important in the assessment of the impact of collusion on price, which is
explored in detail next. Building on the previous findings, I estimate hypothetical
overcharge related to a possible collusion. First, I employ the techniques that are
frequently used in collusion retrospectives, i.e. before and after, indicator variable
approach, forecasting. A simple comparison of average price before and after the
regime switch implies 9.26 % overcharge. Dummy variable approach point estimates
for the overcharge range in 11.14-13.98 %; while forecasting point estimates range
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in 8.05-11.46%. Second, I import empirical strategies from merger retrospectives
to collusion retrospectives. I initially estimate the overcharge using basic DiD by
benefiting from spatial variation. I take regime switch as a treatment and identify the
impact of the treatment, as a deviation of price in high market power regions (regions
that are marginally affected from regime switch) from price in low market power
regions (regions that are heavily affected from regime switch). Next, I estimate the
overcharge in a treatment intensity framework. I interpret the regime switch as a
treatment which produces heterogeneous effects at each location that is inversely
proportional to the level of local market power the provider enjoys at that location.
Basic DiD specifications suggest that using difference in price across control and
treatment markets and difference in price before and after treatment, the impact of
the regime switch is conservatively estimated in the interval of 7.48 − 11.25 %. If
the provider’s market power at each location, as measured by relative proximity and
number of rivals, is taken as an indicator of degree of exposure to the “treatment”,
market power variations might lead variations in the price predicted for competition
counterfactual, consequently variation in overcharge estimate as high as 11.89 %.
Findings indicate that overcharge displays considerable spatial variation basing on
market power of provider at each location. If the spatial dynamics are ignored,
estimation leads to; undercompensation in regions where market powers of dominant
competitor and potential competitor converge; and overcompensation in regions
where the market powers diverge. Finally, to ensure inference is valid, and not
affected from spatial dependencies across observations, and DiD methodology, I
apply various remedies suggested in the literature. These include using CRVE
standard errors; limiting the level of data variation, e.g. collapsing data to lesser
number of dimensions; imposing an error structure; using critical values basing on
feasible effective number of clusters; and wild cluster bootstrap. The results are
robust to alternative methods of inference.
There are two natural directions of further research. First is applying the frameworks
developed here to other data sets and markets. For proactive detection, this would
correspond to testing the framework developed in Bresnahan (1987) and applied here
in a prosecuted case of collusion to see the degree of conversion between empirical
findings and the case information. For estimating overcharge, this would correspond
to applying the proposed framework in markets where competition is defined on
product characteristics space. Second is adopting a structural estimation framework,
and comparing implications of reduced form and structural estimations as have been
done in Peters (2006); Weinberg (2011); Weinberg and Hosken (2013).
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Appendix 1: Detection Literature
Work Auction Prosecuted Empirical Strategy






model to collusive firms.
(iv) Test if two sets of
firms behave differently.
Porter and Zona (1999) Yes Yes (i) Apply (i)-(iv) in




(iii) Test for residual
correlation across firms.
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Work Auction Prosecuted Empirical Strategy
Bajari and Ye (2003) Yes No (i) Apply competitive
model to all firms; and
retrieve residuals and
estimates.
(ii) In a pair wise
manner, test for residual
correlation across firms.
(iii) In a pair wise
manner, test for
symmetry in coefficients.










Yes No (i) Use various markers
to identify suspicious
behaviour.
(ii) Apply (i) - (iii) in




Yes No (i) Apply (i)-(iii) in
Bajari and Ye (2003) to
identify suspicious firms.
(ii) In a structural
setting, retrieve cost
estimates implied by
FOCs, assuming firms are
colluding.
(iii) Repeat (ii), assuming
firms are competing.
(iv) Test if estimates from
(ii) and (iii) have the
same distribution.
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Work Auction Prosecuted Empirical Strategy
Conley and Decarolis
(2016)





(ii) Identify a suspect
group.
(iii) Identify comparable
groups with the suspect
group in terms of
characteristics in (i).
(iv) Test the randomness
of co-occurrence of the
suspect group, given the
behaviour of comparable
group.
(v) Test if the behaviour
of suspect group impacts
the threshold more than
comparable group.
Ishii (2009) Yes No (i) Construct a score
variable aggregating net
favours for each firm pair.
(ii) Model likelihood to
win as a function of
this score variable and
observables.
(iii) In competition, score
should be irrelevant.
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Work Auction Prosecuted Empirical Strategy
Marshall et al. (2008) No Yes (i) Monitor the change in
price announcements i.e.
joint vs. singleton, and
advance vs. immediate.
(ii) Model probability of a
price change as a function
of observable shifters, and
time elapsed since last
price change.
(iii) Length of time period
should be irrelevant in
competition.
Bos and Schinkel (2009) No NA (i) Form expectations
about how would firms
collude if they are using
basing point pricing.
(ii) Repeat (i) if firms are
competing.
(iii) Recover the location
of the base and see if the








(ii) Run a reduced form




Yes No (i) Build a model
assuming competition.
(ii) Build a competitive
model assuming large
buyers collude.
(iii) Compete two models
on likelihood measures.
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Work Auction Prosecuted Empirical Strategy
Bresnahan (1987) No No (i) Search for odd





(ii) Fit a competitive
model and a collusive
model to all periods.







Firgo and Ku¨gler (2014) No No (i) Estimate the best
response functions for the
players.




(iii) Test if spatial
considerations i.e.
distance to rival, number
of rivals are influential in
pricing.
Baldwin et al. (1997) Yes No (i) Estimate competitive
model and competitive
model with supply shifts.
(ii) Estimate a collusive
model and collusive
model with supply




Work Auction Prosecuted Empirical Strategy
Abrantes-Metz et al.
(2006)
No No Search for a pocket
of competitors that
is characterised by a
combination of high




No No (i) Apply Abrantes-Metz
et al. (2006).
(ii) As the competitive
benchmark, use pricing
behaviour in a market
with a maverick.








Heijnen et al. (2015) No No (i) Apply Abrantes-Metz




identify firms in the same
market.
(iii) In each market,






No Yes (i) Apply Abrantes-Metz
et al. (2006) to two cartel
cases in Italy.
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Work Auction Prosecuted Empirical Strategy
Vickers and Ziebarth
(2014)
No No (i) Identify a structural
break.
(ii) Monitor the change
in the relations in the
market before and after





Christie et al. (1994)
No No (i) Find anomalies in
market behaviour.
(ii) Look for clustering of
anomalies in some time
period or in some firms.
(iii) Search for presence





Rauch et al. (2013)
No No (i) Find anomalies in
market behaviour.
(ii) Use Benford‘s Law
to detect naturalness of
these occurrences.
(iii) Test the significance





Yes No Using various collusive
markers, search for
structural breaks in firm
behaviour.
Imhof et al. (2016) Yes No (i) Identify suspicious
firms by monitoring bid
variance and distribution.





































Yes No Pulpwood Sweden Structural
Bresnahan
(1987)













HC No Whiskey US Structural
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Yes No Coffee International Structural
Kamita
(2010)
AI No Air Travel Hawaii, US DiD







NA No Construction Korea Forecast
Ma
(2005a,b)








Yes No Automobile Ireland Structural
Mncube
(2014)

























Worka Cartelb Prosecuted Industry Location Methodc
Notaro
(2014)

















Yes Yes Detergent EU Dummy
DiD
Tan (2009) HC No Coal UK Structural
a Does not include the literature covered in Chapter 2.
b It takes “Yes” if a cartel is being studied. It takes “HC” if an historical cartel is studied.
It takes “SMP” if a supply management program is studied. It takes “AI” if an antitrust
immunity is studied.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































a Contains works that centre on the impact of merger on price.
b If the merger retrospective studies multiple mergers, each merger is recorded separately.
c It corresponds to parties to the transaction. In some cases the merger involves purchase
of a brand, rather than the entire undertaking. For these cases, the brands are shown.
d Treatment and control groups might refer to regions, cities, or products. In the table only
core treatment and control groups are present, and only main characteristic is reported
(e.g. other non-federal teaching hospitals in North Carolina is abbreviated to other
hospitals in North Carolina). If there are multiple treatment, control groups that are
central to the analysis, these are separated with a semicolon. Abbreviations correspond
to US states.
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Appendix 4: Definitions and
Abbreviations
Expression Definition
pjltc Total price charged by provider j, to customer c, at location l,





REVjltc Total revenue for the sales to customer c, at location l, in month
t from provider j
vjltc Total volume of purchase from provider j, by customer c, at
location l, in month t,


















∆jl Measure of local market power of provider j at location l dkl−
djl, where dkl = min(d(−j)l)




djl Distance between provider j and location l
NBRjlc Total number of undertakings that are rival to provider j with
at least one facility within d¯ radius of location l
V¯t Total volume of sales in month t
N¯t Total number of sales in month t
γj Facility fixed effects
γt Month fixed effects
γl Cluster fixed effects
χjltc General expression for cost shifters





t Indicates regime is collusive. Takes 1 for t < 8.
γcompt , γ
post
t Indicates regime is competitive. Takes 1 for t ≥ 8.
γhomejl Indicates observations at top 10 % (or 12 % in some
specifications) of ∆jl .
γoverlapjl Indicates observations that are not marked by γ
home
jl .
γownjl Additional facility indicator. Equals 1 if there is at least one
additional facility of provider j within d¯ radius of location l
γverticaljc Equals 1 if some vertical relation is reported for the buyer
provider pair.
γlargec Large buyer indicator. Equals 1 if buyer c is in top 5 % in
terms of total volume of purchase






Ujt Capacity utilization of facility j in month t.
EIjt Value of unit price index of the most frequently used source of
energy for facility j, month t
Qnplt Quantity of T licensed to be produced for customer need n, and
production process p, in month t around location l. Seasonally
unadjusted.
ωn¯plt Monthly weight of location l in total volume of T production
for each n, p pair. Calculated as
Qn¯plt∑
lQn¯plt
Q˜n¯pt Seasonally adjusted aggregated volume of T in month t for each
n, p pair.
Q˜n¯plt Seasonally adjusted volume of T at district level. Calculated
as ωn¯pltQ˜n¯pt
r = r¯, 0.8r¯, 0.6r¯ Radius relevant for T production
tnplt Final aggregated regional monthly demand index informing
seasonally adjusted T production within ri radius. Calculated
by aggregating indices ωn¯pltQ˜n¯pt for n, p = (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)
and the unadjusted index Q22dt into a single index. The
superscripts −1,−2,−3,−4 indicate lagged values.
tnptl Aggregation of seasonally adjusted regional monthly demand










-14.1300*** -10.0775*** -10.0663*** -10.1090*** -14.3185*** -9.0334*** -9.0320*** -9.0428***




-14.5223 9.4206 9.7156 10.5525 -22.7851** 0.7046 0.6803 1.6578
(13.3670) (12.5987) (12.6491) (14.4151) (9.3263) (4.8833) (4.9371) (10.4163)
NBRjlc -1.8781*** -1.8959*** -1.4007** -1.4476** -1.8551*** -1.8585*** -1.3573** -1.4161**
(0.5733) (0.5363) (0.6852) (0.6768) (0.5605) (0.5318) (0.6816) (0.6787)
γownjl 3.1130 4.0211** 4.5874*** 4.5334*** 3.0893 4.0232** 4.5957*** 4.5330***
(2.2776) (1.6497) (1.6943) (1.7084) (2.2599) (1.6476) (1.6902) (1.7028)
γhomejl × ∆jl -0.9726 0.8114 0.9123 0.9943 -0.8501 -0.5318 -0.4999 -0.3454






0.0728 0.1657 0.1789 0.1863 0.0411 0.1534 0.1647 0.1730







0.0965 0.0248 0.0190 0.0164 0.0847 0.0847 0.0824 0.0758










0.0020 0.0039 0.0042 0.0044 0.0008 0.0032 0.0034 0.0037
(0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0083) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0078)
γhomejl × djl -0.0314 0.0141 0.0133 0.0172 -0.0463 -0.0171 -0.0179 -0.0141




× djl -0.0067 -0.0042 -0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0062 -0.0032 -0.0041 -0.0039
(0.0195) (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0179)
γhomejl × γverticaljc 0.5491 0.7968 0.8108 0.7462 0.6931 0.3907 0.3509 0.4062




× γverticaljc -0.1250 0.4026 0.4117 0.4146 -0.1474 0.4391 0.4571 0.4470
(1.6832) (1.5302) (1.5263) (1.5242) (1.7097) (1.5496) (1.5453) (1.5438)





× tnpdt 0.0133 0.0114
(0.0397) (0.0398)









γhomejl × t−2npdt 0.4856 -0.0040
(0.3836) (0.1027)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)































× EIjt 0.0701*** 0.0764***
(0.0188) (0.0187)









Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4750 0.6064 0.6075 0.6092 0.4761 0.6056 0.6067 0.6083
27Notes for Table 21: Dependent variable is the delivered price pjltc. t is month, j is provider,
l is location, c is consumer. γoverlapjl is overlapping market; γ
home
jl is home market. γ
post
t is
posttretment. γverticaljc indicates vertical relation between provider and buyer. γ
own
jl indicates
presence of multiple nearby production facilities of the provider. ∆lj is a measure of relative
distance, and is multiplied by 0.1 before regression. NBRjlc is number of rivals. Ujt is capacity
utilization. EIjt is energy price index. djl is distance. t
−i
npdt refers to i
th lag of monthly demand
index. tnpdt refers to aggregate T activity around a given location over 18 months. Standard errors
are clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
28Notes for Table 23: Dependent variable is the delivered price pjltc. t is month, j is provider, l
is location, c is consumer. γoverlapjl is overlapping market. γ
pre
t is pretretment; γ
post
t is posttretment.
γverticaljc indicates vertical relation between provider and buyer. γ
own
jl indicates presence of multiple
nearby production facilities of the provider. ∆lj is a measure of relative distance, and is multiplied
by 0.1 before regression. NBRjlc is number of rivals. Ujt is capacity utilization. EIjt is energy
price index. djl is distance. t
−i
npdt refers to i
th lag of monthly demand index. tnpdt refers to
aggregate T activity around a given location over 18 months. Standard errors are clustered at
county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 22: Inference – DiD Variable, Home & Overlapping Market






−10.077 5 −10.066 3 −10.109 0 −9.033 4 −9.032 0 −9.042 8
Clustered s.e. 1.189 9 1.191 7 1.226 6 1.263 0 1.263 7 1.268 2
t-stat −8.469 1 −8.447 4 −8.241 5 −7.152 2 −7.147 6 −7.130 5
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 14.311 3 14.245 9 19.865 5 18.200 1 18.185 5 20.987 2
p-value, G∗A 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
Conley s.e. 0.994 9 1.003 2 0.993 2 0.943 2 0.949 4 0.939 6







−9.351 1 −9.336 4 −9.362 8 −7.826 2 −7.824 7 −7.865 1
Clustered s.e. 1.354 9 1.352 2 1.384 6 1.483 4 1.480 1 1.484 3
t-stat −6.901 8 −6.904 6 −6.762 0 −5.275 9 −5.286 7 −5.298 8
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 9.269 9 9.226 9 11.592 1 11.271 6 11.267 2 13.039 9
p-value, G∗A 0.000 1 0.000 1 0.000 0 0.000 2 0.000 2 0.000 1
Conley s.e. 0.945 0 0.954 6 0.950 2 0.952 9 0.962 1 0.970 2







−11.187 3 −11.182 6 −10.954 9 −8.665 3 −8.657 0 −8.407 4
Clustered s.e. 1.736 5 1.736 9 1.758 2 1.899 1 1.900 4 1.909 4
t-stat −6.442 4 −6.438 2 −6.230 8 −4.562 8 −4.555 5 −4.403 1
p-value 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
G∗A 8.616 2 8.607 5 8.839 0 9.539 0 9.501 9 10.266 5
p-value, G∗A 0.000 1 0.000 1 0.000 2 0.001 2 0.001 2 0.001 2
Conley s.e. 1.479 7 1.476 2 1.437 9 1.498 3 1.493 7 1.488 7
p-value, wild BS 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7 0.000 7
Notes: Each panel corresponds to different level of aggregation in data. In each panel the coefficient of interest is DiD indicator.
Second row is the CRVE standard errors; third and fourth rows are associated t-statistic and p-values. Fifth row provides G∗A,
feasible effective number of clusters of CSSL; sixth row provides associated p-value. Seventh row is Conley standard errors. Final
row is bootstrap p-values.
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Table 23: DiD – Allowing Parameter Inequality, Before and After Regime Switch28
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc pjltc
γpost × γoverlap
jl
-3.4937 -3.8657 -4.3878* -3.8571* -2.6539 -3.3884 -2.9930 -2.6245




-1.8398 0.5794 0.4348 -2.7226 -0.5251 -0.5888






0.3555 0.4576* 0.4658* 0.4896* 0.3427 0.4683* 0.4720* 0.4933**






0.1639 0.2116 0.2428 0.2534 0.1261 0.2108 0.1975 0.2117









0.0175** 0.0191*** 0.0193*** 0.0198*** 0.0176*** 0.0198*** 0.0199*** 0.0202***









-0.0017 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0008
(0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0064)
γ
post
t × djl -0.0064 0.0010 -0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0075 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0015
(0.0209) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0211) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0189)
γ
pre
t ×NBRjlt -1.2434* -1.0941* -0.5652 -1.1944 -1.2188* -1.0798* -0.5085 -1.1504
(0.6402) (0.6181) (0.7589) (0.7514) (0.6304) (0.6208) (0.7555) (0.7461)
γ
post
t ×NBRjlt -2.2473*** -2.3323*** -1.7754** -1.3125* -2.2708*** -2.3581*** -1.8001** -1.3269*
(0.6580) (0.6283) (0.7553) (0.7627) (0.6439) (0.6172) (0.7471) (0.7559)
γ
pre
t × γownjl 5.0800** 3.8212** 4.4103** 3.8236** 5.1031** 3.8138** 4.4443** 3.8494**
(2.5617) (1.7913) (1.8302) (1.8267) (2.5341) (1.7920) (1.8293) (1.8250)
γ
post
t × γownjl 2.3389 4.1455** 4.8055*** 5.2527*** 2.3320 4.1754** 4.8188*** 5.2688***
(2.3314) (1.7404) (1.7525) (1.7769) (2.3147) (1.7436) (1.7483) (1.7732)
γ
pre
t × djl -0.0045 -0.0080 -0.0086 -0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0080 -0.0093 -0.0062
(0.0212) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0211) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0202)
γ
post
t × γverticaljc -0.3441 0.9196 0.9206 0.8573 -0.3978 0.8806 0.8937 0.8329
(1.6835) (1.4549) (1.4361) (1.4240) (1.6985) (1.4609) (1.4469) (1.4344)
γ
pre
t × γverticaljc 0.3644 -0.4651 -0.4555 -0.3360 0.3559 -0.4597 -0.4689 -0.3453
(1.5313) (1.5180) (1.5288) (1.5173) (1.5246) (1.5124) (1.5264) (1.5155)
γ
post




























































Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4848 0.6096 0.6110 0.6163 0.4854 0.6096 0.6110 0.6164193
Table 24: Inference – DiD Variable, Before and After Regime Switch






−4.370 4 −4.387 8 −3.857 1 −2.950 8 −2.993 0 −2.624 5
Clustered s.e. 2.246 0 2.244 9 2.241 9 2.111 0 2.110 2 2.051 1
t-stat −1.945 9 −1.954 5 −1.720 5 −1.397 8 −1.418 3 −1.279 6
p-value 0.053 7 0.052 7 0.087 6 0.164 4 0.158 4 0.202 9
G∗A 15.257 7 15.014 1 17.579 3 16.515 1 15.964 9 17.465 5
p-value, G∗A 0.070 3 0.069 5 0.102 9 0.180 7 0.175 3 0.217 4
Conley s.e. 1.786 3 1.801 7 1.764 0 1.486 3 1.494 3 1.472 1







−4.426 5 −4.481 3 −4.465 1 −2.343 5 −2.439 8 −2.451 0
Clustered s.e. 2.594 0 2.596 9 2.582 2 2.402 5 2.402 8 2.352 7
t-stat −1.706 5 −1.725 7 −1.729 2 −0.975 4 −1.015 4 −1.041 8
p-value 0.090 2 0.086 7 0.086 0 0.331 1 0.311 7 0.299 4
G∗A 13.826 3 13.775 2 14.009 4 18.034 6 17.894 1 18.023 0
p-value, G∗A 0.110 3 0.106 8 0.105 7 0.342 3 0.323 4 0.311 3
Conley s.e. 1.615 6 1.617 3 1.605 0 1.528 3 1.523 1 1.522 7







−5.438 4 −5.389 0 −6.175 7 −0.503 1 −0.450 3 −0.890 9
Clustered s.e. 3.454 1 3.438 5 3.480 5 3.482 5 3.457 7 3.482 8
t-stat −1.574 5 −1.567 2 −1.774 4 −0.144 5 −0.130 2 −0.255 8
p-value 0.117 7 0.119 4 0.078 2 0.885 3 0.896 6 0.798 5
G∗A 10.830 2 10.846 7 10.846 3 9.981 2 9.951 6 9.959 5
p-value, G∗A 0.144 1 0.145 7 0.104 0 0.888 0 0.899 0 0.803 3
Conley s.e. 3.131 8 3.123 7 3.096 5 2.939 2 2.933 6 2.920 5
p-value, wild BS 0.128 0 0.129 4 0.084 7 0.906 3 0.917 0 0.811 6
Notes: Each panel corresponds to different level of aggregation in data. In each panel the coefficient of interest is DiD indicator.
Second row is the CRVE standard errors; third and fourth rows are associated t-statistic and p-values. Fifth row provides G∗A,
feasible effective number of clusters of CSSL; sixth row provides associated p-value. Seventh row is Conley standard errors. Final
row is bootstrap p-values.
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